China’s salami slicing operations
Four disturbing incidents occurred in the last two years, all of which destroyed critical global infrastructure. In each case, Chinese “civilian” maritime vessels were involved. China’s salami slicing operations are in full swing.
Incident 1. On Feb. 2, 2023, two undersea telecommunications cables were severed within six days of each other off Taiwan’s Matsu islands. It was discovered that a Chinese cargo vessel was sailing the area at the precise time of both incidents. The cables were severed by the vessel’s anchor, which was dragged on the seabed. On board were seven Chinese nationals.
Incident 2. On Oct. 8, 2023, the gas pipeline connecting Finland and Estonia was severed. A post-incident investigation by the Finnish authorities revealed that a Chinese vessel, the Newnew Polar Bear, crossed the area at the same moment the pipes were slashed. The pipes were ripped apart by the vessel’s anchor which was dragged across the seabed. The Chinese crew refused to cooperate with the investigators. Beijing denied accountability, claiming that the anchors were dropped due to a storm and then dragged by strong winds. Meteorological records showed no storm during the time.
Incident 3. On Nov. 17 and 18, 2024, two undersea fiberoptic communications cables were severed in the Baltic Sea: the C-Lion 1, a 1,200-kilometer cable connecting Helsinki to the German port of Rostock, and the Arelion, a submarine cable which connects Lithuania to the Swedish island of Gotland. Satellite images showed a Chinese civilian cargo vessel, the Yi Peng 31, sailing the area precisely when the cables were severed. The vessels slowed down significantly as it dragged its anchor on the seabed for some 100 nautical miles. The crew purposely switched off its transponder during the anchor drag. NATO vessels surrounded the Yi Peng 31 but the vessel raced to international waters where internal law prevents local authorities from boarding the ship. A month-long stand off ensued.
Beijing refused to cooperate in the Swedish-led investigation. Instead, the Chinese conducted its own investigation and declared the incident a mere “accident.” In an effort to show transparency, four token observers from the EU were allowed to witness the investigation. It was a sham. The four had no say in the final verdict.
Incident 4. On Jan. 5, 2025, a Chinese vessel was identified as having severed the telecom cables connecting East Asia to the US West Coast. It did so by dragging its anchor on the seabed north of Keelung, Taiwan. The ship, owned by a Hong Kong company, Jie Yang Trading Limited, originally sailed under China’s flag but changed its registry in 2024 to one from Cameroon (as Shunxin-39) and another in Tanzania (as Xinshun-39). According to the Taiwan Coast Guard, the vessel’s crew were entirely made up of Chinese nationals.
Tracking data showed the vessel crossing the site where undersea cables were situated in northern Taiwan. It carried two sets of automatic identification systems (AIS). Both were switched off shortly before the cables were severed.
One mission, varying objective
Beijing takes no responsibility for the incidents and maintains that they were all accidents.
Tsai Jung-hsiang of the National Chung Cheng University in Taiwan vehemently disagrees with Beijing’s narrative. Neither do other maritime authorities. The Taiwanese professor correctly reasoned that the deployment of vessels for the same mission (to destroy undersea infrastructure), using the same method and perpetuated by the same country, is too much of a coincidence. He believes the missions were carefully planned to fulfill varied objectives.
The objectives for the incident affecting Sweden was multi-layered. They are: to test how NATO would react, given that Sweden is the alliance’s newest member; to cause economic instability by disrupting internet and communication services between EU countries; to send a signal that China has both the capability and political will to cause damage and chaos; to cause NATO countries to focus on internal security rather than broader geopolitical strategies.
The incident that affected Finland and Estonia were done in aid of Russia. Its objectives too were multi-layered. They are: to disrupt energy security of the EU; to test NATO’s response – its readiness, tolerance, methods, level of unity and sanctions it will take; to pile up costs for EU nations who are already grappling with the cost to support Ukraine.
The incidents in Taiwan serve a different purpose. First, it is China’s rehearsal for a blockade. Second is to apply psychological pressure on Taiwan, to break their will, undermine their confidence and keep them on edge. It also serves as a warning to Taiwan’s allies, demonstrating the risks of coming to Taiwan’s defense.
Salami slicing strategy
In the context of warfare, a salami slicing strategy refers to a tactic where an aggressor achieves its objectives through a series of small, incremental actions which, taken individually, avoids crossing red lines and provoking a significant response. Taken collectively, however, they result to a strategic advantage.
The strategy exploits the ambiguity of the situation where actions could be written off as an accident or coincidence. It gives the perpetrator plausible deniability.
China’s track record shows that it will continue to deploy its salami slicing operations until there is pushback from victims.
Experts agree that victim countries should apply the same gray zone tactics towards China, whenever possible, as an act of deterrence. In addition, China should be made to pay a steep cost for its rogue tactics by way of stiff economic sanctions and legal repercussions.
Peaceful nations must realize that we exist with a communist nation which has every intention of sowing global havoc and instability in its pursuit of hegemony. That said, nations must brace themselves by way of infrastructure resilience, diversification of supply chains and civil society preparedness.
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