Mercenaries and the people’s military - CHASING THE WIND by Felipe B. Miranda

The military in Marcos’ time confused its commander-in chief for its ultimate constituency and therefore lost its claim to being a democratic institution. The wily Marcos, knowing well that his kleptocratic rule needed the forceful arm of the military, showered the military with whatever currency attract its corruptible leaders – cash, real property, women and position.

Of course, relative to its plundering civilian counterpart, the military’s share of the spoils was much depreciated. No military official accumulated over a billion dollars in the shade. No one – whatever his political position and however many stars adorned his shoulder board – dared cross Marcos in full daylight. And at night, the military’s mistresses sorely lacked the polish and sophistication of those ladies who serviced exclusively civilian patrons.

Far too many mercenaries wore a military uniform then and when the original EDSA finally struck, those who would have a people‘s military understood the need to reformat the corrupted institution and its notoriously bad sectors. For a little while after February 1986, there was repeated reference to a New AFP.

Over the next 14 years, the AFP slowly tried to refocus on depoliticization, professionalism and modernization. Liberally assessed, its efforts in this direction may be considered as slowly succeeding, and thus the military appeared to be taking the right turn as it reached its millenial crossroad to democratization.

By the end of 2000, the AFP was highly regarded by the public, running well ahead of other government agencies in terms of public approval and suffering no crisis in public trust due to its perceived success in handling rebel threats to public order. Between March and July 2000, the military’s prestige improved tremendously as it took on the well-entrenched MILF in Muslim Mindanao.

Since EDSA II, however, the military’s high visibility has not inspired people to view it in a preferred democratic perspective. Even as it assisted in toppling an administration which many Filipinos believed to be corrupt, the military’s clear involvement in power sharing within the Arroyo administration and the publicization of power struggles within the AFP made people suspect that military politicization had somehow revived with a vengeance.

Far too many military men, retired as well as active, have assumed sensitive civilian positions in a nation which does not suffer from a dearth of qualified civilian candidates. From the National Security Council to the Executive Secretary to the Department of Defense down to a host of other politically critical agencies, military presence is readily detectible in the Arroyo administration. The administration’s own calendar of activities prominently project its deep concern and involvement with the military. Careless executive language even makes it appear that some government postings are for the taking, depending on the particular pleasure of some military officer.

Within the military, the manner through which traditionally internal affairs became much publicized media issues – such as the intense in-fighting for the Chief-of Staff position and the forced resignation of Navy Flag Officer-in Command Wong – does not speak well for an institution whose primary virtues should include discretion, confidentiality and internal issue resolution. Media outreach and deliberate news leakages, Malacanan connections and "bulong" campaigns are not the best modalities for producing meritorious appointments and promotions within the military.

On the contrary, such means are indicative of self-serving strategies by those whose character does not comprehend the virtues of their institution – courage, integrity, honor and patriotism – and whose professional track record often shows a lack of merit for whatever specific positions is at issue. These candidates may wear uniforms, but they do not properly belong to a military of the people. They are properly mercenaries, up for the highest bidders, whatever appropriately hard currency might be used to impress them into transactional service.

An administration that surrounds itself with too many military men may be sending the wrong signals to its ultimate constituency, the people. It could be perceived as being unsure of its own political legitimacy and must perforce rely on the military to keep it in power. Thus, it buys off the support of the armed forces, whatever the democratic cost of their politicization might be.

Or else, the administration may be publicly viewed as merely the military’s surrogate, acting only insofar as it is allowed to act by those who already control the governance of the country. In such a situation, one who knows his political realities and applies the precise vocabulary will refuse to speak of a democracy. Presuming to know his nation’s political history, that person may also note that this unfortunate country has had more than its fair share of shadow governments in the last 100 years.