Salesman

At the Shangri-la Dialogue held in Singapore last week, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth called on the Asia-Pacific nations to raise their defense spending to five percent of GDP. This is the same rate of spending of NATO member-countries at the moment in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Hegseth’s remarks must have invited quizzical looks from the Asian defense officials gathered for this security dialogue. Most of the nations in this region have a different appreciation of the security situation in the region.
Hegseth rhetorically asked his colleagues: “How can it make sense for countries in Europe to do that (raise military spending to five percent of GDP) while allies and partners in Asia spend far less in the face of a far more formidable threat from communist China, not to mention North Korea?”
He speaks from his rabbit hole. Most of the Asia-Pacific nations do not think a regional arms race is the proper response to simmering territorial disputes in this part of the world. These disputes include China’s claim on Taiwan and on a large swathe of the South China Sea. Most view the Taiwan question as internal to China and most believe a sustainable arrangement could be worked out for the overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea.
Despite huge investments in upgrading its navy and air force, China officially pegs its defense spending at 1.5 percent of GDP. Singapore caps its defense spending at three percent over the next decade. None of the Asia-Pacific countries spend anything close to the five percent of GDP Hegseth wants them to spend.
Instead of indulging in a regional arms race, most of the Asia-Pacific countries (with the possible exception of the Philippines) would rather promote trade and investment relations with China. It is a strategic preference that works better for the populations of these countries. It promotes investments and raises standards of living.
Besides, there is no standing institutional framework in the region that might orchestrate defense spending in the same way NATO does for western Europe. NATO’s equivalent in the region, instigated by the US during the depths of the Cold War, was the short-lived Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) that ran counter to the region’s desire to have an independent foreign policy.
The ASEAN is not a security arrangement. It is more akin to the European Union: a mechanism for enhanced regional economic cooperation. Its most remarkable achievement is the formation of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) that enables the region’s economies to better withstand the vagaries of the global economy.
Hegseth is better seen as a salesman for the American military-industrial complex. He wants Asian countries to buy costly US war equipment at the cost of promoting human development in the region.
Turf
House Deputy Speaker Duke Frasco refused to sign a declaration of support for the retention as Speaker of Martin Romualdez. That declaration is being circulated to preempt any effort to replace Romualdez.
The response to Duke Frasco’s refusal to sign was swift and brutal. He was purged from the National Unity Party and will likely be stripped of his post if Romualdez wins his retention bid.
There is more happening here than is readily evident.
With the resounding defeat of Gwen Garcia in the recent contest for Cebu governor, the dynasty she represents has been weakened. The entire province is now open to rival dynastic interests.
Duke Frasco is married to Gwen’s daughter, the recently retained Tourism secretary. Both the Frascos and the Garcias built a political bailiwick in Liloan and Compostela towns – especially during the Duterte years. Gwen eventually switched and supported President BBM. That proved to be a factor in her recent defeat.
It turns out, Yedda Romualdez, wife of Martin and granddaughter of the legendary labor leader Democrito Mendoza Sr., might have an interest in Cebu politics. Some say she transferred her voter registration to her ancestral hometown of Liloan. The rumor in the locality is that she is preparing either to challenge Duke’s brother for mayor of Liloan town or, should the opportunity present itself, seek the post of provincial governor in the next electoral cycle. Yedda denies interest in Cebu politics.
If she does that, she will expand Martin’s sphere of influence, extending it from Leyte to Cebu. This is important turf in the forthcoming presidential contest.
There is, to be sure, more to Duke Frasco’s refusal to sign the declaration of support for Martin Romualdez. The Garcia-Frasco dynasty is under clear and present danger.
Little wonder that Martin Romualdez takes more than minor offense at this refusal. Duke Frasco, defending his dynasty’s survival, resists the expansion of the Romualdez political machine.
All politics is local. In this apparent contest between a declining dynasty and a reviving one, the cracks and fissures in the administration’s “supermajority” appear – especially after Toby Tiangco so openly blamed the administration’s electoral fiasco on Martin Romualdez. The emerging local rivalries could blossom into major challenges as the major alliances prepare for the all-important 2028 presidential contest.
A single spark could start a prairie fire. When local power brokers like Frasco begin rethinking their political alignments, the much-vaunted “supermajority” might not hold. It is, after all, a “supermajority” led by lame ducks.
Recall, too, that it was Frasco who admitted to promises of project funding in exchange for congressional signatures supporting Sara Duterte’s impeachment.
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