Final act

Donations take effect either immediately upon their execution and during the lifetime of the donors (donation inter vivos) or upon their death (mortis causa). In this case of the spouses Leo and Lupe, their donation was denominated as donation mortis causa, yet it was considered as donation inter vivos. Let us find out why.

The document here entitled “Donation Mortis Causa” was executed on August 27, 1968 by Leo and Lupe in favor of their two children, Ana and Lino, and their granddaughter Risa, daughter of their predeceased son Tino covering their 126 square meter house and lot, a portion of which was already being occupied by Risa and Lino. The donation was in equal shares and reads as follows:

“That this donation mortis causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse;

“That Risa and Lino will continue to occupy the portions now occupied by them;

“That this donation mortis causa shall not in any way affect any other distribution of other properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate or intestate and wherever situated;

“That anyone surviving spouse reserves the right, ownership, possession and administration of the property herein donated and accepted and this Disposition and Donation shall be operative and effective upon the death of the donors.”

Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the Deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named donees, however, signified their acceptance of the donation in the face of the instrument.

In September 1968, Lupe the donor-wife died. A few months later or on December 19, 1968, Leo the donor-husband executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in the subject property to their donee-daughter, Ana. Four years later or in June 1972, Leo also died.

In 1998, Risa, the granddaughter-donee, filed a “petition for the probate of the August 27, 1968 deed of donation mortis causa” before the regional Trial Court. Ana opposed the petition on the ground that his late father Leo had already assigned the property to her.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision finding that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos because Leo and Lupe’s intention was to transfer title over the property to the donees Ana, Lino and Risa during their lifetime, given its irrevocability. Consequently, the RTC said that Leo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interest in the property in favor of Ana was void since he had nothing more to assign. Thus the RTC directed the registration of the property in the name of the donees in equal shares. Was the RTC correct?

Yes. If a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donors style it as mortis causa. The express “irrevocability” of the donation is the distinct standard that identifies the document as donation inter vivos. Here, the donors plainly said that “this donation mortis causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse”. The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes clearer by a proviso that the surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos.

It is true that the donors in this case reserved the “right, ownership, possession and administration of the property” and made the donation operative upon their death. But such reservation, in the context of an irrevocable donation, simply means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they live.

Notably, the three donees signified their acceptance of the donation as the deed required. This acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donation. Donation mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donees during the donors’ lifetime.

So the donation in this case was immediately operative and final. It is deemed perfected from the moment the donors learned of the donees’ acceptance of the donation. This acceptance makes the donees the absolute owner of the property donated. Consequently Leo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Ana should be regarded as void for, by then, he had no more right to assign (Del Rosario vs. Ferrer, G.R. 187056, September 20, 2010, 630 SCRA 683).

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