Difficulty, not incapacity

Psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground to declare a marriage void, is more than just “difficulty”, “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Acts violating marital covenants like infidelity do not show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity to perform the basic obligations of marriage. This is the ruling reiterated in this case of Mon and Mona.

Mon met Mona sometime in 1977 while they were students of nearby schools. Since then, Mon courted Mona and five months later they became sweethearts. While Mona subsequently left for Japan to study Japanese culture, literature and language, and even taught in a university there, their communications with each other still continued.

So in 1982, after Mona returned from Japan, the sweethearts decided to tie the knot in a civil ceremony and later affirmed in a church rite. Since their marriage, they showed contentment and love for each other and begot two children. Mona took care of the children and even joined sales activities to augment family income. She traveled a lot and pursued studies abroad but remained faithful to Mon.

However, after eight years of harmonious relationship, their marriage started to fail when Mona discovered that Mon was having an affair with her own cousin Naty. He even brought the latter to their conjugal home after sending Mona to Japan to resume her teaching position. Eventually, Mon left the conjugal home sometime in 1992 to live with Naty, leaving Mona who claimed custody of their children.

Their separation led to the filing of charges and countercharges. Mona filed a criminal case of concubinage and an administrative case against Mon. On March 7, 1995, Mon in turn filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Mon claimed that their marriage was “tumultuous”. He described Mona as domineering who frequently humiliated him before his friends, a spendthrift who overspent the family budget and who made crucial family decisions without consulting him. Mon added that Mona was tactless, suspicious and given to nagging and jealousy as shown by her filing of the criminal and administrative case against him.

During the trial, a psychiatrist was presented as expert witness who found both Mon and Mona to harbor psychological handicaps which could be traced to their unhealthy maturational development because of strict, domineering, and disciplinarian parents; and which will hamper their capacity to comply with their marital obligation. He found Mona to be mistrustful, of low self-esteem, given to having shallow heterosexual relationships and immature. Mon on the other hand was found to be egoistic who projects himself as dominant person and craves for adulation, reassurance and attention to cover his deep seated insecurity and inadequacy.

On May 31, 2000, the RTC found both Mon and Mona psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage and thus declared it null and void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Was the RTC correct?

No. Psychological incapacity required by Article 36 must be (1) grave or serious such that the parties would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties of marriage; (2) rooted in the history of the parties antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestation may emerge only after marriage; and (3) incurable or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the parties involved.

In this case, the psychological examination failed to reveal that these personality traits or psychological conditions were grave or serious enough to bring about incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed the psychiatrist was able to establish the parties’ personality disorders. But he failed to link them to his conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated to perform their obligations as husband and wife. Their personality disorders would not render them unaware of the essential marital obligation or to be in-cognitive of the basic marital covenants. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper their performance of their marital obligations does not mean that they suffer psychological incapacity as contemplated by Article 36. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity. 

The claimed incapacity is not likewise incurable and permanent. Even assuming their acts violate the covenants of marriage, such acts do not show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which will prevent them from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future. At most the psychiatric evaluation of the parties proved only incompatibility and irreconcilable differences which cannot be equated with psychological incapacity (Aspillaga vs. Aspillaga, G.R. 170925, October 25, 2009).

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