Flexible

The Constitution guarantees the right of the accused in all criminal cases to a speedy trial (Section 14 [2] and 16 Article II). So in 1998, Congress enacted R.A. 8493 providing for time limits within which an accused must be arraigned (30 days from filing of Information) and brought to trial (30 days after arraignment). But for the first 12 months following the effectivity of SC Circular 38-08 implementing said R.A. on September 15, 1998, the time limit from arraignment to trial may be extended 180 days; for the next 12 months, 120 days; and for the third 12 months, 80 days. This is the right which Rico tried to invoke in his case; but was not given to him. Let us find out why.

Rico was indicted for the crime of Grave Coercion in an Information dated June 28, 2002. After he posted bail and was released, his arraignment was set on February 12, 2003. While he had a pending petition before the DOJ for review of the City Fiscal’s resolution finding probable cause to charge him for Grave Coercion, the Judge still proceeded with his arraignment on February 12, 2003 wherein he pleaded not guilty.

After arraignment, pre-trial of his case was set on May 28, 2003. But due to the occurrence of Typhoon “Chedeng” his pre-trial was re-set to October 23, 2003. Neither Rico nor his counsel however appeared on October 23, 2003 because they were not properly notified. Hence, while a warrant was already issued for his arrest, it was recalled on discovery of such lack of notice. Instead pre-trial was just reset to January 21, 2004.

Before the scheduled pre-trial, however, Rico filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information pursuant to Rule 119 Section 6 of the Rules of Court, on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial because he was not — without his fault — brought to trial within 80 days from the date he was arraigned. He drew attention to the time gap of 105 days from his arraignment on February 12, 2003 up to the first pre-trial setting on May 23, 2003 and another gap of 148 days from the latter date up to the second pre-trial setting on October 23, 2003 or a total of 253 days — a clear contravention, according to him, of the 80-day limit. Was Rico correct?

No. In spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept of “speedy trial” is a relative term and necessarily involves a degree of flexibility. The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of his case was designed to prevent the oppression of a citizen because of criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the court to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.

The essential ingredient is order, expeditiousness and not mere speed. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. In determining whether the accused has been deprived of these rights, four factors must be considered: (a) the length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his rights; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.

In this case the causes for the postponements and delays are not unreasonable. While neither Rico nor his counsel was notified of the resetting of the pre-trial to October 23, 2003, the same appears to have been occasioned by oversight or simple negligence which, standing alone is not fatal to the prosecution. The faus pax was acknowledged and corrected when the MeTC recalled the warrant of arrest against Rico.

A delicate balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial on the one hand, and the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals must be maintained. Applying this balancing test and taking into account the four factors above enumerated, it cannot be said that Rico has been unduly and excessively prejudiced by the delay in the proceedings especially given that he had posted bail (Olbes vs. Buemio et. al. G.R. 173319, December 4, 2009).

With this kind of ruling, the Speedy Trial Act (R.A. 8493) seems to be not as effective. Indeed our Jails are still congested with detention prisoners whose cases have been pending trial for years. The “Justice on Wheels” adopted by the Supreme Court seems to be more useful.

 Note: Books containing compilation of my articles on Labor Law and Criminal Law (Vols. I and II) are now available. Call tel. 7249445.

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