Backlash from failed peace talks

There's no need for the reminder of Amnesty International about the aftermath of the aborted Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the RP and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The estimate of 370T still displaced from the initial 610T who had fled with shattered lives from the failed peace talks is but an under-estimate.

 Other than the troop casualties in pocket skirmishes, many civilians lost their lives, properties and livelihood. Deprived of peace, security, peace of mind, and piece of their home turf.

 Since the breakdown of negotiations following posthaste opposition by affected LGUs, the killings, looting, burning of houses and human rights abuses, are beyond accurate telling.

 Another backlash is the revival of armed civilians, like the "Ilaga" and other vigilantes, once the feared nemeses of Muslims in central and northern Mindanao.

While the AFP is openly opposed to armed civvies to battle MILF renegades, it may not be too keen in clamping them down. Perhaps, the "Ilaga" and other groups are more effective in guerrilla warfare than the military because of terrain familiarity. The homegrown militias are more bent to protect their loved ones and their homes.

Of far-reaching aftermath are the conflicting versions of the President's actual role on the MOA-AD. Either theory advanced by peace talks adviser Gen. Esperon, or that by press secretary Jesus Dureza, is not pleasing, or complimentary to GMA.

Esperon was categorical that GMA had read the MOA-AD in its final form for signing by both panels. It meant she knew its provisions including the many barangays ceded to the MILF without prior consultation, the autonomous governmental powers conferred, the internal and external sovereignty it has to exercise, etc. which confer self-autonomous status, if not outright an independent seceding state to the Bangsamoro Juridical pretender.

Secretary Dureza was just as certain in belying Gen. Esperon's statements; since GMA "merely had an idea of the general thrust of the proposed MOA-AD… because the President only gives strategic decisions on matters that would require her intervention, if necessary". He insisted that GMA had been "aware of the general thrusts, such that, she had insisted that the legal frameworks and processes had to be observed". GMA allegedly further stressed that the MOA provided no MILF right to secede.

Both Palace subalterns are at loggerheads on GMA's stand on the MOA-AD. Whichever is the truth places GMA in indefensible position as leader of the state. Either is vulnerable to condemnation and, even bordering on culpable violation of the Constitution and/or impeachable betrayal of public trust, if not treason.

In Esperon's version that GMA had read the MOA-AD in its final form is self-condemning. It's because despite the grave constitutional infirmities on secession of territory, exercise of sovereignty and governmental authority as to confer the MILF the status of sovereign state, etc., it placed GMA as shirking her duty and responsibility.

In Dureza's contra-opinion cutting down Esperon, still GMA turns out inept as a leader. Imagine, knowing the general thrust of the MOA-AD to expand the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity under such arrangements all disadvantageous, if not perfidious, to the Philippine state, and yet, tolerating its eventual signing, if not for the Supreme Court TRO!

In the first place, why trust a military panel for a strictly constitutional, legal, and diplomatic matter of national interest? Secondly, why make the MOA-AD under secrecy for four years under negotiations? Thirdly, why did not the administration assert its rightful position of strength as representative of the sovereign state? Finally, why did the prime movers overlook so many vital factors, including the backlash from both sides?

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