Naïve

Mike Velarde has established himself quite impressively in the firmament of our politics: friend of the powerful, broker of votes, patron of the ambitious and, recently, purveyor of discreet messages between irreconcilable factions.

It now turns out that, over the recent past, he intermediated between President Gloria and former president Erap. The objective: to find mutually acceptable means to bury the old hatchet and achieve reconciliation of sorts.

The man who speaks in riddles, who runs a ministry kept together by personal charisma rather than by theological rigor and who regularly entertained politicians on the same stage where he professes to preach is probably fit for the job of conciliator. He can be intimate with the main personalities of our troubled politics, whisper things into their ears, proffer some advice backed up with some degree of stature and impress them with the large crowds he gathers for his weekly festivals of faith.

His intimacy with the main personalities of our troubled politics is an asset for conciliation in this particularly troubled period. He could ease the tensions, bridge the river of suspicion that runs between the contending factions. He could probably help forge unexpected and unconventional resolutions.

There are, however, unspoken rules for the job he found himself doing. The first of those rules is discretion.

He is an intermediary of mutual trust. To be successful in his job, he must keep confidences. His effectiveness at performing his unique function rests on his capacity to keep secrets. The moment he blabbers, his utility quickly evaporates.

When Velarde spoke publicly of the role he played in the subtle negotiations between the sitting president and the former one, he blew it.

There are unspoken parameters for the job he undertook. The most important one is that he remains simply a messenger between the two parties and not an architect of a probable political arrangement, not a statesman re-imagining the political configuration on his own and not a theorist re-inventing the postulates of our political order.

Velarde did not seem to appreciate those parameters and appears to have been overwhelmed by his own measure of his importance, his own measure of his wisdom.

And so it was that he did more than transmit signals between the camps. He tried to peddle his own quaint and naïve theory of how things should be.

He overstepped his role. He overplayed his card. In so doing, he undermined his own role in a discreet game of political flirtation.

A go-between brokering a potential affair between two lovers is not expected to give both parties lessons on the Kama Sutra.

Velarde’s theory of how things should be is of the same quality as the "wisdom" he imparts his loyal flock.

He thinks reconciliation is merely a matter of how the pie is cut. It is driven by self-interest rather than by a principled understanding of what the nation needs. In which case, reconciliation becomes conspiracy.

And so he proposes that since the pro-Gloria forces enjoy a majority in Congress, the pro-Erap forces should be allowed a majority in the Cabinet. I will try to be very polite and say that this proposal is, well, uh, a bit disconcerting.

In one simplistic blow, Velarde wipes off the slate certain important concepts in the theory of democratic government: legitimacy, accountability, leadership, ideology, program of government, popular mandate, party rule, the executive branch as a management team. Government becomes nothing more than a pie cut in a certain way to please all those who want a piece of it. Governance becomes nothing more than the craft of appeasement.

In Velarde’s mind, political peace is something that could be bought by allowing all factions a share of the action or a share of the loot.

This is a terribly banal way of looking at the business of governance, a naive way of looking at the duties of presidential leadership. It is not benefited by a proper appreciation of the dimensions of statesmanship required to properly lead the nation.

Velarde’s banal view of politics reflects the banality of his views of doctrine and orthodoxy, the banality of his religious ceremony.

Velarde dropped the ball. He flubbed the delicate – and potentially important – role he was assigned to play.

He did so because his ego could not be contained. His ego could not accept the fact that his role in this delicate political flirtation was simply that of a messenger. Or a pimp, if we wish to be blunt.

His ego must have protested loudly: How could a great religious leader be simply a messenger?

And so it has happened: Velarde completely confused the role of messenger with that of prophet. He could not be content with quietly delivering the signals between two expectant camps. He just had to interject his own quaint vision of our political salvation.

That is how things fall apart. That is how this fiasco comes to pass.

In the aftermath of this failed reconciliation project, we are left with an inkling of distasteful testimony. How did it come about that Velarde became the channel of negotiation between two important political camps?

If the choice of intermediary is naïve, wasn’t the entire project naïve? If the choice of conciliator was banal, doesn’t this suggest to us that the agenda of both sides in this delicate political flirtation banal as well?

There are statesmen and there are charlatans. I think the real crisis of our politics is that we have fallen into a condition where we can no longer distinguish between the two.

Unless we quickly recover the ability to make that important distinction, I fear we cannot resurrect our politics from the level of the burlesque.