Terminated without prejudice

The general rule is that dismissal of a criminal case resulting in the acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy thus allowing its revival. But are there instances when the criminal case dismissed with the accused’s consent may amount to double jeopardy as to prevent its revival? This is answered in this case of Benny.

Benny was one of the accused in a criminal information for estafa through falsification of public document filed on October 22, 1992 by a bank. After arraignment on March 18,1994, pre-trial was held and terminated on October 21,1994.Continuous trial was scheduled for December, 1994 and January February, 1995, but the hearings were cancelled because the Presiding Judge of the branch was promoted and no trial judge was immediately detailed thereto.

When finally the case was set for trial, it was postponed three times. The first and third postponements on June 21,1995 and July 24,1995 respectively were due to lack of proof of notice to all the accused and their counsel. The second postponement on July 17,1995 was upon request of the private prosecutor and without objection on the part of Benny’s counsel.

However, at the rescheduled hearing on September 8,1995, the private prosecutor failed to appear again due to severe attack of gout and arthritis although he had sent his associate lawyer. This time Benny’s lawyer already moved that the case against him be dismissed for failure to prosecute and considering that he is entitled to a speedy trial. The trial court granted said motion and dismissed the case against Benny.

However, a month later or on October 25,1995, upon motion of the private prosecutor, and after a closer analysis of the chronology of hearings and the reasons for postponements, the trial court realized that the dates of hearings were transferred for valid grounds, and there was no "unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive" delay in the trial. Hence the trial court set aside its initial order and reinstated the cases against Benny.

Benny questioned this order of the trial court before the Court of Appeals (CA) as a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. He argued that this reversal was a violation of the doctrine of double jeopardy as the criminal cases were initially dismissed for an alleged violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The CA however sustained the trial court and ruled that there was indeed no "unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive" delay in the trial as there were no unjustified postponements which had prolonged the trial for unreasonable lengths of time. So Benny’s right to a speedy trial had not been violated.

Were the trial court and the CA correct?

Yes.

The order of dismissal in this case was made at the instance of the accused (Benny) before the trial court and therefore with his express consent. Such kind of dismissal will not place the accused in double jeopardy unless the same is due to (1) insufficiency of evidence or (2) would result in denial of the right to speedy trial because the proceedings had been prolonged unreasonably.

In the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Both the trial court and the CA observed that the delay in the trial in this case was due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties and of the trial court. There were no unjustified postponements which had prolonged the trial for unreasonable lengths of time. There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings and no postponements unjustifiably sought, Benny’s right to a speedy trial had not been infringed. Since the right of Benny to a speedy trial has not been violated by the State, he cannot invoke the doctrine of double jeopardy. Where there is no transgression of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the reconsideration of the trial court’s initial order of dismissal upon the express consent of the accused does not result in double jeopardy (Almario vs. Tuason, Jr. et al. G.R. 127772. March 22,2001).

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