Presidential Rubicons

Philippine presidents have not compiled a good record on confronting their Rubicons, those historic turning points which could so decisively serve the long- term interests of their nation. Marcos, in undermining the integrity of the 1969 elections and subverting the avowed objectives of his martial law administration for over a decade, not only plundered his nation but aborted its developmental momentum at a most critical time.

Comprehensive agrarian reform was the Rubicon of the Aquino administration. Despite earning an excellent place in Philippine history for serving as the focal point in the struggle against Marcos dictatorship, President Aquino was unable to irreversibly break up the landed interests and their aggressively influential elites. In failing to address this issue frontally, the Philippines missed out on a developmental sine qua non for agrarian-based, Third World countries – genuine and, therefore, practically radical changes in the structure and control of the nation’s agricultural production.

The Ramos administration, on the other hand, could not quite "level the playing field" for genuine entrepreneurship to take root and be sustainable in the country. Despite President Ramos’ commendable efforts in trying to open up the country’s industrial sector and enhance its global competitiveness, rent-seeking behavior for many pseudo-entrepreneurs continued. Even Marcos-cronies who were charged judicially for their nefarious activities managed to delay the timely administration of justice and eventually metamorphosed into – incredibly – purportedly loyal and civic-minded citizens of the Republic. In the new, emerging "tiger" economy that the Philippines was supposed to be during the Ramos dispensation, many prominent personalities did change their stripes, from what properly would have been penal orange to an impressive range of colors even the rainbow might have envied.

President Estrada’s Rubicon was perhaps the most regrettable of all. With a phenomenal level of public support catapulting him into the presidency, he could have demonstrated that a populist leader need not fail as a leader of his country. With his charismatic appeal, the much elusive unification of the nation could have taken place during his term. The vast majority of the public would have supported him as he is identified to be one with them and caring for them. (Perception is the controlling reality in politics and whether the public was right or wrong about him is beside the point. They trusted and supported him.) The minority, particularly the historically aggressive, rent-seeking elites among them, could have been forced politically into becoming more responsible or at least significantly less self-serving. That the Estrada administration could not last more than two years is proof of its inability to appreciate the nature of political crises and its gross mismanagement of even a crisis involving its very political survival.

In being derelict in using the public trust to govern the country effectively, the Estrada administration has contributed to greater public cynicism for leaders presumably coming from even their own, common-tao ranks. While the public – mostly poor – had been hopeful that someone of their kind would definitely serve them well, their experience of the Estrada administration had beggared them of this desperate, messianic hope. In this terrible sense, the poor had suffered further impoverishment as President Estrada failed to finish his term and left an impression of being – to say the least – an incompetent administrator.

The present Arroyo administration appears to believe that its Rubicon might well be the issue of terrorism and the collaborative arrangements it forges with the United States. The strong language this administrative employs in alluding to Filipinos disagreeing or suggesting caution with its preferred options may boomerang and politically weaken it. As of mid-December 2001, most Filipinos have a sense of terrorism and American responses to it that bespeak much sympathy for the United States. (About 64 percent of a nationally representative sample of 1,200 Filipinos 18 years old and above consider the American military retaliation against the Taliban to be just.) Nevertheless, when it comes to specific policies which the Philippine government must undertake, the overall sentiment of Filipinos cannot be described as hawkish and is better appreciated as being cautious. Closer collaboration with the UN rather than the US as the lead agency in the war against terrorism is recommended by four out of 10 members of the public. Another two in 10 advise a hands-off attitude, preferring a more neutral policy of non-involvement with either the US or the UN on terrorism. The remaining 4 in 10 would counsel providing a medical contingent to help Americans in any anti-terrorist action (16 percent), allowing the US and its forces to use Philippine ports, air and naval bases (15 percent) and volunteering Filipino soldiers to be used as combatants by the US in warring against the terrorists (16 percent).

It is significant that public approval for President Arroyo remains anywhere between a fairly high 49 percent up to as much as 69 percent among people recommending any of the options cited above. What this means is that the issue of terrorism and military collaboration with the United States is not a make-or-break issue for the Arroyo administration yet. At least not with Filipinos as of December 2001. Regardless of their preferred options on the management of terrorism by the Philippine government in collaboration with the American military authorities, a good majority of Filipinos (from 57 percent to 69 percent) approves of the Arroyo presidency.

Even among those who would advise non-involvement or neutrality, the president gains a 57 percent approval rating. It would be ridiculous to describe these people as largely communists, unpatriotic or Abu Sayyaf-lovers. If one’s vocabulary is to be true to the data even as it is guided by an overwhelming sense of Valentine, the only way to describe these people is that they are largely dedicated presidential lovers. Incidentally, the higher one’s IQ is, the more one appreciates non-partisan data. President Arroyo should have no problem with these figures, but her speechwriters might have to be less dramatic in their sound-byte-oriented either/ors.

A Rubicon must be crossed properly and decisively where it exists. Presidents who fail to recognize their Rubicon obviously do not do well historically. Those who cross it unjudiciously suffer similarly. There may be presidents, however, who rush to earn their place in history and force a Rubicon on their people unnecessarily. Such presidents probably would not do well either.