Manila and Tokyo are right to double down on ties

Japan’s decision to overhaul laws on the sale of weapons in April was welcomed warmly in Manila. The Department of National Defense can now purchase lethal weapons from Japanese firms, like warships, drones and missiles. Before, arms exports were strictly limited to non-lethal equipment.

The reforms were followed by Japan’s Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi’s recent visit to Manila. He met with Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr., in very amicable scenes, to discuss the transfer of Japanese defense equipment and the implementation of the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA).

Domestic politics aside, the Marcos administration has struck the right chord on foreign policy, particularly enlisting security partners, not least Japan, to ensure a balance-of-power in the Indo-Pacific in the face of China’s maritime expansion.

Three of the five countries that signed visiting forces agreements with the Philippines did so under the current administration, namely Canada, New Zealand, France and Japan. In particular, Japan is perhaps the most significant relationship apart from the US; Tokyo, after all, is Manila’s largest source of Official Development Assistance.

These “offshore balancers” help offset China’s asymetric advantage over the

Philippines, leveraging Manila’s strategic geography as a fulcrum for minilateral security arrangements, joint military training and ultimately power projection.

Tokyo is akin to a “natural ally,” having pioneered and long pushed for the concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” As a fellow archipelago, there is a broad alignment of threat perceptions and the preference for a rules-based international order.

In March, Beijing’s navy recklessly locked on to a Filipino vessel during a routine patrol. The move bears striking resemblance to another radar lock-on incident late last year by the Chinese military on a Japanese aircraft also conducting routine surveillance.

The risk mindset is also aligned: Tokyo and Manila prefer diplomacy over confrontation with China, but understand the need to have the ability to say “no” if interests diverge, to borrow words from Singaporean Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan. Both understand that peace is ultimately assured by local strength, not foreign goodwill.

The alignment extends to capability requirements for effective “archipelagic defense” that both countries share: precision-fire capabilities such as missiles, maritime and air defenses, and significant naval and air power capabilities. As a fellow state on the frontline of China, Japan also possesses extensive practical experience in dealing with Chinese provocations and provides significant funding support and equipment, including patrol vessels to the Philippine Coast Guard, making it a reliable and value-adding partner.

Japanese Defense Minister Koizumi has repeatedly stated that Japan and its regional allies are facing the most severe and complex security environment since World War II. Philippine Defense Secretary Teodoro has likewise underscored the increasingly intense and multi-domain aggression from China.

The Japanese government has, for the first time, allocated a defense budget exceeding nine trillion yen (about P3.4 trillion), with 11 percent of it dedicated to the introduction of stand-off missiles to enhance long-range strike capabilities. Meanwhile, the Marcos administration’s Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept also incorporates ranged strike capabilities with the Philippines’ BrahMos anti-ship missiles and the US’s Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), used in the 2026 Balikatan exercises, which Japan participated in.

Japan has begun procuring stand-off missiles from the US and Norway – intended for use only for counterattacks against enemy territory in the event of an attack – while also equipping its destroyers with Tomahawk launch capabilities and deploying domestically produced new guided munitions.

Most significantly, however, Japan’s revised rules allowing the export of offensive military equipment could benefit the Philippines, diversifying defense supply chains amid the twin stresses of high demand and low industrial supply capacity. Japan is also a key partner with a history of providing low-interest financing, which the Philippines needs.

Since the RAA took effect in 2025, the militaries of the Philippines and Japan have also enhanced joint training exercises as well as interoperability and capacity. Examples include a trilateral US-Philippines-Japan exercise in February and the Balikatan 2026, exercise, to which Japan sent 1,400 personnel.

Taken together, Japan’s revised weapons export rules and the Philippines-Japan RAA give “strategic flexibility” to Tokyo and Manila to project strength. For the Philippines, which faces intense pressure from China, bringing Japan – alongside the United States – into exercises conducted on Philippine soil demonstrates Manila’s growing “convening power” for likeminded states.

Manila and Tokyo are heeding calls for integrated and collective security, while continuing to keep channels open for dialogue.

It is perhaps appropriate that more than 70 years since the establishment of Japan-Philippines diplomatic relations, 70 percent of Filipinos view the relationship with Japan positively. For the future prosperity of the Indo-Pacific, this relationship must continue to flourish.

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Justin Baquisal is national security analyst at FACTS Asia and adviser at PSA Intelligence.