A narrow but real window for US-Iran diplomacy

This weekend, negotiators from the United States and Iran are expected to convene in Oman for their fourth round of nuclear talks. The two sides remain far apart on fundamental questions, their expectations diverge and time to make a deal is running out.

But for the first time in years, there is cause for optimism. What distinguishes this moment is not a sudden convergence of positions but a shared recognition that diplomacy is preferable to confrontation.

While Iran insists its nuclear program is strictly for civilian purposes (and US intelligence assesses that it’s not building a nuclear weapon), Tehran has significantly expanded its enrichment activities since Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018.

Today, Iran is a threshold nuclear state with enough 60 percent enriched uranium to produce six nuclear weapons (if enriched to 90 percent) and the ability to “dash to a bomb” in about six months (though weaponizing a device would probably take it one to two years). To much of the West, this status quo – and trajectory – is unacceptable.

Absent diplomatic progress by the end of June, the US will be compelled to trigger the snapback of UN sanctions, a step that would destroy what remains of the diplomatic track, prompt Iran to leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty and escalate the risk of military conflict. Trump, now in his second term, wants a comprehensive deal that exceeds the JCPOA – curtailing enrichment, restraining missile development and tightening Iran’s regional behavior.

But that’s a fantasy. Iran will not agree to a full rollback of its nuclear program, let alone dismantle its regional alliances, particularly not in the few weeks left before snapback looms. Nor will Tehran give up enrichment altogether or its ballistic missile capabilities, which it sees as central to its deterrence posture.

Yet even in this constrained environment, a diplomatic path remains open. Both sides have incentives to accept a more limited agreement to avoid military confrontation.

Trump, for all his fire and fury, has shown himself disinclined to start new wars. His recent removal of National Security Adviser Michael Waltz, whose hawkish stance on Iran clashed with Trump’s preferences, was telling. So was his announcement on May 6 of a cease-fire with Yemen’s Houthi rebels. Trump prefers a negotiated outcome, as do his Gulf allies. And he believes that with Iran weaker than it’s ever been, there’s never been a better time to get one.

With his administration’s efforts to broker a cease-fire in the Russia-Ukraine war faltering, the Iran file now offers his best – and perhaps only – chance for a major diplomatic win before the end of the year.

For its part, Iran initially rejected direct engagement, but hardliners ultimately approved indirect talks via Oman, with a willingness to engage in direct negotiations if progress was made. This shift in the regime’s position reflects Tehran’s recognition that continued economic and diplomatic isolation carries increasing costs. The Iranian government views sanctions relief as essential to reversing the slow collapse of the economy and containing risks to the regime of social unrest.

While Trump is regarded as a hostile actor, some within Iran’s elite believe his desire to secure diplomatic “wins” – and his reluctance to launch new wars – presents an opportunity to obtain reprieve without making major concessions. Though Tehran does not control the Houthis, it pushed for the cease-fire agreement with the US to help address a key US concern – Iran’s support for regional proxies – and improve the mood for nuclear talks.

The sticking point remains Iran’s enrichment capability. Tehran has rejected suggestions from Secretary of State Marco Rubio that Iran rely on imported uranium for its civilian nuclear program rather than enrich domestically. The Islamic Republic views enrichment as a non-negotiable sovereign right. But it remains open to a more limited deal – one that caps enrichment, ensures verification by the IAEA and provides credible assurances that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon.

Recent statements from the White House have also shown greater flexibility. Trump said on May 4 that his main goal is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, not to eliminate its civilian nuclear capacity. And Vice President JD Vance reiterated on May 7 that Iran “can have civil nuclear power” but not an enrichment program that brings it close to weapons capability. This distinction – between civilian use under strict limits and weaponization potential – could support a narrow agreement aimed at keeping diplomacy alive past the summer.

This isn’t Washington’s preferred outcome. Trump is notoriously impatient and will be skeptical of a deal that appears designed to string him along. But a comprehensive agreement between parties that deeply mistrust each other cannot be negotiated in two and a half months. After threatening to bomb Iran if talks fail, a more modest deal is the only viable alternative to military confrontation. Trump has always shown a remarkable willingness to shift from maximalist positions as long as he can claim a political win.

If progress is made, the US would defer snapback, either informally by pressuring its European allies or by seeking a new UN Security Council resolution to extend the deadline. US allies in Europe, and even Russia and China, could support such a move if it’s framed as a way to avoid crisis. This would preserve the option of snapback later as leverage, keep the diplomatic track open and defer the need for immediate escalation.

At the same time, the military option would remain on the table. The US has expanded asset deployments in the region and emphasized that the use of force is an option. B-2 bombers capable of carrying munitions designed to penetrate hardened targets – such as Iran’s enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz – are in theater. These deployments serve both as negotiating leverage and as preparation for potential airstrikes in case the talks fail.

There is no guarantee of success. Iran may reject US terms or overplay its hand – dragging its feet in the hope of extracting further concessions. Trump may decide the concessions are insufficient and shift course – toward snapback or worse. If negotiations collapse and the United States or Israel attacks Iran’s nuclear facilities, Tehran will retaliate against US military targets in the region and move to weaponize its nuclear program.

But despite these risks, the current round of diplomacy represents the most serious opportunity for nuclear de-escalation since the collapse of the JCPOA nearly a decade ago.