Lack of basis

May a spouse recover moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees as a consequence of a marriage that has been declared null and void because of psychological incapacity? This is one of the issues raised and answered in this case of Larry and Lina.

Larry and Lina got married on July 4, 1979 and begot a son. From the start of their marriage, Larry appeared to give his career as a banker and businessman the first priority and was unable to relate not only to Lina as a husband but also to their son as a father. He appeared to have no inclination to make their marriage work. Eventually when troubles came, Lina and Larry separated. While Lina tried to save the marriage, Larry was reluctant and refused to reconcile.

In fact, it was Larry who filed with the RTC a petition on July 12, 1992 for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of Lina. After Lina filed her answer, Larry amended his petition by stating that both he and Lina were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

But in her amended answer, Lina denied the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated and specifically prayed for moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of P7 million because Larry deceived her into marrying him when he was psychologically incapacitated.

After trial, the RTC found from the testimonies not only of the parties, particularly Lina, but likewise those of the two psychologists, that the acts of Larry, after the marriage, were sufficient proof of his psychological incapacity and therefore he is incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Thus, on July 31, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage between them null and void ab initio; awarding custody of their son to Lina; ordering the liquidation of their conjugal assets and ordering Larry to pay Lina moral damages in the amount of P2.5 million, exemplary damages of P1 million and attorney’s fees of P100,000.

In awarding moral and exemplary damages, the RTC said that as a result of Larry’s acts after their marriage which proved his psychological incapacity, Lina suffered mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and social humiliation.

On the other hand, his act of filing the petition for annulment compelled Lina to litigate and hire a lawyer, thereby entitling her to be reimbursed the attorney’s fees she paid.

This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Were the RTC and the CA correct in awarding moral, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees?

No. Psychological incapacity is no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly in-cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It is the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

When the RTC and the CA considered Larry’s acts as proof of his psychological incapacity, they considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral and exemplary damages. It is contradictory to characterize the acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time consider the same set of acts as willful. By declaring Larry as psychologically incapacitated, the awarding of moral and exemplary damages on the same set of facts was negated.

Since psychological incapacity means that one is truly in-cognitive of the basic marital covenants or has a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that Larry purposely deceived Lina into marrying him. Thus, the award of moral and exemplary damages was without basis.

For the same reason, the award of attorney’s fees is left without basis (Buenaventura vs. Court of Appeals and Buenaventura, G.R. 127358 and 127448, March 31, 2005).