Fizzling of ‘Ceboom’: Insights from Hutchcroft and Gera's study (Part 2)

In my previous column, I shared the main findings of Dr. Paul Hutchcroft and Dr. Weena Gera’s study on the decline of Cebu’s development coalition --a coalition which had been instrumental in the ‘Ceboom’ of earlier years. Today, allow me to look into some key insights regarding the persistent problems, as well as the lessons that Cebu and other aspiring urban centers can draw from its experience.

As the 2025 elections approach, our choices this coming May 12 could either keep kicking the can further down the road or confront the complex challenges that emerged from the earlier success of 'Ceboom’, which has since fizzled into a broken promise of sustainable progress.

Why do I say ‘broken promise’ despite observed signs of physical progress like tall buildings, imposing bridges, new business parks, and shiny malls (all private sector-driven, by the way)? Just ask any old-timer Cebuano or long-time resident.

The cost of living has risen so much that one can no longer distinguish the price of meals in Cebu from those in Manila. Commuting during workdays is punishing, with the time it takes to get from point A to point B growing unbearable. Living in city centers has become so expensive that the middle class are forced to choose between overpriced boxes gloriously called condominium units or moving to the suburbs of Liloan, Consolacion, Talisay, or Minglanilla --only to endure a daily, long, and crowded commute to Cebu City on so-called modern jeepneys that are as unpredictable as the weather.

Others in the working class (including BPO workers), the lower middle class, and the poor, have limited choices --many stay in informal communities where drugs still proliferate despite years of the so-called drug war. Meanwhile, there are barely any parks or green spaces to break up the monotony of the gray urban sprawl.

That’s my take on Cebu’s problems. Here’s what the Hutchcroft and Gera study says: “Across many realms of policy, metropolitan Cebu has degenerated dramatically from the golden days of “Ceboom” amid such challenges as ever-mounting traffic congestion; a solid waste management system bursting at the seams; major threats to water supply; the high cost of power; a shortage of affordable housing; and inadequate drainage and flood management aggravated by the congestion of key waterways.”

The Hutchcroft and Gera study’s core assertion is that “metropolitan Cebu will not be able to address multiple development challenges without a coherent system of governance that links its many components.” But sadly, the study notes, there is no clear path for such a coherent system to emerge anytime in the foreseeable future.

Efforts to establish metropolitan governance in Cebu encountered significant setbacks, the study notes. Since the 1980s, various initiatives have tried to overcome Cebu's fragmented governance. The Metro Cebu Planning Advisory Council (MCC) marked the first attempt but failed due to its lack of authority. It evolved into the Metro Cebu Development Project (MCDP) in 1989 and the Metro Cebu Development Council (MCDC) in 1997. Though sanctioned by the Regional Development Council (RDC), MCDC relied on foreign donors, limiting its sustainability. By 2008, Cebu City, under Mayor Tommy Osmeña, formally withdrew from the council due to political tensions.

The Metro Cebu Development and Coordinating Board (MCDCB) launched in 2011 with support from the private sector, notably the Ramon Aboitiz Foundation, Inc. (RAFI), and assistance from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). MCDCB introduced the "Mega Cebu Vision 2050" but lacked juridical authority and failed to secure broad political support, disbanding in 2020.

Attempts to legislate a metropolitan authority persist. Rival bills from Cebu’s congressmen propose the Mega Cebu Development Authority (MCDA). However, competition among local political factions remains a structural obstacle.

National intervention under the Duterte administration offered another avenue. The Hutchcroft and Gera study interestingly notes: “After Davao Mayor Rodrigo Duterte ascended to the presidency in 2016, his key local agent was none other than Michael Dino, the Cebuano businessman whose Ciudad Project (Tommy) Osmeña had nixed. In his new role as head of OPAV (Office of the Presidential Assistant for the Visayas), Dino became a kind of prefect for the metro region and successfully reshaped the politics of Cebu City. As for the implementation of his ambitious set of infrastructure plans, one city councilor expressed this view: ‘Puff – nothing!’.”