How would mutual defense pact work in WPS dispute?

At a global forum in Manila in May, President Marcos Jr. warned that “if by a willful act” committed by China a Filipino is killed in the West Philippine Sea, it would be “very close” to an “act of war” that could cause the Philippines to invoke the 1951 Phl-US Mutual Defense Treaty.

Yesterday, retired Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio was quoted in Jarius Bondoc’s column in this space as saying: “The Philippine Navy and Coast Guard vessels must stand their ground and not leave Escoda [Shoal]. Let China fire at them. We can then invoke the Phl-US Mutual Defense Treaty.”

The question arises: how would the treaty be applied against China’s increasingly belligerent actions against Philippine vessels in our territorial sea? Essentially, it provides that an armed attack against any of the two parties obligates the other party to come to its defense.

Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr., speaking at a forum in Manila organized by the US Indo-Pacific Command, said: “I think we should broaden the scope of the (MDT) to face a dynamic and cunning adversary,” alluding to China. He enjoined nations in the region to call out our neighbor, referring to the latter as the “biggest disruptor of peace” by its actions in the WPS. China can be deterred, he believes, as “it’s just a question of getting a worldwide consensus.”

“What people don’t realize is that there is an active effort to shape the international order – publicly articulated by China – to create a new order,” said Teodoro. “And this new world order will mean it will be China-led.”

He continued: “We should not allow China to define what ASEAN centrality means. We should get together in ASEAN and protect each other’s sovereign rights and sovereignty while settling our internal disputes between and among ourselves.”

On the treaty with the Americans, Teodoro stressed that “it should be interpreted dynamically,” noting that the “biggest danger… is to narrow down and canalize our operational limitations.” He didn’t explain what exactly he meant by that.

He seemed concerned by the public’s “fixation” on what constitutes an “armed attack” because the MDT does not clearly define the term. The term arises in discussions whenever China conducts activities in the West Philippine Sea that the Philippines deems as “escalatory,” such as its use of military-grade lasers, water cannons and even ramming incidents, which has resulted in a Filipino sailor losing a thumb in one such incident.

Teodoro lamented that the failure to immediately counter China’s illegal activities within the WPS – over which the Philippines has sovereign jurisdiction – weakened the country’s position and enabled China to solidify its presence there.

At a recent House of Representatives appropriations committee hearing on the defense department’s budget, Teodoro rued that the Philippine government acted too late in upgrading its naval and air force capabilities and establishing forward posts in the WPS. Now the authorities are scrambling “double time” to correct these mistakes, he said.

“The lesson is, we procrastinated in putting aside a threat, and in these types of situations, time is an asset you cannot recover anymore,” he said.

Asked what changes in the MDT, if any, are being taken, Teodoro replied: There would not be many changes, except for “how an attack on the country can be interpreted because aggressors [referring to China] have been circumventing definitions of an armed attack.”

“There would be no changes to the MDT, it’s just that we don’t want to canalize on an interpretation of an attack on an armed vessel. This is more for strategic purposes because China uses a non-lawful system of aggression which static interpretation and static processes will not address.” Meaning, presumably, that for now it’s still a gray area.

“So just as the aggressor has millions of variables in its playbook, we have to also re-study. There are no specifics right now; that will depend on the recommendations of the working groups on how to make the MDT interpretation more dynamic to address threats that we may not even foresee. For example, cyberthreats and other threats that China, which knows no rules, may employ. So that is the context of our statement. There are no specifics at this time.”

Makabayan bloc Rep. Arlene Brosas asked Teodoro whether the work on the MDT interpretation may entail the designation of more Philippine military bases as EDCA sites, where US military facilities would be built inside such bases.

“No, this does not entail additional EDCA sites,” the defense secretary replied. “We are sticking to the nine EDCA facilities, but it entails perhaps interoperable measures to address China’s creative and varied tactics on a defense-to-defense level.” For example, China is using maritime militias, which is illegal, as Chinese coast guard vessels are actually naval vessels.

Under this kind of environment, Teodoro emphasized, “we cannot work within a set of parameters. We have to work with our allies and partners to address an evolving threat.”

Brosas explained that she asked for clarification because her legislative bloc preferred that the Philippines avoids getting into risky military situations such as being unintentionally involved in the rising tensions between the United States and China.

“We don’t want these situations that may heighten the risk of a military confrontation between the two powerful states with the Philippines potentially becoming part of a power struggle,” she pointed out. “We don’t want to be dragged into the conflicts with America’s adversaries.”

If the “interoperable measures” referred to will threaten the Philippines even more,” she informed the defense secretary: “On the part of the Makabayan bloc, we would like for the solution to the maritime disputes [in the WPS] to be grounded in diplomacy and negotiations.”

The progressive legislator dovetailed her statement with this remark: “I know what you’re doing is hard, but if the military alliances would only promote aggression, we don’t want that.”