Operational

There is, it seems, more heat than earnestness in the discussion about possible arrangements to manage the competing territorial claims between the Philippines and China.

Last week, the Chinese embassy released a transcript of a conversation between one of their diplomats and the commander of the AFP-Western Command. The diplomat has not been identified. Meanwhile, the Filipino commander has been relieved of his post and was unavailable for comment. An AFP spokesman claims the relief of the respected Navy officer is unrelated to the controversy.

The Chinese side is telling us they were constrained to release the transcript to disprove Philippine claims that there are no negotiations going on regarding the protocols governing the interaction of our two naval forces crowding the contested shoals. The Philippine side, without denying the contents of the transcript, accused the Chinese side of violating our wiretapping law.

Earlier, the debate was over the existence of any “gentleman’s agreement” entered into between Beijing and former president Rodrigo Duterte. The Chinese side claims that Duterte agreed not to send Filipino ships closer than 12 nautical miles from Scarborough Shoal in exchange for allowing small Filipino fishermen to fish in the contested area.

Duterte has not definitively confirmed such an agreement. The Philippine government officially maintains no such agreement was forged – or will be recognized.

The Chinese embassy released the transcript to prove that, indeed, officials from the two sides were engaged at some level figuring out a working arrangement to reduce confrontations in the contested area. The Filipino vice admiral quoted in the transcript seemed to be assuring his counterparts that his bosses approved of the “new model” of interaction between our naval forces in the disputed South China Sea shoals.

The Philippine government’s reaction to the release of the transcripts was adamant. National Security Adviser Eduardo Año declared: “No one in the Philippine government is, nor have been, empowered nor authorized to enter into or commit to any sort of agreement, understanding or arrangement – more so, informal ones – by our President.” Other Filipino officials condemned the transcript as “fake news” and “disinformation.”

Some Filipino officials have even suggested that the transcript regarding the “new model” was digitally doctored. Unlikely as this suggestion might be, it imputes bad faith.

The shrillness of the responses by Filipino officials suggests something akin to Shakespeare’s lady “who protests too much.” It seems the administration has not been running a tight ship on matters relating to the dispute.

To be sure, the commander of the AFP-Western Command overstepped his bounds. His mandate is to enforce policy, not forge it. It is beyond his pay grade to negotiate directly with Chinese diplomats over a “new model” for South China Sea interactions – even if, as the transcript suggests, it is with the knowledge of his higher-ups.

The “new model” allows the Chinese side to prevent entry of Philippines vessels closer than 12 nautical miles of the contested shoals. That is an implicit cession of sovereignty to China. Moreover, the claimed agreement included the air space above the shoals China claims.

The “new model” the Chinese side touts therefore involves an extremely serious policy matter. Sovereignty over the disputed shoals is at the heart of the dispute. This is way more than an operational agreement to guide our vessels. 

I recall, a few months ago, a retired military officer was appointed as some sort of “tsar” to oversee all matters relating to the South China Sea dispute. If we had allowed middle level Filipino officials to directly negotiate with Chinese diplomats, our “tsar” has not been tightly managing his ship.

The Chinese side badly needs to reinforce its claims that both sides have agreed to a “new model.” The recent incident where Philippine Coast Guard vessels were attacked with water cannons by their Chinese counterparts was a public relations disaster for Beijing. It invited a cascade of international condemnation regarding China’s bullying behavior. The Chinese side needs to prove that the Filipino ships subjected to the indignity of water cannons violated the “new model.” Thus, the release of the transcripts – and eventually the actual recording of the conversation.

With the water cannon attack on our Coast Guard vessels and the subsequent release of the Chinese embassy transcripts claiming some sort of implicit arrangement, our bilateral relationship is clearly at its lowest point. We can choose to make things worse or work for something better. Making it better requires a lot of sincerity and transparency between the two parties.

Beijing should stop baiting our middle-level officials into appearing to agree with their proposals and then secretly recording conversations to put that seeming agreement on record. Instead, China should designate an empowered panel to deal with the Philippine counterparts.

Manila, for its part, has basically cleared the deck. Officially we have renounced whatever agreements were made, explicitly or implicitly. We can now start negotiations with China with a clean slate.

Although our overlapping sovereignty claims seem irresolvable, there remains a need to forge operational agreements covering the naval forces of both sides. This is necessary to prevent useless skirmishes that could trigger a larger conflagration. It is also necessary to ensure our municipal fishermen are able to ply their trade in peace, without threat of harassment from Chinese vessels.

As things calm down, both sides should muster the diplomatic maturity to get this done.