Absence is not disorderly behavior

There is a constitutional provision which dwells on a topic that is not discussed in our daily conversations. The scenario it governs, rarely happens. In the academe, though, we take this topic a little bit more seriously and sometimes with impassioned fervor. Of late, this proviso is viewed in an incomprehensible angle by those who walk in the corridors of governmental power. In fact, they seem to misapply it in favor of probably some undisclosed agenda.

We all have heard about the massacre in Pamplona, Negros Oriental, that felled Gov. Roel Degamo and many others. It was gruesome beyond imagination. Every right-thinking Filipino felt outraged. From the very moment the killers left their victims dead, speculations surfaced on who planned the murders. Not to be outdone, the Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Department of Justice together with military authorities moved surprisingly quickly. Their Investigations tended to identify, in blurring fashion, the so-called mastermind to be a congressman. Almost everyone, as if Sherlock Holmes, chorused in a theory on how Congressman Arnolfo Teves Jr., planned it all.

The House of Representatives itself took a further stride when, upon the recommendation of its Ethics Committee, suspended Teves as a representative. The suspension may be a short two-month period. That is the maximum length of sanction the Constitution allows, anyway. But with such a decree, the 3rd Congressional district of Negros Oriental lost its voice in Congress and their people deprived of representation. Why? Because Teves has been absent from attending sessions since March 9 or about two weeks. The two-month suspension of Teves is, chronologically speaking, about 46 days disproportionately longer than his 13 days of actual absence.

The penalty imposed by the House of Representative upon Teves is anchored on a constitutional provision that reads “each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”

The constitutional ground for suspending a legislator is “disorderly behavior”. Section 16 (3) of Article VI of our fundamental law does not mention any other ground upon which a lawmaker may be punished. In Law school, our classic example of such a punishable conduct involved Cebu’s own Sergio Osmeña Jr. The case was titled Osmeña vs. Pendatun. Serging, that was how Cebuanos fondly called him, delivered a privilege speech in Congress making serious imputations of bribery against the president of the republic. The House created a special committee, to investigate the truth of the Osmeña charges against the president. The House also authorized it to summon “Serging” to appear before it to substantiate his charges and if he fails to do so to require him to show cause why he shouldn’t be punished.

The word used in the charter is “disorderly”, defined as chaotic, disorganized, jumbled, undisciplined, and cluttered. Behavior is defined as “how someone acts”. Differently said, behavior is what a person does to make something. The privilege speech delivered by Osmeña was some act and that behavior of his was considered disorderly by his peers.

In the Teves case, what sanctionable act did he commit? He was punished because he absented himself from sessions. In other words, Teves wasn’t in Congress personally to have anything done. If Teves failed to attend sessions, he couldn’t have said or done anything to make something. Unlike Osmeña who delivered a speech in Congress, Teves was reportedly out of the country. If the court took the personal attack made by Osmeña upon the chief executive as constitutive of disorderly behavior, not a word was uttered by Teves. So, where is this “disorderly behavior”?