Do state, MILF fighters know ceasefire terms?

TALK OUT: Readers not only react to but also raise issues of their own, like these two about bureaucratic inefficiency:

Name withheld upon request: “May I relay through your column the dilemma of a relative who has passed the written part of the 2014 board exams for deck officers. He would have taken the practical test right after, but this was taken over by the Maritime Industry Authority (Marina). We inquired with its Region 7 (Central Visayas) office, but were told to go to the Manila head office. Marina seems unprepared to handle the task; its staff does not even know what to do. The Professional Regulations Commission was doing a good job before, scheduling the tests in orderly, timely manner. Today, the Marina has yet to get its act together, as seafarers wait to have gainful employment. Please do not mention my name, to protect my relative.”

Joy Ramos, Cubao, Quezon City: “I hope my story about the QC Business Permit and Licensing Office will lead to something good. Last Jan. 14, 2015, I applied for renewal of two permits. I finished Steps 1 and 2 in a few minutes, but was disheartened to see more than 200 people lined up for Step 3, Final Evaluation, at the arcade in front of city hall.

“On inquiry, Security Guard R.O. Albino of Lockheed Agency told us that only those holding stubs were to be serviced. Too, 500 other stubs already had been issued for Jan. 15 and 16, so we should come back early the next morning to get new stubs. I returned at sunrise as told, and got my stub for the 17th, a Saturday, with the note, first- come, first-served.

“When I arrived at 8:20 a.m. of Jan. 17, there already was a long line, and the office had not yet opened. Guard Albino was there, telling non-holders that stubs for the 18th and 19th already had been issued, and only for the 20th, last day for license renewal, remained. Dozens left; dozens of others stayed in line.

“Four lines of people were waiting to be called up to the second floor: one, the longest, for stub-holders like me; the second for seniors; the third for those with four or more applications; and the last for those without stubs. Pretty soon, Guard Albino was calling up batches from our and the fourth line. We complained, to no avail. Another guard tried to pacify us by pointing to the Help Desk. The clerk there was of no help, admitting that they didn’t know how to handle the backlog, and that this recurs every year, but never under the previous mayor. We could make the present mayor know of the problem, he said, and pointed us to the Complaint Desk — which was unmanned. Finally called to the second floor, our batch discovered that all four lines converged at the same service counters.

“It was past 6:30 p.m., ten hours after I fell in line, when I finally got my renewals. My neck, back, and legs were aching with fatigue, and my stomach acidic from the aggravation. I wondered if city officials think of the dignity of small- and medium-size business owners like me.”

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A survivor said the Moro rebels finished off his 43 fallen police comrades with gunshots to the face. A separate rebel band bragged to have beheaded 12 of the commandos who, having run out of ammo, retreated to its territory. Hundreds in the two villages fled their homes.

For Manila officials those gory details are minor. Vital to them is why a firefight sparked at all at the edge of Maguindanao’s Mamapasano town, held by the rival Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). For, on it hinges two issues: (1) the credibility of the Aquino Presidency’s peace pact with the MILF, and (2) Congress’ enactment of the pact’s contentious provisos.

Did the police company coordinate with the local Army and MILF units, as required by the 2012 ceasefire? Answers are hazy. On record the National Police-Special Action Force (SAF) from General Santos City two hours away swooped down on a remote barrio at dawn Sunday. Mission: to serve arrest warrants. Targets: a Malaysian terror-bomber and his local henchman wanted by the US, with $5-million and $2-million prizes on their heads. Defense Sec. Voltaire Gazmin said the SAF communicated with the Army 6th Infantry Division only “at tactical level.” Meaning, it was “last minute,” with the lower field brigade. MILF peace panel chief Mohagher Iqbal claimed the cops never contacted the rebels’ 100th Base Command. Interior Sec. Mar Roxas hinted that this had to do with the reward. That elicited malicious tales about the cops’ and rebels’ motives.

Still, did the SAF know and call the right body? That body is not separately the Army and the MILF camps, but their AH-JAG or Ad-Hoc Joint Action Group, whose mobile numbers all should have. Did the SAF even know the locale, where MILF and BIFF rebels rule adjacent barrios, with some protecting the wanted terrorists?

If the SAF didn’t, then the lessons of Al-Barka have been ignored. Twice, in 2007 and 2011, government troops had been ambushed in that town in Basilan, far west of Maguindanao but part too of the Muslim Autonomous Region. Three rebel groups control adjoining barrios: the Moro National Liberation Front with which the government signed a peace deal in 1996, its splinter MILF, and Abu Sayyaf kidnappers for ransom. While the rebels feud over funds and sway, they are kinsmen. Fifteen Marines were butchered in the first incident, and 19 Army Special Forces in the second. In both, the soldiers were to arrest the local MILF chieftain. Too, they had failed to contact the AH-JAGs that included MNLF and MILF reps.

Yet even had the soldiers done so, the Abus still would have attacked. And the MNLF and MILF either would have helped out or stayed neutral, depending on their on-off intramurals.

Not only the rebels but also the police and military have tiffs. Like, one job of the Muslim regional police is to control civilian firearms. But the military, in quelling Moro separatists, at times equip local politicos with long arms. The latter use those for violent partisan ends, like the infamous Ampatuan Massacre of 2009.

Relatedly, if the command and info chain is weak within and between the police and military, it is weaker among rebels. Inability to clear the lines sadly leads to armed clashes and loss of lives.

Another question arises about government troop training. This includes foreign experts — British commandos in the case of the SAF, and US Delta Forces for the Marines and Army. Are they not drilled on field communications and jungle tactics to avoid routs?

That too is now a side issue. Malacañang and the MILF are eager to downplay last Sunday’s cop massacre – the worst in the history of the Moro secession. Understandably both sides worry about the effects on the Bangsamoro Basic Law pending in Congress. The peace panels are working behind the scenes for a common version of events. For starters, they call the butchery by similar words: “an unfortunate mis-encounter.”

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