It’s Catch 22. Try removing all the “dynastic” candidates from the two coalitions and there will be just a pitiful handful left, hardly adequate to choose the “Magic 12” for the Senate in 2013. One disgusted anti-dynasty advocate said let’s just bite the bullet and boycott everyone with any relative up to the second degree of consanguinity or affinity. But if we do that, we might get an even bigger circus for the next six years. It’s too much like cutting your nose to spite your face!
For now, the more rational recourse is to prune off the really bad seed sired most likely by equally ignoble predecessors. We’ll just have to content ourselves with including the more palatable ones from the limited gene pool of aspirants. But it’s high time that we took a serious look at the issue. Are dynasties an obstacle to a country’s political maturity and socio-economic progress? Is it possible to minimize if not totally eliminate them from the political landscape? Or is this a fool’s errand?
The 1987 Constitution prohibits political dynasties. Article 2, Section 26 stipulates: “The State shall guarantee equal access to public service and prohibit political dynasty as may be defined by law.” It’s a cop-out because it requires the passage of an enabling law to give it any teeth for implementation.
The framers of the Constitution knew that defining “political dynasty” requires a long and intense debate. They also expected the customary defiance of politicians especially from Congress. Maybe the honorable Representatives have a tendency to confuse the Lower House for their own house, hence the inclination to bequeath their seat, like an heirloom, to their kinfolk. Of course delicadeza in politics is an outlandish concept.
The simple definition of political dynasty is “a family that maintains power for several generations; or a sequence of hereditary rulers.” But Senator Miriam Santiago, who filed SB 2649 or the Anti-Political Dynasty Act, defines it more thoroughly with these caveats: Political Dynasty “shall exist when a person who is the spouse of an incumbent elective official or relative within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of an incumbent elective official holds or runs for an elective office simultaneously with the incumbent elective official within the same province or occupies the same office immediately after the term of office of the incumbent official.”
“It shall also be deemed to exist where two or more persons who are spouses or are related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity run simultaneously for elective public office within the same province, even if neither is so related to an elective official.”
Sadly, the odds for the bill’s approval are slim to nil. But hats off to the feisty Senator for bucking the family businesses!
There are no easy answers to the issue of political dynasties, and the Philippines is not the only country that has struggled with this concern. The irony is that democracy evolved as a protest against the divine-right theory of kingship. Yet, as Michels (1999 [1911]) wrote, even in democratic organizations, “the iron law of oligarchy” prevails. The leadership, once elected, would entrench itself in power, undermining the democratic principle of a level playing field. Today, “incumbent’s advantage” is accepted as a political reality.
Two in-depth studies on the subject merit consideration. The first is written by Pablo Querubin from the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies entitled, Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines. The second is Political Dynasties, which probes political power in the US by Ernesto Dal Bo and Jason Synder, from the University of California; and Pedro Dal Bo from Brown University.
Querubin cites evidence that term limits introduced in the 1987 Constitution to prevent lower-quality politicians from overstaying, did just the opposite. It may “exacerbate the dynastic nature of Philippine politics by providing incentives for incumbents to bring additional members of their family to power and thus control several offices simultaneously…relative to a scenario without term limits where political competition is stiffer.”
He also submits that, “Political dynasties emerge as the natural unit in democracies where political parties traditionally have been weak.” The family name become “brands” that incentivizes politicians to invest in their political reputation. The clans may benefit from the investment and networks established by their predecessors, and channel resources to their constituents. This becomes the blueprint for dynasties to become powerful, committing to long term policy platforms and alliances that secure their influence, a role usurped from political parties.
Bo and Synder observe that in the US, political power is self-perpetuating, defined as a “power-treatment effect, whereby holding political power for longer, increases the probability that one’s heirs attain political power in the future regardless of ability.” Although a longer tenure may instill a public service vocation in some family members, more likely it “allows a legislator to accumulate an asset that he then bequests — like financial or human capital, name recognition, or contacts.” Thus, political power in democracies becomes inheritable.
Dynastic legislators are less likely to come from a state other than the one they represent. This is consistent with the idea that they may inherit a form of political capital, such as connections or name recognition, as opposed to sheer talent or drive.
Dynastic legislators are significantly more likely to be female and may have facilitated female political representation in the US (31.2% women legislators are dynastic vs. 8.4% men).
If political competition had been robust in all states, dynastic prevalence would be 40% lower (4.7% vs 7.7%) .
Inheriting political power may be considered undemocratic. But as Comelec and most defenders claim, it is the voters that give them that power. And having passed on the blame, they wash their hands off the issue and shrug-off the consequences.
To dismantle dynasties, political parties must become stronger and encourage competition of members with different backgrounds, and economic interests. The personalized style of politics associated with political dynasties must end. Even with the Anti-Epal Law, politicians still advertise public goods and services as though the funds came from their personal pockets.
The use of office funds to campaign for the incumbent or his family must be eliminated. This practice casts doubts on de-centralization of resources to local governments that are often controlled by local elites. In some cases, the national government must circumvent local elites and deal directly with the citizens to break the dynastic hold on power.
Lastly, those who advocate reforms should not be those whose power is directly affected by the reform.
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