Momentum

Beijing is not missing a beat.

Right after the ASEAN ministerial meeting closed in Phnom Penh, failing to issue the communique the Philippines wanted, a 30-ship fleet was dispatched from Hainan heading towards the Spratlys. The fleet is reported to be a fishing expedition off Yongshu Reef, which is claimed by the Philippines.

The fleet is led by a 3,000-ton supply ship and is likely escorted by Chinese coast guard vessels. This large fleet will be fishing in waters claimed by the Philippines.

Manila is still reeling from the diplomatic defeat in Phnom Penh as well as from the rather embarrassing episode involving a Chinese missile frigate running aground on Hasa Hasa Reef off Palawan. The frigate has since been extricated and sailed back to Hainan escorted by a convoy of Chinese navy vessels.

When the frigate ran aground, Philippine authorities failed to detect it. We found out about the frigate from a report carried in an Australian newspaper. In the absence of radar cover — or the American “spy planes” President Aquino daydreams about — our navy requires visual contact to detect foreign vessels in waters we claim.

The Chinese frigate that figured in the minor mishap is heavily armed with modern missiles. It clearly outclasses the WWII frigate we recently inherited from the US Navy: the new BRP Gregorio del Pilar, flagship of our puny navy.

The fact that our naval surveillance failed to detect its presence is embarrassing enough. Notwithstanding, we could even file a diplomatic protest about the incident. The Chinese vessel was in international waters where freedom of navigation is guaranteed. The Palace might have simply mentioned that fact amid howls of protest at home calling for a protest to be filed.

If we could not even detect and identify vessels traversing waters we claim, how can we assert sovereignty with any credibility?

For decades, we relied on the US Navy for radar cover over the entire archipelago. More than two decades after we expelled the US bases, we have not replaced the radar cover they once provided. There was always some more pressing expense than procurement of radar capability.

The US committed to help us maintain a minimum credible defense capability. We might as well beg for radar equipment to cover the archipelago. We might not be able to deter foreign vessels from entering waters we claim, but at least we should not be relying on Australian newspapers to report the presence of those vessels.

Our failure to win ASEAN support for our territorial claims is a major setback. Winning the support of the regional association was our only viable strategy in dealing with a strong assertion of Chinese claims.

We are now without an operable strategy in place. Beijing knows that. The Chinese leadership is not about to let the opportunity pass. This is the reason a large fishing fleet is deployed in waters we claim. Our bloodied nose is being rubbed with salt — the better to instruct us about our proper place in the scheme of things.

 Beijing was obviously displeased when our freshly refurbished frigate went out hunting down Chinese fishing vessels at the Scarborough shoal. They were displeased even more when tough talk emanated from Manila seeming to insist on exclusive access to the disputed (although historically shared) shoal. They were thoroughly pissed, I imagine, when we stupidly threatened to unilaterally bring the dispute to international arbitration (even as international law dictates that both parties agree to submit for arbitration to happen).

Beijing, since that incident, responded with a staccato of actions demonstrating their displeasure: expansion of their naval presence at Scarborough Shoal, stricter phytochemical tests on our banana exports, creation of a prefecture governing the disputed South China Sea islands, a series of cyber attacks on Philippine databases, a broad diplomatic initiative to win friends in the ASEAN, their own tough talking for the benefit of their domestic audience, and now, the deployment of a large fishing fleet appropriately escorted by impressive naval assets.

With our own diplomatic strategy in disarray, expect Beijing not to let up. They are not done with us yet.

The deployment of this fishing fleet is an in-your-face response to continued confrontational talk in Manila. The basic message here is: stop us if you can.

Note that after the Philippines so miserably failed to get what it wanted from the Phnom Penh meeting, Beijing immediately offered the ASEAN its support in framing a mutually acceptable code of conduct covering the contending South China Sea claims. They are basically telling our ASEAN partners that China is willing to cooperate with the region, although not on Philippine terms.

That is deft diplomatic maneuver, aggravating Manila’s embarrassment and raising the specter of Philippine isolation.

Manila, of course, will try to court more statements of US support to help sandbag our collapsing diplomatic strategy. For every decibel of US reassurance, however, Beijing is likely to respond with ten decibels of diplomatic countermeasures.

If necessary, Beijing will drive a wedge between the Philippines and her ASEAN partners: slowly constraining our bilateral commerce while showering our neighbors with their generosity. We are heir to the dictates of power asymmetry.

 We need to rethink our diplomatic options more smartly. So far there is little to suggest we are up to it.

At the inauguration last Tuesday of a P5-billion water facility built with China’s assistance, President Aquino made the Chinese ambassador uncomfortable by indirectly suggesting her country was not respecting Philippines honor. Such talk was impolite as well as impolitic. It does not help repairing our relations.