Scarborough

Trust Beijing to seize upon every minor incident to nail down its foreign policy position.

Recall that, many years ago, Philippine authorities arrested Chinese fishermen for poaching in areas of the Spratlys claimed by Manila. Beijing responded by sending in warships ostensibly to protect their fishermen. Then they began building structures they claimed intended to shelter fishing vessels. Those structures evolved into a naval base permanently stationed in disputed islets.

The Philippines, in turn, set up a Marine base in Kalayaan. Subsequently, some semblance of a community was induced to settle in a previously uninhabited shoal. That small community was quickly elevated into a municipality belonging to the province of Palawan.

For years now, Philippine and Chinese forces have stared each other down in the inhospitable coral reefs claimed by several countries. Possession of those reefs is crucial to establish border lines and claim sovereignty over large swaths of water that hold great economic potential.

It is unlikely the standoff at the Spratlys will end anytime soon. The contending military forces in those islets will try to make life inconvenient for each other for a long time to come.

The same pattern of entrenching military presence will likely happen at the Scarborough shoal.

Last week, our flagship Philippine Navy vessel, recently refurbished after it was saved from scuttling at a US Navy junkyard, accosted Chinese fishermen at Scarborough. Found in the holds of the poachers were rare sharks, precious corals and large clams — all of them protected by Philippine law.

Before our Navy could haul in the poaching vessels, however, two Chinese military craft materialized on the scene. A tense standoff happened.

While diplomats frantically worked the backchannels to resolve the standoff with minimum loss of face for either side, President Aquino declared the Philippines will assert its sovereignty over the shoal. As he was speaking, the poachers slipped away under the protective cover of the Chinese navy.

Manila warned Beijing to stay away from our territorial waters. Beijing warned Manila to stay away from their waters.

Manila sent in reinforcements from our Coast Guard while pulling out our only real warship. The move, according to Manila, was to demilitarize the standoff.

Beijing, meanwhile, sent in more military craft to the scene. As they did that, Chinese diplomats began claiming the Philippine Navy harassed Chinese fishermen in Chinese waters.

Manila thinks the law is on its side.

According to the provisions of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Seas (UNCLOS), Scarborough is well within our exclusive economic zone. The shoal belongs to our continental shelf. It is surely closest to Zambales province.

Those considerations do not impress Beijing, which claims “historic rights” over all islands in the South China Sea. “Historic rights” have, of course, long lost currency in international law.

Beijing does not recognize the UNCLOS and denies our claims to the shoal. They do not recognize our version of the archipelagic doctrine in setting sea boundaries. They refuse multilateral negotiations on the matter and are demand only bilateral talks.

As in the case of the Spratlys, Beijing will likely seek recourse in the principle of effective occupation and control of the contested shoal. The naval forces Beijing has in the area of the shoal will likely remain there on a permanent basis. If they can figure out an engineering solution to construction on a fragile coral shoal, they will likely build a base there as they did in the Spratlys.

Should Beijing decide to establish a permanent military presence in Scarborough (in order to lay the predicate for effective occupation and control), our diplomatic effort will hit a dead-end.

Beijing was never too shy about resorting to brute force to break any diplomatic Gordian Knot. While diplomats were still negotiating the standoff last week, the Chinese Navy enabled the erring fishermen to slip away. Our Navy could only look on; the Palace relegated the matter to the DFA.

The last word coming out of the DFA had our diplomats daring China to present evidence of their claim before the International Tribunal on the Law of the Seas. They might as well have tried talking to a wall. Beijing made it clear a long time ago they do not recognize this mode of settlement on the matter of the contested South China Sea islands.

China’s firm stance through the latest Scarborough incident multiplies its options. Conversely, it limits ours.

Should Beijing permanently station a naval force on the shoal, there is very little our diplomacy will be able to do. Since Scarborough shoal does not involve other Asean claimants, there will be very little interest among our neighbors in putting up a united front on the issue.

We do not have the naval assets to challenge Chinese military occupation of the shoal. That is no big secret.

Unable to challenge militarily Chinese occupation of the shoal, we will be forced into a strictly bilateral framework for dealing with the dispute. This is exactly what China wants us to do. In a strictly bilateral framework, we will be negotiating from a grossly inferior position.

Last week’s Scarborough incident provided Beijing an opportunity to push its strategy on the disputed islands. Expect them to move quickly, forcing a quick sequence of initiatives to keep us flustered.

President Aquino should take hold of this issue and quickly develop a counter-strategy. It is beyond the capacity of the DFA to provide both leadership and a comprehensive national policy response to the rapidly evolving situation. Time is of the essence here.