Filipinos and Gadhafi

It is said that Moammar Gadhafi had a special interest in Filipinos. I once asked a Libyan diplomat why this was so. He said that the fallen Libyan leader had never gotten over a telephone call from Nur Misuari, then a young professor from the University of the Philippines. Misuari had called the Libyan strongman directly for help. This was sometime after the controversial Jabidah Massacre when it was alleged that Muslim recruits were killed because the Marcos government wanted no witnesses.

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According to the diplomat’s story, Gadhafi was so impressed by the audacity of the young Muslim begging over the phone thousands of miles away asking for help “because they are killing us.” Whatever the truth of that story, Gadhafi did initiate moves to help Filipino Muslims to push his ambition to be the leader of the Muslim world.

Libya chose to speak on behalf of the aspirations of Muslims in Mindanao in the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference). At that time the MNLF wanted secession but it was Gadhafi who prevailed upon the group to reject secession and instead seek for a more just and equitable governance of the Muslims in Mindanao but stay within the Philippines. This was how the Tripoli agreement came to be. It was one of the first foreign missions for Imelda Marcos who came to Tripoli on behalf of President Marcos. The Tripoli agreement became the spine of agreements that were attempted later under other Philippine presidents.

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A few days before the peaceful people power revolution in February 1986, CIA Chief William Casey visited Imelda Marcos. With him was Lord Deedes, the golfing crony of Dennis Thatcher. I met him while in London and he invited me several times for lunch at an Italian restaurant near Fleet street to recall his visit to Manila. He was a columnist for the Telegraph and seemed to have enjoyed his visit. Among the many inside stories he told me was that they were invited to dinner in Malacañang Palace but it lasted until 3 o’clock in the morning. He had fallen asleep but was rudely awakened when the CIA chief asked Mrs. Marcos “if she ever went to bed with Gadhafi” and she said something to the effect, “of course not, I am a good girl.” I thought the story hilarious and so did Lord Deedes. But the story is not so hilarious if you begin to think just what Casey and Deedes were doing in Malacanang then and why Casey would ask her specifically about Gadhafi.

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Many years later, Gadhafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, said to be his heir apparent came to Manila to try and put the different Muslim groups together. He stayed at the Shangri-la Makati where meetings were held all day between MILF, MNLF and ARRM to agree to unite as one group. I was able to get an interview with him later in the day. I was surprised that Saif who had become a man about the world, making friends in the West and funding Muslim projects through his foundation, should bother with the Philippines.

As far as I know Libya contributed to the building of a clinic in cooperation with USAID in Mindanao. Saif candidly said “I also don’t know why but my father still wants to be part of finding peace in Mindanao.” The Philippines is too far to be important to Libya’s sphere of influence. By then it was the MILF that was moving to the forefront of peace negotiations and Malaysia as the broker. 

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Many of us are relieved with the end of the civil war in Libya and rightly so. We rejoice with the Libyans who fought hard against a tyrannical regime but wished there had been a way to achieve this through less loss of lives and destruction. As in Iraq, it is too early to celebrate. There is still the future to be faced.

Of the many articles written about that uncertain future, I find Mary Dejevsky’s article in London’s Independent relevant to geopolitics especially as the Western powers deal with developing countries. She said “Libya’s liberation must not justify a new colonial adventurism.” But she is not optimistic.

“And so — regrettably, inexorably — the pernicious cycle of neocolonial self-justification will go on. In congratulating themselves and each other, and their own and each other’s armed forces, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy will fuel the perception that such Western operations are not only feasible, but desirable. The ghosts of Iraq, it will be said, have been laid; the doctrine of liberal humanitarian intervention lives to fight another day. The “right thing” was done,” Dejevsky wrote.

Political analysts would agree with her conclusion that outside intervention assisted the Libyan rebels’ cause beyond doubt. “How far it actually facilitated — as opposed to merely accelerating — the opposition victory will be debated by political analysts and historians in the months and years to come.”

“Above all, the impression was created, for both domestic and foreign audiences, that the civil war, such as it was, was being fought and won by the Libyan opposition forces themselves.”

The lessons from Iraq were learned, she said, that “whatever outside support was provided beyond air strikes — training, weapons, finance have all been kept quiet.” It was to ensure that when victory came, the Libyans could claim it as their own.

She would caution against the use of intervention in other people’s revolutions or civil wars. She says, bluntly that the victory should not be seen to mean that “international community” has a moral obligation to assist in the overthrow of authoritarian or dictatorial leaders everywhere. 

“The specific justification for international intervention in Libya — to protect civilians — was interpreted ever more loosely as the conflict wore on, to the point where it risked losing most of its meaning. NATO was thus exposed to the charge that it was bending the rules to suit itself, which could make it harder for anyone to advance the same argument in support of a similar UN resolution in future,” she wrote.

Philippine history is rich with examples on what intervention can mean even when it is pursued for “noble” motives. The Independent article’s last words: “The very worst consequence of Libya would be if the perception of success persuaded 21st century governments that a small amount of air power could replace the gunboat diplomacy of old.”