Protracted

There is no single template for revolution, unfortunately.

 In the case of Libya, the final resolution will not come as quickly, nor as clearly, as we saw in both Tunisia and Egypt. This means that there will be much more pain to go around, not just for the Libyans, but for the whole world.

A protracted civil war looms, with Gadhafi controlling Tripoli where the majority of the population resides and the opposition controlling the other cities. A long drawn-out civil war means sharp fluctuations in oil prices, reflecting the uncertainty of supply. It means a humanitarian crisis for the Libyans trapped in the fighting and the foreign workers rushing to flee the war-torn country.

Two oil price increases this week bring home the dreary message to Filipinos. More price adjustments are expected next week. Libya’s problem is our problem too.

 The Libyan economy might be physically devastated by internal war. The rest of the world might be thrown back into a recession by the force of oil scarcity. Libya accounts for only about two percent of global oil production. But given the tight supply and demand relationship in the case of fossil fuels, the loss of Libyan production spells supply shortage for all the oil importing countries.

Why is the revolution in Libya different from the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions?

Let us start from the most obvious: Libya is ruled by a madman willing to bomb his own population. He used brute force to break the momentum of revolt, at least in Tripoli which he easily controls with his mercenaries. That is significant because over half Libya’s population lives in Tripoli.

Despite its land area, Libya has a population of only six million. The rebellion, largely spontaneous and organized, does not have the capacity to consolidate a new regime across the thousands of kilometers that set cities apart.

With its small population, the Libyan economy has absorbed 1.5 million foreign workers. The foreign workers basically ran the production facilities, transport, the schools and the hospitals. Gadhafi deliberately kept his people poorly educated and unemployed.

Despite decades of dictatorship, Egypt and Tunisia at least had functioning institutions that could mediate between the tyrants and the rebelling populace. In both countries, the army was an influential presence. When the people rebelled, the army in both countries simply kicked out the tyrant and oversaw a political transition.

In Libya, the army is a decrepit institution, almost a decoy. The soldiers are badly trained and their weapons are from another era. The best armed and best trained armed units are the militias who constitute Gadhafi’s personal bodyguard. When the uprising gathered steam, the army simply melted into the crowd, join the insurrection and, today, must face up Gadhafi’s planes flown by Algerian pilots and repulse attacks from the pro-Gadhafi militia manned by mercenaries imported from Chad.

In Tunisia and Egypt, the rebellions were mounted principally by the youth, working with new communications technologies. The demographics, principally the large proportion of young and well-educated people, allowed these rebellions to overwhelm distinctions of tribe and religious disposition.

Although Libya shares the same young demographic profile of its eastern and western neighbors, the rebellious youth did not have the same access to the internet. Thus, tribal affinities continue to play a major role in defining alliances. We see that in the prominent role played by tribal elders in the revolutionary councils being set up from the second city of Benghazi. The continuing importance of traditional tribal lines of leadership is also exhibited in Yemen.

For 42 years, Gadhafi ran the country by way of a personality cult. His sons control the major agencies of repressive power. There are no political parties to articulate ideological positions and organize political action. Between Gadhafi and the rebellious people, no effective institutions stand in between. Such institutions might have served to mediate the conflict and define an organized resolution to the standoff.

The situation in Libya has evolved into a pure contest of force between Gadhafi and sons on one hand and the unorganized forces of the uprising on the other. This is going to be bloody, resembling revolutions in the 19th century. It will end only when Gadhafi and his sons are finally hanged in a public square.

Gadhafi might strike the world as a ranting lunatic. In reality, however, he is not a complete fool. He would not have lasted 42 years in power if he was that.

 My own reading from the ivory tower of distant Diliman is that Gadhafi realizes he can no longer rule. His bluff and insane bluster is a show. He is playing a more sophisticated — albeit desperate — game.

While he realizes he can no longer rule as he did for decades, he has his back to the sea. He cannot flee at this point. He will surely be persecuted wherever he chooses to run to. What he can do is produce some sort of stalemate between him and the revolution. That stalemate will force the Arab League or the African Union to try and broker a negotiated solution to the Libyan situation.

A negotiated solution will provide Gadhafi a survival route. The firmer the stalemate, the stronger hand he could play in a negotiated solution.

Gadhafi calculates correctly that the US and the European powers are not ready to wage a ground war against him or even to mount air strikes to take him out. The wild outcomes of such courses of action are difficult to control.

The man knows that the most brutal force he can use will not defeat the revolution even as it solidifies global consensus against him. He is using brutality and naked force simply to win a stalemate.

No one want this situation to drag on for too long; but Gadhafi so far appears to have a game plan his enemies could not foil.