Precipice

Bangkok’s shiny new airport is back in business. But that cannot be taken as an indication that the political crisis gripping Thailand is over.

For weeks, protesters have managed to cripple the Thai economy more than they have managed to dislodge the elected government in place. Investments have fled the country. Exports have not moved to the markets.

The occupation of the Bangkok airport damaged the country’s reputation as a tourist haven, a reputation built over a long period. Receipts from tourism constitute a vital cog in that country’s success story. Yet it was precisely the industry targeted by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), a middle class movement repudiating the majority choice expressed by way of elections.

The ruckus in Bangkok caused the cancellation of the ASEAN summit originally scheduled for later this week. That is not going to be that last fallout from this rather curious political impasse.

The occupation of the two main airports might have gone on much longer. But, by coincidence, the country’s constitutional court rendered a decision finding the ruling party guilty of electoral offenses. The PAD opportunistically seized that event and claimed victory for itself even as the court decision was unrelated to the protestors’ activities.

Sans the court decision, the stalemate at the airports might have been broken only by a military coup. In which case, the “democratic movement” might have succeeded only in delivering state power back to the military establishment.

The court-imposed ban on the ruling party will not trigger any substantial shift in power. As they did when Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party was banned much earlier, the political network associated with the former prime minister (deposed by a coup) is generally expected to simply regroup around yet another political party tag.

When the politicians do regroup and install yet another prime minister associated with the deposed Thaksin, the PAD will predictably resume their street actions. For weeks, they occupied the government house and forced Somchai to move his parliament to Chiang Mai. Given the tacit support PAD enjoys from the Bangkok police and the army, this eternally disenchanted group can easily reoccupy the centers of government and the terminals of the economy.

Foreign businessmen in Bangkok are not too optimistic that the political troubles hounding Thailand would abate anytime soon. From a major destination for investment flows, Thailand courts the possibility of becoming the region’s pariah because of irresolvable political conflict.

The primary reason the political confrontation is irresolvable is the attitude of the Bangkok elite that they hold veto power over the electoral choices of the provinces. They claim the mantle of democracy but reject the practice of electoral choice. Removed from the masses, this “democratic movement” is politically dependent on the monarchy and the army.

PAD has become, quite unintentionally, the main threat to Thailand’s wellbeing.

While political events remain fluid, the health of the beloved Thai king has suddenly emerged as a potentially destabilizing factor. The 80-year old monarch has disappeared from public view of late. He has failed to dissolve government in the aftermath of the court ruling adverse to the ruling party. He did not appear in ceremonies to celebrate his own birthday.

The king has been, for decades now, the vital fulcrum in Thai politics. He arbitrates extraordinary transfers of power in a country that almost regularly changes between military rule and electoral democracy. Should he leave the scene, Thai politics will be unhinged. There will be no political authority of last resort.

The Bangkok-based “democratic movement” will likely form an alliance with the army. We might not see electoral democracy in place for a very long time. This is because the popular vote tends to prefer political networks the Bangkok middle class does not approve of.

Nothing drives away investments, and tourists, more than lingering political uncertainty. We should know. That is the reason why we have been on the losing end of investment flows into the region.

PAD can make it hard for any government to govern. But it does have enough popular grassroots support to take government in any manner that is remotely democratic.

PAD does not have a strategy for power. It only has the tactics that will ensure a power vacuum.

PAD cannot lead Thai society. The majority of citizens disagree with its political positions.

PAD can only protest. It cannot rule.

Therefore PAD can only be a destructive force in Thai society. It cannot bring progress. It cannot help the economy perform better. It cannot create jobs, bring in tourists and convince investors.

It is a narcissistic political movement, engrossed with its own complaints and yet intolerant of the preferences of others. It casually invokes reform but has demonstrated no clear (and workable) agenda of change.

There is much that some Filipino political groups — those that presume themselves to be the only voice of democracy and good government — can learn from Thailand as this country moves even closer to the precipice.