Mere expectancy
A complaint should be filed by the real party-in-interest. But who are “real parties-in-interest”? This is answered in this case of 72 occupants of the Piedad Estate in Quezon City, a Friar Land acquired on December 23, 1903 by the Philippine Government and registered as Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 614 under Act 496 then later subdivided into 1,305 lots and disposed of by the Bureau of Lands under the Friar Lands Act.
The lots involved here are lots 668 and 669 in Culiat,
So they prayed in their complaint that the said OCT 614 and the TCTs of GICI be declared null and void and that they be declared as bona fide occupants of the said lots pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Land Act, because their predecessors-in-interest and they have been in adverse, peaceful and continuous possession in the concept of owners of said lands.
GICI moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that among others, they are not the real parties-in-interest. But the lower court denied the motion. On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) however, the latter dismissed the complaint because the plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest. Was the CA correct?
Yes. Plaintiffs claim that they are bona fide occupants of the property within the contemplation of the Friar Lands Act, having been allegedly in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the property, although it is not stated for how long and since when. In their second amended complaint they seek judgment to declare them as bona fide occupants. They do not pray to be declared owners of subject property — despite their alleged adverse possession — but only to be adjudged as the bona fide occupants thereof. In other words, they concede the State’s ownership of the property.
Being so, they may not be considered the real parties-in-interest for the purpose of maintaining the suit for cancellation of subject titles. The CA is correct in declaring that only the State, through the Solicitor General, may institute such suit.
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit (Rule 3, Section 2, Rules of Court). “Interest” within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The interest of the party must also be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third or unrelated party. “Real interest” on the other hand means a present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future contingent, subsequent or consequential interest.
If plaintiffs are to be believed, they would possess a mere inchoate interest in the properties covered by subject titles, a mere expectancy conditioned upon the fact that if the questioned titles are cancelled and the property is reverted to the State, they would probably or possibly be given preferential treatment as qualified buyers or lessees of the property under the Friar Lands Act. But this certainly is not the “interest” required by law that grants them the license or the personality to prosecute the case. Only to the State does the privilege belong (Canete et. al. vs. Genuino Ice Company Inc. G.R. 154080,
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