A non-precedent? (Part 2)

A perceptive reading of the majority opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio and the principal dissent by Senior Justice Reynato Puno unravels a clash of opposing views on three critical issues underlying the People’s Initiative ("PI") undertaken by certain groups led by Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado (the "Lambino Group").

These critical issues were: first, whether the Lambino Group’s petition complied with Constitutional requirements for amendment proposals through people’s initiative; second, whether the petition involved revisions or amendments; and, third, whether there was need to review the court’s 1997 ruling in Santiago vs. Commission on Elections declaring Republic Act No. 6735 "inadequate" to implement people’s initiative.

Another issue, really a corollary to the third, was whether the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group’s petition, solely on the strength of the Santiago decision.

To reiterate, a majority of 8 Justices, and 7 dissenting, ruled that: the Lambino Group had "miserably failed" to comply with requirements of Sec. 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on PI (the bases for this ruling were discussed in our last column); the petition proposed revisions to the Constitution while the Charter allows only proposals for amendments; and, consequently, there was no need to revisit the Santiago ruling.

Since the Comelec merely followed Santiago, it did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to entertain the petition of the Lambino Group.

On the first issue, whether the petition for initiative complied with the requirements of Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution, the majority opinion held it did not. The full text of the proposals had not been shown to the ostensible signatories before they signed the petition. Although this requirement was not specifically laid down in the Constitution, that was the clear intent of the framers.

Further, the majority noted, the requirements that the petition itself be signed by the people, and that their signatures, not merely their names, be verified, were not met.

The majority’s findings were based on express admissions of petitioner Lambino himself in oral argument, that only about 100,000 copies of the petition with signature sheets were printed, none of which contained the full text of the proposed changes.

On the other hand, the dissenting opinion, while acknowledging that there were "contentious issues of fact," noted that the question of compliance of the initiative petition with the Constitution should be fully litigated before and resolved by Comelec. Since it dismissed the initiative petition on the basis of the Santiago ruling, the Commission never did rule on the sufficiency of the form and substance of the petition. According to Justice Puno, the exchanges during the oral argument, including portions where Lambino vainly tried to explain his "admissions," need "further clarification and presentation of evidence to prove certain material facts."

The dissenting Justices’ solution was to remand the factual disputes to the Comelec which is "mandated by the Constitution to administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."

The dissenters also noted, in relation to these "contentious issues of fact," that the Supreme Court is not a "trier of facts." This notion simply proceeds from the principle that the High Court, in general, resolves only questions of law, and not of fact.

This is easy enough to understand in ordinary appeals where a case has gone through the wringer of trial before a municipal or regional trial court, or both, and then the Court of Appeals which decides both questions of fact and of law.

But once that process has been undergone, and the matter is still brought before the Supreme Court on appeal, the latter does not go through evidentiary hearings all over again. The Court will normally consult the record of lower court proceedings and make rulings on disputed questions of law on the basis of the factual record which the Court will take as final.

But under the rules of court, there are certain "original" cases filed in the Supreme Court which, by definition, have never been to trial. Or, some suits will precisely require administrative or quasi-judicial bodies to act upon a matter which they refuse to take cognizance of, to prohibit them from acting, or to require them to act in a certain way.

There would be no problem if no issues of fact are present. If there are, the Supreme Court typically remands or refers the matter to other courts or legally mandated agencies in order to receive evidence and resolve disputes of fact. Then the Court decides the issue of law on the basis of the factual record developed.

On the other hand, the Court sometimes sees no need for remand and relies upon "admissions" of the parties in pleadings or in oral argument (if granted). Its rulings, then, are based on these "facts," as "expressly admitted" by the parties. Such admissions are deemed fully binding on those parties.

There have been times when the Justices have agreed that remand was not necessary in the circumstances. On many occasions, though, there are disagreements among them on the facts. Some of our magistrates, usually in a minority, may, in such instances, express great discomfort that the rulings of law are rendered upon an undeveloped, incomplete or disputed factual record.

As in this initiative case. The minority here felt that remand was necessary since the majority based its "factual" findings on "admissions" which may not have been admissions at all, or were misinterpretations of facts elicited under the stress of a Justice’s relentless questions.

But the majority felt that the "express admissions" were made by a lawyer who was ostensibly knowledgeable in the process of initiative, in which he had been deeply involved. The probing questions may have been tough but, in their view, were fair. To further remand, as Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban huffed in his concurring opinion, would have been "imprudent and futile...a cop-out, a handwashing."

We continue, next time, with a discussion of the two other critical issues – whether the proposed Charter changes constituted mere amendments or prohibited revisions, and whether there was need to revisit, and reverse, the Santiago ruling –from the differing perspectives of Justices Carpio for the majority, and Puno for the dissenters.