Dealing with coup-lite

In certain countries, involvement in a coup d’etat that is crushed by the government can mean immediate execution for the ringleaders and indefinite incarceration for the foot soldiers.

In our country, certain quarters have turned coup plotting into a pastime. Since the successful military-backed people power revolts in 1986 and 2001, there has been an endless stream of attempts to use the military to effect yet another regime change.

And because all the coup attempts except for the one in December 1989 have not led to bloodshed, the public has learned to shrug off coup rumors and actual attempts, seeing the disturbances as coup-lite — nothing more than irritants, like traffic jams and floods. This tolerance in turn has emboldened coup plotters and their political manipulators.

Under the Articles of War, participation in a coup or mutiny warrants life imprisonment or death. But until the Oakwood mutiny in July 2003, we have treated coup plotters like mischievous children, giving them nothing more than an absent-minded slap on the wrist before sending them back to their assignments. That attitude has encouraged a recurrence of coup attempts.

Now the government is finally making noises about changing that attitude and throwing the book at coup plotters.

This change will not fuel further restiveness if soldiers can see that it is being implemented not so much to reduce the headaches of the Arroyo administration, but mainly as part of long-term reforms to create a professional, apolitical Armed Forces of the Philippines.

It may just be coup-lite, but if we want to create a professional AFP, we should stop treating coup plots lightly.

This must be done alongside other sweeping military reforms that address the needs of the Filipino soldier.

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Many of those needs are basic. One example: for want of emergency medical support, scores of soldiers have died in the battlefield. Except in a few areas of conflict, military airlift is possible only while the sun is out.

The lack of basic emergency medical assistance is just one of the numerous problems bedeviling the AFP, one of the most poorly equipped armies in the region. It is one of the causes of the disgruntlement that is feeding the coup culture.

Lack of funds, corruption, inefficient systems and sheer government neglect have helped nurture the messianic complex of certain military officers. When they recruit comrades, they are promising not only the liberation of the country from perdition but — closer to home for those being recruited — liberation from the rot in the AFP.

Defense Secretary Avelino Cruz, one of the good performers in the Arroyo Cabinet, has always been a low-key worker. But these days he is taking a high profile to send a strong message to AFP personnel that their needs are being addressed.

The Department of National Defense (DND) and AFP have started deploying to units in the frontlines combat medics who can perform trauma surgery.

"Combat Life Saver Kits" for emergencies are also being distributed. The kits include a patch that induces quick clotting to stanch bleeding. Cruz, during a long talk with me last Friday, was frustrated that it took such a long time before the AFP acquired such life-saving patches, which cost only $35 each.

With help from the United States, some Air Force helicopters now have night-flying capability. Medical Evacuation or MedEvac units with trauma facilities including blood plasma were introduced in 2004 and became fully operational last year.

The first of several 25-bed "forward field" or mobile hospitals costing P53 million each has also been set up at Camp Bautista in Busbos, Sulu. Wounded soldiers can be stabilized in the field hospital before they are airlifted to a bigger AFP station hospital in Zamboanga, and then to Metro Manila if needed for further treatment. Cruz hopes to set up soon a second mobile hospital in Cotabato.

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Better medical care especially for those in the frontlines is just one of 269 recommendations contained in the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) program, worked out over three years from 2001 with the assistance of the United States.

Many of the reforms are costly, especially for a military whose resources and capability went into precipitous decline after losing $200 million a year in rental for the US bases here. The Philippine government made little effort to make up for the loss, and the AFP soon felt the lack of funds even for proper maintenance of aircraft and other equipment.

Housing alone is a serious problem; the AFP has only 7,100 housing units for its 130,000 personnel, and funding is enough to build only 3,000 units costing P1.5 billion annually starting this year.

Cruz said Congress has committed P5 billion a year for six years from 2006 and P10 billion annually for another six years to acquire "mission essential equipment" including tactical radio sets, squad automatic weapons, night goggles, body armor, trucks, jeeps, night attack helicopters and Hueys.

The DND has also revised its budgeting and procurement systems to avoid waste, discourage corruption and provide for long-term planning.

The PDR objectives of "re-manning, re-equipping and retraining" the AFP include creating well-trained and fully equipped "battalions of excellence" as well as upgrading intelligence capability. The latter includes laying down guidelines to prevent intelligence services from being used for partisan political purposes even by Malacañang. Intelligence gathering will be limited to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency; violators face disciplinary sanctions.

Cruz is preparing to submit to Malacañang within a few weeks the draft of a new National Defense Act that will replace the current one passed in 1935.

Among other things, the bill seeks to keep politics out of AFP promotions, successions and assignments by laying down detailed rules and requirements. Adopting systems in military and diplomatic services in countries such as the US, Australia and Korea, for example, an officer will be forced to retire from the service if he fails to make it to star rank after 30 years of service. No officer can get two stars unless he still has at least two and a half years in the service; three stars will require at least a year and a half.

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Copies of the PDR have been distributed to the AFP officer corps. Defense and military officials have their own jargon; Cruz and his undersecretary, Rodel Cruz, talk of a "succession matrix" and "training modules."

The DND chief says one of his big problems is getting the word out to every AFP member that reforms are underway and quick fixes such as coup attempts are counterproductive.

Getting that word out to politicians, who keep trying to use the AFP to grab power, will be even harder.