Unconvincing evidence

Is the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code applicable to violations of B.P. Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law? In other words can a person be held liable for the issuance of a bouncing check by another person on the ground that the act of one is the act of all? This is the question answered in this case of the spouses Rey and Lina.

Rey and Lina were regular customers of Oscar in his pawnshop business. On three occasions, the spouses obtained loans from him. The loans were in the sum of P9,075.55; P12,730 and P8,496.55 all guaranteed by post dated checks issued by Rey alone as signatory. All the three postdated checks however bounced when presented for payment on their due dates for the reason "closed account". When the spouses failed to redeem the checks and replaced them with cash upon demand, Oscar sued the couple for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.

After trial and based on the lone testimony of Oscar who testified that Lina was present when her husband signed the first check but did not specify her participation with regards to the two other checks, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted both spouses for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law on three counts and sentenced each of them to one year imprisonment for each count. According to the RTC, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on conspiracy are applicable in a suppletory character to cases involving violation of B.P. 22 – a special law. So Lina is likewise guilty as a co-conspirator of her husband Rey even if she did not sign the checks. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) on appeal by Lina. Were the RTC and the CA correct?

The Supreme Court said that the RTC and the CA were correct in applying the principle of conspiracy in a suppletory character as B.P. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) like Article 8 which provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it".

But even if the principle of conspiracy is applicable to cases involving bouncing checks, Lina could not be held liable. To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused (Lina) must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or of moral assistance to her co-conspirator/s by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that Lina performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. She was merely present when the first check was issued by her husband Rey. With respect to the other checks, there were no details of her participation or the nature of her involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator or by another act of cooperation without which it would not have been accomplished. Her mere presence when the first check was issued cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship. Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of a common design or purpose. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence beyond reasonable doubt just like any element of the crime itself. Accordingly the constitutional presumption of Lina’s innocence must be upheld and she must be acquitted (Ladonga vs. People, G.R. 141066, February 17, 2005. 451 SCRA 673).

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