The proposed shift to a unicameral parliament

The scrapping of the 2007 elections may be grabbing the headlines these days. But the more fundamental, the critical, issue is still whether a unicameral parliamentary form of government must replace our existing bicameral presidential system.

This is particularly so, since the Transitory Provisions in the defunct Consultative Commission’s final report essentially put federalism on the back burner. There is no "transition period" recommended, certainly not the ten years that was being bruited about. It seems the Commission merely paid lip service to the idea of federalism, but left the details to someone else to tackle.

Until we have had an opportunity to comb through the records of the proceedings of the Commission’s committee and plenary sessions, we won’t really know whether any of the arguments in favor of the shift to a unicameral parliamentary system are backed up by any empirical studies or hard evidence.

Both sides have accused each other of making unsubstantiated claims and advancing arguments without any firm basis. For example, should we give up on the bicameral presidential system because it has "demonstrably" failed? Or has it failed only because we have not adopted "reforms" which will "clearly" resolve all the shortcomings we perceive in the present system?

Further, does the experience of other countries "indubitably" prove the superiority of the unicameral parliamentary system? Or is it "obvious" that the reasons for our poor economic performance are more complex than simply the "correct" form of government?

It’s no wonder that many suspect that while the arguments pro and con in the Commission may have been eloquent and based on strong beliefs, they have stayed in the realm of the rhetorical and the theoretical. The issues may not have been truly joined, except in terms of who belonged to the majority and who was in the minority. I fervently hope these suspicions are disproved by the records of the proceedings.

Still, we can begin with some of the objections raised by the minority in the "Dissenting Report" which the group of "only" seven submitted to President GMA. The general areas they cited give us a fairly adequate basis on which to see where the principal areas of disagreement are.

Concentration of power in the parliament–The majority denies that power will be concentrated in the hands of politicians in a parliamentary system, as the minority insists. Such concentration is evident in the presidential system too. In the matter of appropriations, rather than the Prime Minister and the majority coalition having unlimited discretion over the budget, it is that majority coalition composed of the President and her allies in Congress, both the House of Representatives and the Senate, who today effectively control the budget.

At present, the President and certain executive offices under her control and supervision are provided confidential funds subject to no, or only cursory, audits. Witness the ongoing "investigations in aid of legislation" looking into the fertilizer fund scam, the diversion of infrastructure funds to election spending, and many other such "scams," all of which show the wide latitude of the Executive in the appropriation and expenditure of public funds. Are "checks and balances" the solution?

Checks and Balances–The minority says there is no system of checks and balances in a parliament to control possible abuses and prevent corruption. But it’s pretty clear that the existence of checks and balances today has done little, if anything, to stop wastage and outright theft of public funds. The minority finds the "internal checks," mainly exercised by a parliamentary opposition, inadequate.

The evidence on this score goes both ways. Where there is a genuine and active opposition which takes its job as fiscalizer seriously, the government in power tends to try to stay on its toes, especially since the parliamentary opposition typically organizes a watchdog "shadow government" which considers itself a government-in-waiting.

Cronyism flourishes whatever the system, and not only in a parliamentary environment, as the minority submits. Cronyism flowers best in a dictatorship. In an ostensible democracy, it depends, among other things, on a vigilant citizenry, the quality of enforcement and an independent, honest and effective judiciary.

Inherent instability of parliamentary system – The notion that the Prime Minister is utterly dependent on other members of Parliament for his continued incumbency, and that this dependence enshrines "transactional decision-making" as the parliamentary way of governance, seems overstated. Politicians catering to special interests are characteristic of our presidential system too. There is ample evidence of this.

It simply does not follow that representatives elected by local constituencies to a unicameral national legislature will promote only local or special interests, and be absolutely uninterested in the national interest.

The evidence from other countries does not indicate any "inherent" instability in government resulting from the ability to change leaders frequently. If anything, the experience in Southeast Asia is to the contrary. Both Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore and Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia served for decades and were largely instrumental in spurring their countries’ sustained growth. While Italy’s revolving-door governments are often cited as proof of this instability, the phenomenon may be peculiar to Italy and is not necessarily an indication of what might happen in this country.

The minority does not concede what is considered a principal advantage of the parliamentary system: The ability to change governments by a no-confidence vote actually prevents instability by allowing a legal transfer of power without need of revolutions or extra-constitutional disruptions.

The principle has been established in this country that a national leader must retain the confidence and support of the people in order to remain in office. However, the presidential system generally prescribes impeachment as the only method of forcing a President, who is unwilling to resign and is not physically disabled, out of office during the term for which he or she is elected. (To be continued)