A matter of nomenclature

Service of summons is the process by which a Court acquires jurisdiction over an individual or a corporation. If a summons has been improperly served upon a corporation, should a case be dismissed against the said corporation on the ground of lack of jurisdiction? This is the issue raised in this case of Cora.

On September 22, 1999, Cora filed a complaint for damages and reimbursement of insurance premiums against a multi-national insurance company (IC) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City where she resides. Her complaint stated that the IC may be served with summons through its manager at its branch office in Davao City. So summons together with a copy of the complaint was served upon the IC’s Davao Regional Office and was received by its Insurance Service Officer on November 19, 1999.

On December 8, 1999, the IC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person due to improper service of summons. It contended that summons should have been served on its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel as provided in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, not on its Insurance Service Officer.

On December 9, 1999, Cora filed an amended complaint alleging that summons and other court processes could also be served on IC at its principal office at U.N. Avenue, Manila through its President and any of its officers authorized to receive it.

On December 10, 1999, the RTC denied IC’s motion to dismiss and directed the issuance of an alias summons to be served at its main office in Manila. The RTC said that the improper service of summons is not a ground to dismiss the complaint and that the remedy was to issue an alias summons. While the IC has already received the alias summons together with a copy of the amended complaint in Manila through the proper officer, it still insisted that the RTC should have dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because the service of summons at its regional office through an insurance officer was improper. IC contended that the alias summons was improperly issued and served because its issuance presupposes the existence of a previous valid summons, which has not been served or has been lost. In this case the previous summons has not been lost but has been served though improperly. Was the IC correct?

No. A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. It is difficult to conceive that when a defendant personally appears before a court complaining that he had not been validly summoned the case filed against him should be dismissed. An alias summons can be actually served on the defendant.

In this case, the complaint was amended after IC filed the motion to dismiss thus the amended complaint superseded the complaint it amended. When summons has not yet been validly served on the defendant, new summons for the amended complaint must be served on him. Technically, in this case, the RTC should have ordered the issuance of a new summons for the amended complaint and not an alias summons for the original complaint, which is merely a continuation of the original summons. There was no sense in issuing an alias summons for the original complaint since it had already been amended.

Nevertheless, it is not pertinent whether the summons is designated as "original’" or an "alias" summons as long as it has adequately served its purpose of making certain that the corporation would promptly and properly receive the notice of the filing of an action against it. What is essential is that the summons complies with the requirements of the Rules of Court and it has been duly served on the defendant together with the prevailing complaint. In this case the alias summons satisfies the requirements under the Rules both as to content and the manner of service. Moreover, the second summons was technically not an alias summons but more of a new summons on the amended complaint. It was not a continuation of the first summons considering that it particularly referred to the amended complaint, not the original complaint (Philamlife vs. Breva et al. G.R. 147937, November 11, 2004).

E-mail: [email protected]