The case stemmed from the resolution adopted by the CHR on September 4, 1998 based on the special provisions of the General Appropriations Act of 1998 applicable to all Constitutional Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy, wherein it approved and authorized the creation of ten additional plantilla positions, the upgrade of various existing positions and augmentation of the commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel Services to support such creation and upgrading of positions. In the implementation of said resolution, two other resolutions were adopted by the CHR: (1) on October 19, 1998, raising the salary grades of 21 positions, creating 4 new positions and upgrading 3 other positions; and on November 17, 1998 collapsing 11 vacant positions to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification.
The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) however disapproved the plantilla reclassification. In view of this disapproval, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) NCR Office recommended to the CSC Central Office that the subject appointments of personnel in the proposed plantilla reclassification be rejected. Such recommendation was supported by the rank and file employees of the CHR represented by the CHR Employees Association (CHREA) since the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions and will eat up the portion of the budgetary pie allocated for Personnel Services. CHREA contended that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification, upgrading and creation of positions. But the CSC upheld the validity of the CHR resolution. And the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the CSC. The CA said that the CHR has the authority to cause the upgrading, reclassification, plantilla creation and collapsing scheme without prior approval of the DBM because CHR is a Constitutional Office enjoying fiscal autonomy. Was the CA correct?
No. Article IX, Sections 1 and 5 of the Constitution state in no uncertain terms that only the Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall be independent and shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Along the same vein, the Administrative Code (Book II Sections 25 and 26) also say that the constitutional commissions shall include the Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit. It is abundantly clear from the Constitution and the Administrative Code that the CHR is not among the class of constitutional commissions. "Expressium facit cessare tacitum" - what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.
Nor does the CHR enjoy fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time. As envisioned in the Constitution, only the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, the Commission on Audit and the Office of the Ombudsman enjoy fiscal autonomy because they need full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their need require in the discharge of their constitutional duties.
Besides even assuming that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, its authority to formulate and implement the organizational structures of its respective offices and determine the compensation of its personnel is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law. Under sections 2 and 4 of said law, it is the DBM that shall establish and administer the unified Compensation and Position Classification System (Commission on Human Rights Employees Association etc. vs. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. 155336 November 25, 2004).
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