Cancellable right

Adoption is the act of one who takes another’s child into his own family, treating him as his own and giving him all the rights and duties of his own child. It actually creates the relation of paternity and filiation, but to have a legal binding effect there must be a court decree of adoption issued upon petition of the adopter. But, does a person have an inherent "right" to adopt and consequently, the vested right to rescind said adoption? This is the issue raised in this case of the couple Nita and Andy.

Nita and Andy had been blessed with so many things in life except having a child. To compensate for this void in their married life, they took into their custody and care, and reared as their own, Nita’s two year old nephew Boyet.

For years, Boyet enjoyed the warmth, love and support of Nita and Andy. To the couple, Boyet had become their own "son". And so when Boyet was already in his teens, they decided to formalize the relationship by filing a petition to adopt Boyet. On May 5, 1972 an order granting their petition was issued which made all the more intense their feeling of affection for the young lad. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar changed the surname of Boyet into that of the couple’s surname.

But as years passed, the couple realized that the parents-son relationship was only good on paper. Despite their proddings and pleadings, Boyet refused to change his surname. He did not reciprocate the same warmth and affection given by the couple. When Andy was already dying, he even expressed his desire to revoke the adoption. He was only prevailed upon by Nita to desist from doing so by convincing him just to give to charity whatever properties or interests may pertain to Boyet in the future.

After Andy’s death, the relationship between Nita and Boyet even worsened. Having been widowed Nita yearned for the care and show of concern from a son. But Boyet remained indifferent and would only visit her in her homeprovince once a year. Even when Nita went to Manila for treatment and medical check up, Boyet remained callous and utterly indifferent towards her. When Boyet became a career professional, he continued using the surname of his biological parents in the records of the Professional Regulations Commission, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with the practice of his profession. In utter disregard of Nita’s feelings expressed in several instances.

These turn of events revealing Boyet’s callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Nita to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Nita filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

In view of the aforequoted provision, Boyet moved to dismiss the petition of Nita on the ground of lack of cause of action. Nita however insisted that RA 8552 should not adversely affect her rights to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws in effect when the decree of adoption was granted and enforced.

Was Nita correct?

No.

Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Nita filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Nita after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state’s determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate (Lahom vs. Sibulo G.R. 143989, July 14, 2003).

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