Sufficient cause to complain

The well-settled rule is that a party who moves to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits all the averments in said complaint regardless of the defenses raised in his answer. This is once more reiterated in this case of Danilo.

The case involved a vacant lot in the Tala Estate Subdivision in Quezon City which was being used by Danilo and his agents as a jeepney terminal. On March 16, 1994, CR Realty filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint against Danilo for damages and injunction alleging among others: (1) that CR Realty owned the said vacant lot designated as lot 68 in its TCT No. RT 90200;(2) that Danilo and his agents however were claiming the portion of lot 68 and using it as a jeepney terminal; (3) that despite its clarification that the jeepney terminal was within lot 68,Danilo persisted in his plans to have the area fenced by applying for a fencing permit which was already granted;(4) that Danilo was preventing CR Realty and its agents from entering its property under threats of bodily harm and destroying existing structures thereon. So CR Realty prayed that Danilo and his agents be enjoined from claiming possession and ownership over lot 68 and from making use of it as a jeepney terminal.CR also asked the court that Danilo be made to pay P650.00 daily as lost income for the use of the lot until possession is restored plus actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

In his answer, Danilo alleged: (1) that the vacant lot referred to in the complaint was within lot 90 of the subdivision covered by his TCT No.RT-78110; (2) that he was not claiming any portion of lot 68 claimed by CR; (3) that he had the legal right to fence lot 90 since it belonged to him and had a permit to do so; (4) that CR had no color of right over lot 90 and hence was not entitled to the injunction; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.

As a result of the conflicting claims of the parties to the vacant lot used as a jeepney terminal, a verification and relocation survey was conducted wherein it would appear that the said lot is within lot 68.Danilo vigorously objected to the said survey and insisted that the lot was within his lot 90, adverting to the report of another geodeticc engineer. Danilo asserted a superior claim because he said that his title has been confirmed through a judicial reconstitution proceedings while that of CR did not carry a technical description except only as it is designated in the title as lot 68 of the Tala estate.

From the viewpoint of Danilo, the complaint would no longer involve a simple case of collection of damages and injunction but a review of his title vis-avis the title of CR, so he filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.

Acting on Danilo’s motion, the lower court dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The lower court held that CR was in effect impugning the title of Danilo which could not be done in the case for damages and injunction it had filed. The court cited the rule that a Torrens Title could not be the subject of a collateral attack but can only be challenged through a direct proceeding before the Land Registration Court. So it concluded that it could not decide CR’s claim for damages and injunction for lack of jurisdiction because its judgment would depend upon a determination of the validity of Danilo’s title and the identity of the land covered by it. This ruling was sustained by the CA.

Were the CA and the lower court correct?

No.

A complaint states a cause of action if it has a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate said right; and an act or omission on the part of said defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to plaintiff.

The test of sufficiency of the facts found in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. Hence if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be raised by the defendant.

In this case, CR’s cause of action has been sufficiently averred in the complaint. If it were admitted that the right of ownership of CR to the peaceful use and possession of lot 68 was violated by Danilo’s act of encroachment and fencing of the same, then CR would be entitled to damage.

The trial court also has jurisdiction to determine the identity and location of the vacant lot in question. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. It cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. Furthermore, in this case Danilo may be considered estopped to question the jurisdiction of the trial court for he took an active part in the case. In his answer, he did not question the jurisdiction of the trial court to grant the reliefs prayed for in the complaint. His geodetic engineer were present in the verification and relocation surveys. It was only when the second survey showed results adverse to his case that he submitted the motion to dismiss questioning the court’s jurisdiction.

Both parties in this case claim the vacant lot is within their property. This is an issue that can be best resolved by the trial court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. After the land has been originally registered. the Land Registration Court ceases to have jurisdiction over contests concerning the location of the boundary lines. In such case the action in personam has to be instituted before the ordinary court of general jurisdiction (Ceroferr Realty vs. Court of Appeals et al. G.R. 139539 February 5,2002).

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