Bottling the military genie

The  exposure  of  military men to  civilian  functions  and politicians in the last three decades stripped the mystic of civilian  rule and military subordination. Too many  civilian officials  and  political figures left indelible  impressions  of ineptitude, opportunism and corruption among military men  interacting with them in the martial law years and beyond. For many in the military, familiarity with civilian authorities bred mostly contempt.

In the face of much publicized nationwide perceptions  of governmental weakness, inefficiency  and  general indecisiveness,  many military men could now think the unthinkable: why continue to support this soft constitutional order, why continue  to  obey feckless civilian authorities who are often hostile to the military who secure them? Why not take over and take charge?

There is no way now to abort  these subversive thoughts. The many years of martial law and most of the years following Marcos’ fall conspire in  birthing such ideas. (In the past decade and a half, many military men exercised themselves as political creatures and most of them did not choose to become senators and congressmen.) The problem now is how to keep ideas of military intervention from reaching full term, from being nurtured so well by current political and economic realities that they are finally delivered as a successful military coup.

Obviously, the best response of a civilian government  to  any military challenge is  to improve  the level and quality of government  performance.  This strategy  undercuts military adventurism in  two  ways. First, it provides the military with an alternative view of civilian  government as being concerned and reasonably effective; contrary views then are more easily defused as being objectively wrong and mostly politically motivated. Second, it builds up the government’s democratic base and thus makes  it unlikely for military plotters to succeed in overthrowing the civilian authorities.

Where  government performance is difficult to improve for whatever reason, myopic authorities might try to manage the military by buying it off or dividing it  so no faction is able to launch a successful bid for power.  These strategies do buy  the  authorities time, but they  are counterproductive  in  the  long  run. Marcos  tried  to buy off the military by allowing  his  loyalists to develop illegitimate, lucrative interests within  and outside the military. The  strategy  backfired  precisely because it depended on limited favoritism, on building  up a  small class of privileged military  men  at  the expense of the majority within the military, those who were marginalized and embittered by Marcos’ mercenary approach.

Some politicians might be  considering  the divide-and-rule  option at present. Key military personalities, service branches and other focuses of small-group loyalties within the military appear to be targets of political probes which disrupts unity within the military. The tragic consequence of this divisive option  is to  demoralize members of an institution whose strength flows from its being a highly unified body. Without unity, institutional resolve does not develop among military men. The military might as well be abolished as nothing destabilizes constitutional orders more than a fractious armed forces.

Another  approach  has to be tried,  one  which  acknowledges the shortcomings of civilian government in the past and offers a credible program of effective government for the near future. The approach needs to explore the general  framework  of democratic political systems and  the  specific context of a democratizing Philippines. The  constitutionally explicit roles of the military   must be identified and fully discussed as the issue of democratic constitutionalism is explored with men in uniform.

Civilian authorities  have to clarify and make use of  two  traits  which thinking military men probably have: patriotism and decisiveness. The operationalization of these concepts must demand such virtues of military men ahead of the civilian authorities.  The  tactical objective here  is to  sufficiently moderate the military’s aggressive demands on the civilian authorities by encouraging the military to undertake its own serious institutional assessment; in the process, the civilian authorities are able to buy some time to prove themselves equal to the task of governance. The strategic end is to get the military used to thinking primarily of its institutional tasks (i.e. military professionalization and modernization) within the broader context of constitutional democratization and national development.

Patriotism  and decisiveness must be presented  to  military men as being served  by an unwavering determination  to prioritize institutional and national  integrity over one’s personal integrity. An officer who refuses to be on the take but will not inform on or help prosecute wayward peers might  have  personal integrity but he serves no more than a limited, personally-gratifying objective. A nation and its institutions are not  served by those whose loyalties exclude institutional focus for whatever reason. Constitutionalism fortifies civilian authority and those in the military have to learn that personal bonds as well as agency loyalty may subvert the superior institutional focus – the nation-state and its civilian government.

Even  when civilian authorities are  demonstrably deficient  in patriotism or decisiveness, military men should not be encouraged to undertake role comparisons that tempt them to march into politics and assume the role of ultimate guardians for the nation. On the other hand, every effort must be exerted to help them appreciate the dangerous nature and costly consequences of military politicization. For those who successfully resist their temptations, military professionalization within a foreseeable future must be offered in all seriousness. Military careers that are largely insulated from political interventions must be made possible. Professional pride, status advancement and material compensation have to be much improved for those in the military; otherwise, the oft-touted dignification of a military career is reduced to so much rhetoric.

Integral to this strategy, a resolute, continuous and transparent military house-cleaning must be put in place. Equally vital would be a credible initiative towards military modernization, a sine qua non for those who would professionalize the country’s military. The first move seeks to persuade military men that those who would build up military constitutionalism are serious about their objectives of clean and effective governance; the second tries to assure AFP members that they will not be forced back into medieval soldiering — as they had been most of the last 100 years – but will indeed be in keeping with modern times.

Other strategies for bottling the military genie can be identified. (For instance, a program for summarily dealing with any member of the military participating in the planning, organizing and/or execution of a coup may be drawn up by the legislature and enforced either judicially or extrajudicially.) However, those delineated here comprise the minimum programs for any attempt at military constitutionalism to be successful. Civilian authorities and politicians who treat these programs as less than urgent – or emasculate them in any way — obviously put the country’s fragile democratic order at great risk.