Presidential instincts

Presidents do not suffer from lack of good instincts. Yet every president we have had since 1986 had distrusted those instincts at crucial times and made decisions which spelled a relative depreciation of their place in Philippine history or their outright downfall.

History would have reserved an even better place for President Aquino if she had not blinked in the face of the agrarian reform possibilities for Hacienda Luisita. When she chose to go against her progressive instinct and allow for a more conservative family decision to prevail, her image as a crusading national leader suffered much. Henceforth, many sectors which had been calling for progressive – some would mistakenly say radical – changes became skeptical about her pledge to turn around the oligarch society that Marcos perpetuated and systematically plundered.

President Ramos’ instinct for opening up the economy – leveling as much as possible of the playing field and inducing competitiveness – was definitely in the right direction. It would have made for a paradigm shift in a country where the incestuous union between politics and business cloaked a tendency not so much to create new wealth as to expropriate what others have created. However, when his administration started questioning signed contracts that had apparently been above board, a key element in the strategy of economic development – the confidence of both local and foreign investors – was undermined. Again, the ugly head of political intervention had surfaced and the Ramos economic program accordingly earned more than its share of skeptics.

The most impressive case of a president going against his instinct with dramatic consequences involves President Estrada. During the process of impeachment in the House and the trial in the Senate, his political instinct inclined him to wage an extensive public campaign against his opposition. However, those who presumed to know better strongly advised a largely legal strategy, not bothering much about the erosion of his public confidence since the administration supposedly had the requisite number in both Houses to either block the impeachment or to acquit him.

As one familiar with media and the public pulse, Estrada chafed much against his legalistic advisers. For him, the more natural course was to go public and build up his case before the court of public opinion. His advisers would not let him – foolishly preferring their stonewalling strategy which resulted in a daily erosion of presidential credibility as the nation watched its now favorite telenovela.

Beyond the point of no return, with the trial aborted and EDSA II already in place, Estrada could have rued the decision not to overrule his advisers and follow his instincts. The country might not have been better-off if he had done this, but it certainly would not have made for multiple crises of legitimacy between late January and May 1, 2001. Democratic institution-building would not have suffered as many jolts and the May elections would have been truly a referendum on the Estrada administration.

Finally, we have President Arroyo. Her instincts appear to favor liberal and reconciliatory policies at a time when nearly everyone in the country speaks of healing the wounds which the last months had inflicted on the nation. The Catholic Church’s and businesses reconsecration of their respective constituencies suggests that these wounds have a far longer historical context. Oppression in Philippine society highlighted by the cavalier neglect of the poor was there way before Highway 54 became EDSA.

After an initial hardline stance against the May First demonstrators and some of the leading opposition members, President Arroyo has reverted to her truer instincts. In overruling some of her more sanguine and medieval-minded advisers, she has shown the independence of mind which did not characterize the president she replaced. Notwithstanding the favorable Supreme Court rulings and the May elections that the Comelec bungled, she continues to work at building up a more secure base of political legitimacy among her people. Reaching out to various sectors – poor and non-poor alike – she also has not neglected the followers of the deposed president. Probably adept at understanding the power of popular images, she has invested in two visits to the jailed president and gone on record as not opposing a more liberal house arrest for him.

It is too early to say whether President Arroyo will continue to make better use of her instincts than those who preceded her in Malacañang. Yet, for the good of a country that deserves better times and better leadership, it would not be amiss to wish she could.