Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944 – the greatest naval battle in history

The Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944 is considered the greatest naval battle in history, with the Allied naval forces led by Gen. Douglas MacArthur almost losing out to the Japanese imperial naval forces.

The Allied forces prevailed by a stroke of luck when the Japanese fleet entered the gulf at a time when the mighty US Third Fleet, the backbone of MacArthur’s beachhead, was about 350 miles away chasing a supposed decoy let loose by the enemy.

A miscalculation committed by the Japanese during the naval engagement turned the tide for the American fleets.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf involved 282 warships, compared with 250 at Jutland (Europe) in 1916, until then the greatest naval engagement in history.

Unlike in Jutland, neither side had won, but the battle of Leyte Gulf had been decisive.

The Americans lost one light carrier, two escort carriers, and three destroyers. They had sunk four carriers, three battleships, six heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and eight destroyers.

War records showed that just two days before MacArthur made the historic beachhead on Oct. 20, 1944, the Japanese were able to intercept a coded message sent by the Americans revealing the naval strength of the liberators.

A brilliant plan was hatched by Admiral Soedu Toyoda, who had under his command seven battleships, 13 heavy cruisers, and three light cruisers, then racing from Singapore under Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita.

Kurita was instructed to divide the force in two, with the smaller detachment, under Vice Admiral Teiji Wishimura, entering Leyte Gulf through Surigao Strait, and the main body commanded by Kurita himself knifing through San Bernardino Strait north of Samar.

Both forces would then converge on MacArthur’s troop transports and Admiral Thomas Kinkaid’s warships composing the Seventh Fleet.

The Japanese also created a third flotilla of four overaged carriers and two battleships which were converted into carriers whose mission is to lure the American Task Force 34 away from Leyte Gulf.

TF 34 was the Third Fleet’s backbone under Admiral William Halsey, which guarded San Bernardino Strait during MacArthur’s beachhead.

MacArthur, for his part, noted the confusing command structure of the liberating forces.

While Kinkaid was subordinate to him, MacArthur noted Halsey was answerable only to Admiral Chester Nimitz based in Hawaii.

The split command worried MacArthur, who had urged the Joint Chiefs to resolve the confusing command structure. Much to his dismay, MacArthur’s pleas were ignored.

Things turned out unexpectedly for both sides, forcing the Allies and the Japanese to alter their plans as the battle raged.

The Japanese, for instance, never expected their fleet would be spotted by US submarines on the night of Oct. 23, 1944. The following day, two of Kurita’s cruisers were sunk.

Its crew also warned Halsey and Kinkaid that “trouble was on its way.”

With the message, the Allied forces, including MacArthur’s Hashville, geared up for battle.

Raring to go

MacArthur himself wanted to go along, telling Kinkaid that all his life, he had “been reading and studying naval combat, and the glamor of sea battle” had excited his imagination. Kinkaid, however, turned him down.

According to MacArthur’s biographer William Manchester, “MacArthur submitted, but his interest in the coming engagement was more than whimsical. If such vessels as the Yamato and the Musashi broke through, their eighteen-inch guns could easily sink all American transports and bombard the beachhead into submission.”

In the initial engagement, American planes sank the leviathan Musashi, which the Japanese thought was “unsinkable” because of its armored decks.

Kurita was forced to turn his fleet away from Leyte Gulf in an attempt to sail beyond reach of American planes and return later in the evening.

As pieced together by Manchester, “Halsey concluded that he (Kurita) was retreating and could now be ignored.”

The American admiral noted no enemy carriers had been sighted. Believing that there must be some in the vicinity, he sent up additional reconnaissance plants for a broader search.

At 5 p.m. they finally discovered (Vice Admiral Jisaburo) Ozawa’s bait. Hasley went for it, leaving San Bernardino Straight wide open.”

As reported earlier, Ozawa’s flotilla was intended as a decoy to draw Halsey’s fast and powerful fleet from San Bernardino Strait.

On the night of Oct. 24, the southern unit of Kurita’s fleet commanded by Mishimuro entered the narrow waters of Surigao Strait.

As the Japanese vessels came through one by one, the force of US Navy Rear Admiral Josse Oldenderf “raked them viciously with broadsides from all his ships.”

“Mishimura drowned,” recorded Manchester, “and his force was wiped out.”

Later that night, US scouting planes spotted Kurita’s fleet retreating toward San Bernardino Strait. At that time, Halsey’s Task Force 34 was 160 miles to the north chasing Ozawa’s decoy flotilla.

Manchester wrote: “Believing that Mishimura represented the only threat to him, and under the impression that a detachment of Halsey’s battle fleet was still guarding San Bernardino Strait, Kinkaid sent reconnaissance flights to the northeast.

“To his horror, Kinkaid learned that Kurita was almost on top of his fleet and that the Japanese naval force was intact except for the sunken Musashi.

“Kurita had passed through San Bernardino Strait and was already training his mammoth guns on Kinkaid’s fleet covering MacArthur’s beachhead.”

Thus began Kinkaid’s frantic radio messages to Halsey, but received no response.

Half an hour later, Kinkaid repeated the call for help. But by that time, Halsey’s TF 34 was 350 miles away and was beginning to pummel Ozawa as the American prospects in Leyte Gulf turned grim.

“At this point,” noted Manchester, “there occurred one of the most remarkable episodes in the history of naval warfare. Kurita was less than thirty miles from his objective.”

The American destroyers nevertheless put up a gallant stand, counterattacking Kurita’s battleships.

“Kurita’s Goliaths milled around in confusion,” Manchester wrote, “as the persistent David, some of them sinking, made dense smoke.”

This was the critical moment.

It was 11:15 am on Oct. 25, 1944. Kinkaid again radioed Halsey: “Situation very serious.  Your assistance badly needed.”

Back in Hawaii, Admiral Nimitz had been monitoring the events. He then sent a sharp dispatch to Halsey: “The whole world wanted to know where is Task Force 34.”

That did it, Manchester recorded.

Halsey, breaking off action from the Japanese decoy flotilla, immediately sent six fast battleships and a carrier force back to Leyte.

But for straying far from San Bernardino Strait, the support force could only reach Leyte by the next morning.

The Japanese were able to intercept messages revealing plans for US carrier planes to land on Leyte. The purpose was to prevent the aircraft from being sunk with their carriers.

Kurita, however, believed the plan was preliminary to swarming attacks on his ships by land-based US aircraft.

He intercepted and misread two of Kinkaid’s messages to Halsey. Believing that Halsey was approaching rapidly and that he would soon bolt the door of San Bernardino Strait, Kurita turned back before 10 pm – unaware that Halsey’s leading ships would not reach it for three more hours.

Thus ended the Battle of Leyte Gulf.