DFA Secretary Lazaro’s soft diplomacy

The Philippines finds itself in the most consequential conflict of this generation.

The country is confronting China in the West Philippine Sea, a powerful neighbor who ignores international law, harasses Filipino fishermen, endangers Philippine servicemen and steadily expands its presence within waters where it has no lawful entitlement.

At the center of the country’s diplomatic defense stands Foreign Affairs Secretary Theresa Lazaro.

No one disputes Secretary Lazaro’s competence, experience or professionalism. She is a seasoned diplomat who has spent decades navigating complex international relationships.

Yet diplomacy, like warfare, must evolve with changing realities. The methods that work in peaceful times become inadequate when dealing with an adversarial state that habitually employs intimidation, coercion and brinkmanship to achieve its objectives. Unfortunately, Secretary Lazaro continues to practice diplomacy as though all parties are committed to the same rules-based order.

Under Xi Jinping’s command, China has demonstrated that it does not respond to persuasion, negotiations or carefully crafted diplomatic statements. Rather, it responds to leverage, deterrence, public exposure and consequences. By remaining anchored in a softer, traditional style of diplomacy, Secretary Lazaro is placing the Philippines at a strategic disadvantage.

The following incidents tell the whole story:

First, last January, China publicly attacked Coast Guard spokesman Commodore Jay Tarriela and several Filipino officials. Beijing sought to intimidate through public statements and propaganda. Imagine, a foreign government openly attacking Philippine officials for defending the country’s sovereignty, as if doing so was an act of aggression.

Many expected Secretary Lazaro to summon the Chinese ambassador, issue a forceful protest and make it clear that no foreign government could dictate what Philippine officials do or say. Instead, she called for restraint, emphasized the need to preserve “diplomatic space.” At the very moment the Philippines needed to defend its rights and integrity, Lazaro retreated to “restraint.” This left the country vulnerable to further intimidation and strategic pressure.

Second, Beijing crossed another line when it imposed sanctions on Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro and his family. Teodoro was singled out because he had become one of the most outspoken critics of Chinese aggression. The sanctions were clearly intended to intimidate. By extending them to members of his family, Beijing transformed what could have been dismissed as diplomatic retaliation into something far more vindictive and deeply personal.

Again, the appropriate response would have been the immediate summoning of the Chinese ambassador, file a formal protest and publicly declare that the sanctions are unacceptable.

Instead, Lazaro declared that China’s actions were within its “sovereign right.” Only after public outage did she characterize the sanctions as an unfriendly act.

Third, with regards to the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct negotiations, the DFA should have publicly established its non-negotiable red lines from the get go. Among them, the Code must be anchored on UNCLOS; it must respect the 2016 Arbitral Award; it must not restrict the Philippines from forming alliances and it must not legitimize China’s unlawful maritime claims.

Lazaro did not define these red lines. Instead, she placed greater emphasis on “preserving” negotiations.

Fourth, Lazaro’s role in negotiating the Ayungin Shoal provisional arrangement sent the wrong signal. The Philippines should never have negotiated the exercise of rights that already belong to it under international law. Rights that already exist do not require another country’s permission. By agreeing to negotiate the terms under which those rights could be exercised, the Philippines risked creating the impression that China possesses some legitimate authority over Ayungin Shoal when, legally, it does not.

The Philippines should have insisted on exercising its rights without need for any agreement.

Fifth, Secretary Lazaro appears reluctant to fully embrace the transparency strategy that has become one of the Marcos administration’s most successful initiatives.

By documenting and publicizing Chinese harassment, the Philippines transformed what was once a regional dispute into a matter of international concern. Global support increased. International media attention intensified. China found itself increasingly on the defensive. The transparency strategy succeeded precisely because it exposed Beijing’s actions to the world.

Yet, Lazaro remains hesitant on exposing China’s bad behavior. She is effectively giving China a media umbrella for its unlawful acts.

Sixth, Secretary Lazaro has repeatedly emphasized the importance of preserving “diplomatic space” with Beijing. Certainly, maintaining communication channels makes for good diplomacy. Duterte spent years dealing with China with accommodation and quiet engagement. What happened? China did not moderate its bad behavior – it intensified it.

The lesson should now be obvious – soft diplomacy does not work against a state that relies on coercion and intimidation. Secretary Lazaro’s insistence on soft diplomacy is akin to insisting on a strategy that has proven to fail.

Case after case, Secretary Lazaro’s instinct has been restraint when circumstances call for firmness and pushback. She defers to accommodation when circumstances calls for leverage. She resorts to quiet diplomacy when circumstances call for pressure.

This raises an uncomfortable but unavoidable question: is Secretary Lazaro the right person to lead the DFA in this period of intensifying confrontation with China?

The situation has become so bothersome that rumors have begun circulating within political circles that a powerful figure within the executive branch is coaxing Lazaro to treat China with cotton gloves. It is said that this person has commercial deals with Beijing.

Let me be clear. We do not need reckless diplomacy. We do not need inflammatory rhetoric. Nor should we abandon negotiations altogether. What we need is a foreign secretary who understands that diplomacy and deterrence are not mutually exclusive. That approaches need to be flexible depending on the situation and the characteristics of the adversary.

I write this piece with the hope that Secretary Lazaro course-corrects. Like I said, she is a seasoned diplomat, but perhaps its time to trade the cotton gloves for an iron fist.

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E-mail: [email protected]. Follow him on Twitter @aj_masigan