Foreign interference demands more than rhetoric

When I visited China’s capital, Beijing, in 2011, the scale of what I saw on the trip from the airport to my hotel in the city center made it clear that China is a big and powerful country with ambitious plans for the future.

That Chinese Ambassador Jing Quan said last week that, if China wants to use force, it may easily win is not surprising and must be taken seriously. He added that China would not choose force and loved peace. That is what we must be skeptical about.

There may be no direct confrontation in the immediate future, but as they say, if you want peace, prepare for war. Thus, aside from deft diplomacy, we also need to continue modernizing our navy and air force and properly equipping our coast guard. A credible capacity to defend ourselves gives diplomacy a sharp edge.

But defending ourselves also means recognizing that a foreign power can pursue its aims without open confrontation. That is why the assurance that “China chooses peace” deserves closer scrutiny. We also need to examine the less visible means through which it may seek influence, including sophisticated disinformation networks reportedly operating as early as 2015. These networks promote pro-China narratives or support politicians seen as aligned with, or subservient to, Chinese interests. Studies by strategic think tanks suggest that some of these networks bear the imprint of Chinese state involvement.

The powers competing for influence in our region can read the Philippines quite easily. They can see the openings created by corruption and political loyalties that override public duty. They know which divisions to deepen and where pressure might work.

We can begin with the alleged use of foreign money to influence our elections through online operations and our politicians through payments to businesses linked to them. These require serious investigation and a full institutional review of not just our capability to respond to such alleged threats but also our laws.

Currently, it seems we are merely preoccupied with rhetoric and counter-rhetoric. Those who may favor closer relations with China are labeled as pro-China, ‘tsinadors’ if they are senators, or worse, traitors. But public labeling or disagreements cannot substitute for proof and effective institutional action against foreign interference in our elections and political establishment.

The Omnibus Election Code prohibits foreigners from directly or indirectly aiding candidates or political parties, and from spending in connection with election campaigns or partisan political activity. It also prohibits soliciting or receiving foreign assistance for the purpose of influencing election results. Is the Comelec using this law effectively? Is it proactively investigating, or is it just waiting for evidence to land in its lap? Are these provisions effective enough, or do they need amendments? What is Congress doing about this?

The law creating the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT), RA 10844, makes DICT responsible for policies promoting ICT use, the security of critical ICT infrastructure, privacy, and cybersecurity. Within that mandate, DICT can, and should be encouraged to, proactively strengthen public resilience against disinformation and sophisticated ICT-enabled influence operations through digital literacy, cybersecurity and privacy education, and public advisories.

How about the National Privacy Commission, the AMLC, and different law enforcement agencies? I can go on further, but my point is that we have tools at our disposal to fight for our national interest and promote national welfare amid these geopolitical dynamics. Where tools are inadequate, we can redirect resources or amend laws if necessary.

Defending the republic at home requires making our laws and institutions work effectively and creatively and making full use of their mandates to deal with threats, external or internal.