The campaign that never was

MANILA, Philippines - “This election is ours to lose,” was the ironic statement of Danny Gozo, as he briefed me over coffee. Atty. Henry Gozon echoed the same sentiment, when he told Noy with a chuckle, “The only way you will lose is if you make major mistakes.” This wasn’t just cockeyed optimism.

An internal survey done by Mercy Abad with field work in late August 2009 placed Noy at 54 percent, with a trajectory that could reach as high as 63 percent, and a deep commitment measured at 41 percent. In layman’s terms this means that 6 out of 10 Filipinos was inclined to vote for Noy, and a hardcore 4 out of 10 said they would surely vote for him. This is important because research has shown that 33 percent of the electorate will likely change their mind.

The triumvirate of Butch Abad, Cesar Purisima and Johnny Santos, all Hyatt 10 and ex-Mar men, convened the first Board meeting on Monday, September 14, 2009, only eight months before D-day. Shades of déjà vu! Nonetheless, the mood was buoyant and confident. It was to be a small group — just the committee heads and their deputies. Since there was no one else in the beginning, I was the “default deputy” or more accurately, the “Grand Alalay of JS ”. I was mandated to attend the Board meeting, every Monday, from 9 a.m. onwards.

One by one the board walked in. There were familiar faces, but there were also some surprising ones. I already knew Conrado de Quiros would attend. He considered himself the main proponent of the Noy for President initiative or NoyPi. He came prepared with his initial opinions on paper regarding how the campaign should unfold.

Joel Rocamora, Philip Juico, Dondon Paderanga, Mar Roxas and Cong. Abaya of the Liberal Party, Julia Abad, the incumbent chief-of-staff with some members of the Senate staff, and Noy’s former classmates and longtime friends were all present. The “small group” filled up two long dining cum conference tables.

Dinky Soliman, the designated head of what was called the non-conventional group (NCG) was still abroad winding down her NGO projects, to the relief of Conrad. From day one he was fulminating about Dinky’s alleged role in the Peace Bonds, his perennial bone to pick. Ballsy was the gracious host making sure everyone, including the drivers were fed.

Hmmm, I thought. This was going to be really different from the two previous Presidential races that we were involved in. In the political machinery of Fidel Ramos in 1992 and Raul Roco in 2004, the meetings were confined only to the committee that one belonged to. FVR delegated the campaign to his able lieutenants while Raul Roco was the one-man head of finance, communications and strategy/tactics committees. In both cases, there was a clearly delineated organigram and all knew who had final approval.

Noy’s campaign organization, on the other hand, was a free wheeling rendition of a “people’s campaign” supposedly inspired by the successful Obama bid. This seamless formula had become the gold standard of both the bona fide and wannabe political strategists. It seemed like everyone read the same books about the much-touted “perfect execution” but implemented bizarre imitations.

 An organizational structure was presented. To understand what all the boxes stood for, you had to bend your head to the left and to the right. It was immediately apparent that there would be a structural struggle, not to mention a human one. That was the understatement of the year. The configuration had a basic flaw. Nobody knew who was the final decision maker. Media picked up the scent of blood right away, writing about every rift, spat and quarrel inside the campaign. And did they have a lot to report.

As the campaign was off to a shaky start, the cracks were quickly exposed and “fault lines” began to widen. Even as recruitment of talent was in full swing, it was clear that this was to be a “people’s campaign”. The problem was no one knew exactly how to execute. The “People Power Volunteers” assumed it meant they were the prime movers. But NCG was hobbled by infighting among the groups and pressure from the Liberal Party that wanted to tackle the “pragmatic” issues such as alliances, national and local slates, face time with power blocs etc.

Meanwhile at OK Corral, duels were everyday occurrences. Conrad had declared that Noy should not use ads to differentiate him from Villar. He maintained that our candidate should rely primarily on editorial content, people power and the message of EDSA. How? When the guideline for equal coverage was being strictly followed on the one hand, and columnists/broadcasters were being openly “incentivized” on the other, dependence on editorial content was a quixotic mission. But there was feeble protest on this rather antediluvian stand because the rock star of opinion writers had spoken. No one wanted to be excoriated in his column.

Financial anxieties [since pledges were still OPM - Oh Promise Me and an adviser had convinced the Sisters that most of the monies should be saved for election day], combined with some smugness, made Conrad’s position ex-cathedra. After all, Noy had an unprecedented 60 percent rating when the first SWS survey with his name, came out in late September. Kris Aquino and Boy Abunda disagreed, and produced their self-funded TV ads to ensure that Noy had some presence on TV, which remained the mass voter’s national medium.

Johnny Santos practiced shuttle diplomacy, meeting with all and sundry. In the end, ex-Roco people were tapped to man the Media Bureau, Enteng Romano was to head the New Media Bureau, Campaigns and Grey to work on the advertising campaign (assuming there was one). Maria Montelibano was supposed to be in charge of Events, her forte as a former TV director. But as it turned out, this was never formalized. Cesar Purisima ordered all committees to submit their budgets because according to him, a donor was willing to cover the operating costs of the campaign. All complied.

Butch Abad was busy putting out fires. Turf issues, finger pointing, accusations of incompetence and juggling schedules and egos consumed precious time. Rumors were raging. The triumvirate was supposedly banished from Mar’s campaign with accusations of betrayal. There were whispers of how the senior Mrs. Roxas and the would-be Mrs. Roxas plus other family members confronted the three to verify their doubts.

Two versions of why Mar suddenly withdrew from the presidential race were circulating. One was that Mar could not stand the mounting clamor for Noy to run and was hurting at the daily endorsements and defections from his camp; another claimed Noy asked for it and threatened to bolt from LP if he wasn’t proclaimed the standard bearer.

I wasn’t spared. Early on, I was warned that Mar was allegedly “uncomfortable” because I came from the Chiz camp (which he denied later). It was a toxic environment with everyone trying to outshine, out voice, out maneuver everyone else. I wondered if I was the only one not jockeying for a position — the spoils of a victory that everyone assumed — forgetting we had to win first.

In this setting it made good sense for the Sisters to make their own arrangements. They quietly covered the countryside without media hype. In the midst of the floundering campaign, Butch Abad confessed with characteristic self-deprecating humor, that he wasn’t an “organization man” and his strength lay in “people skills”.

The result was alarming. I tagged along in one sortie to observe our principal up close. After a hotel mix-up in Cebu, the advance team   apprised me of the Bohol bedlam. The governor that Noy was supposed to meet was in Manila; the Bishop sent his antagonistic representative who quizzed him on his stand on the RH Bill; and the schools he was supposed to visit were having their final exams. To save the day, Noy was asked to shake hands with the market vendors.

The next surveys confirmed the soft underbelly of the campaign.

 (More next Saturday)