Peace in Mindanao: No other option

It’s easy to argue that renewed fighting between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines since the breakdown of the formal peace process in August last year means there is little chance of a peace deal between the two sides. The Philippine Supreme Court’s challenge to the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain that was on the point of formal agreement at a signing ceremony in Kuala Lumpur last August delivered a body blow to the eight-year old peace process, facilitated by Malaysia.

But this alarmist view ignores genuine efforts on both sides since then to restart the process.

During a recent visit to the Philippines, two key negotiators of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, Jonathan Powell, former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Chief of Staff and Gerry Kelly of Sinn Fein, heard from representatives of the Philippine government and the MILF leadership a common desire to renew stalled peace talks. After months of renewed fighting, both parties recognize that the conflict can only be solved through negotiations, not armed force.

Of course, overcoming the mistrust, disappointment and cynicism generated by last year’s collapse will be challenging.

In August 2008 hopes were raised in Mindanao and throughout the Philippines that an end to the decades’ long conflict appeared close at hand. Both parties had come up with a breakthrough accord, the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which would have paved the way for a final agreement. However, the day before the signing ceremony, the Philippine Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order preventing the Government delegation from signing the agreement. Widespread fighting immediately broke out displacing as many 500,000 persons. Soon thereafter, the MOA-AD was struck down by the Supreme Court as ‘unconstitutional’.

In response to criticism of its handling of the peace process, the Government disavowed its commitment to the MOA-AD, disbanded its peace panel and launched operations against three so called ‘rogue’ commanders of the MILF they considered responsible for the fighting. A new paradigm was declared in which new talks were to be based on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and would not begin until the three ‘rogue’ MILF commanders were apprehended. The MILF in turn insisted that the Government must sign the MOA-AD and end its operations against the three MILF commanders.

However, after five months of futile fighting and fruitless rhetoric, both parties have now sent signals they are prepared to return to the negotiating table. The Government recently formed a new peace panel headed by a respected senior diplomat and agreed to restart talks without preconditions. The MILF has demanded that new talks must involve additional international guarantors; the status of the MOA-AD be resolved; the International Monitoring Team (IMT) lead an investigation into all violations of the ceasefire; the government end its offensive in Mindanao; and Malaysia remain as facilitator. Crucially, the Government has not explicitly opposed these conditions and just lately the MILF has signalled a degree of flexibility on them. 

None of this means there is no chance for a peace deal. In addition, never before has the international community been so focused on supporting a return to the negotiating table. Nonetheless, it won’t be easy.

Trust has broken down, the administration in Manila does have limited political capital to expend, Presidential elections are looming, fighting continues, and the Supreme Court’s decision may limit the maneuverability of the Government’s peace panel.

These are not insurmountable challenges. As Gerry Kelly of Sinn Fein said following his meeting with both parties, ‘from what I am hearing and from what I have read in the MOA-AD, clearly both parties are very close to an agreement’. And as Jonathan Powell observed, ‘the negotiations on Northern Ireland did not conclude until one month before the end of Prime Minister Blair’s term in office’ — a Prime Minister whom we recall also had little political capital towards the end of his time in office.

As both sides now prepare to return to the negotiating table, it is critical they initiate a new process that avoids the pitfalls of the past yet builds on its achievements. Based on the experience of other successful peace processes, in order to reach the finishing line, both parties will need to do the following ten things:

First, rebuild trust. Deploy confidence-building measures such as issuing encouraging statements or initiating unilateral measures that cost little but achieve much.

Second, create a new structure for the peace process, putting into place a mechanism that recognizes MILF concerns to have more international support but which also constructively provides expertise on troublesome issues.

Third, avoid preconditions the other side cannot meet.

Fourth, go above and beyond past achievements. Do not ignore or insist on previous agreements and accords but build on them, and perhaps consider crafting a streamlined final agreement that addresses all the concerns and aspirations of both parties.

Fifth, initiate discussions on key issues not previously addressed. Many issues such as the final status of the region, disposition of forces, and demilitarization of militias should not be put off.

Sixth, persevere. Regardless of the difficulties, do not let the process die and always keep channels of communication open.

Seventh, consider a two-track approach. Ensure there is one track to ensure key stakeholders are well informed and their views heard, and another, which conducts negotiations out of the limelight where parties are more prone to posturing than to negotiating. These two tracks can be reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive.

Eighth, demonstrate courage and commitment in overcoming the political constraints that will inevitably present themselves. Each party will need to support the other and not try to exploit divisions.

Ninth, demonstrate imagination in overcoming constitutional constraints. It is important to respect the procedures laid down in the Constitution but also recognize that chances are high that as with any separatist rebellion, an accord will probably require a new law amending the Constitution.

Tenth, ensure any new agreement may be implemented. Before the agreement is signed be sure to create a detailed plan with necessary backing from the local and international community to ensure there is as smooth a transition as possible.

Last week, the GRP announced it visited Malaysia and proposed restarting talks. It is now important we recognize our responsibility in encouraging the two parties, supporting the peace process and exercising patience. If the two parties recognize there is no other viable option besides talks, why shouldn’t we?

(David Gorman is the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue’s representative in Manila, where he has worked for the past four years with the Philippine government and the Moro movements to overcome the challenges in finding comprehensive peace in the region.)