Now that Sigaw ng Bayan and the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines are poised to file a formal petition before the Commission on Elections proposing a shift to a unicameral parliamentary system, the stage could be set for that long awaited review of Santiago by the Supreme Court.
We’ve been highlighting some of the analyses proffered by both the majority and the dissenters in both the original decision of Santiago and the motion for reconsideration which, as we’ve noted, was denied "with finality." But while the majority decision is the law in our jurisprudence, newly-appointed Supreme Court Justice Presbiterio Velasco stated the obvious when he said that decisions of the Court are always subject to review.
In general, judicial precedents are followed when the same legal point comes up again in subsequent litigation. But the rule of stare decisis is not cast in stone. This is especially true when the Supreme Court is sharply divided on a particular ruling, as it clearly was in Santiago vs. Comelec.
The Justice who changed his colors, like an honestly agonized chameleon, was Regino Hermosisima Jr. Although he counted himself among the majority in the original decision, he said in his separate opinion on the MR that he subsequently saw that there was "an equally compelling and valid rationale" to support the interpretation that R.A. No. 6735 was a substantial compliance by Congress with its constitutional duty to provide for the implementation of people’s initiative.
Upon a re-reading of the law, Justice Hermosisima now saw in it "the necessary minimum standards," the "basic and indispensable who’s, what’s, where’s, when’s and why’s in the matter of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution." The law, he added, didn’t have to "contain every conceivable detail." Thus, he voted to declare R.A. No. 6735 as adequately providing the legal basis for a people’s initiative.
There was this parting remark which the good Justice says he added "with extreme hesitation." While, he stressed, the "passionate call for the championing of the people’s right to control their political destiny demands a favorable response from this Court, it being the ultimate defender of the sovereignty of the people, this Court cannot be ultrapopulist as to indiscriminately stamp its imprimatur to each and every form of ‘people power’ activism albeit wanting in legal underpinnings."
But he noted: "Neither may this court, however, straitjacket a people’s momentum to charter their own political destiny by imposing its personal additional ingredients as to what makes a perfect statutory mixture, albeit the finished formulation of a simple, basic concoction that is R.A. No. 6735."
The other defector from the original eight in the original majority decision was Justice Justo Torres Jr. who submitted an "Inhibition" which, as we noted last time, was somewhat curious. He maintained that he had "spent a considerable length of time reading the Motion for Reconsideration" and found that it contained "substantial matters which if considered cannot be taken lightly" by the Court.
On the other hand, he also felt that the majority opinion was "equally founded on unassailable legal and jurisprudential premises which singly or collectively can stand the test of logic and reasoned judgment."
Justice Torres decided not to attempt to scrutinize the merits or demerits of the positions of both sides. Because the parties paid "fealty and homage to the Constitution as the final expression of the will of the sovereign people," he didn’t find himself "wholly free to participate in the resolution of the case in clear conscience." (Itals. ours)
He quoted the late Justice Conrado Sanchez who wrote in one case that "to disqualify or not to disqualify one’s self is a matter of conscience," as well as Mohandas Gandhi who said that "in matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place."
You would be excused your puzzlement at the above statements by Justice Torres. Neither would you be blamed for speculating that there might have been extraneous reasons for the evident agony of the Justice. Otherwise, the logic of his step is at the very least arguable. One would think that the difficulty of the case, as well as the cogency and weight of the opposing arguments would present a unique challenge which a jurist would eagerly embrace rather than shun. But, I suppose, the demands of personal conscience should be accorded great understanding and respect.
It’s in this light that I wonder whether the markedly ambiguous statements of Justice Reynato Puno in his separate opinion on the motion for reconsideration were meant to address these extraneous influences. According to him, the "core issue" in the case was "obscured mostly by non-legal arguments." But the "plain issue" was "whether the people should be given the opportunity to speak and decide on the need to amend the Constitution."
Further: "The voice of the people should be heard directly and a deaf ear should be given to those who will dictate their will on the people on the erroneous belief that they hold an exclusive franchise on righteousness. It should be underscored in scarlet that the Court is not pushing for any amendment to the Constitution."
Non-legal arguments? A franchise on righteousness? An inhibition by a Justice based on conscience? What’re we talking about here? Political pressure? I certainly hope not. The Court, I’m sure, knows full well that its own legitimacy and credibility are anchored precisely on its staunch determination to render rulings on the basis of law and not on the siren songs of politicians.