Maximizing the Philippines-Canada security partnership
Canada has undoubtedly risen as one of the most important security partners of the Philippines. This is a view that also strongly resonates in Filipino public opinion.
In just three years, both nations have significantly deepened and broadened their collaboration in capacity-building, interoperability and joint preparedness in the Indo-Pacific, at a time when China has been resolutely pursuing its revisionist and illegal activities in the West Philippine Sea.
When Ottawa unveiled its Indo-Pacific strategy in 2022, it endeavoured to improve its diplomatic, economic, political and defense footprint in the region. Recognizing the intricate security configuration of the Indo-Pacific, Canada sought to position itself not merely as an extension of the United States or the West but as an independent and stabilizing partner in the region.
At the operational level, this vision aligns with Canada's Operation HORIZON. This comprehensive military roadmap underscores Ottawa's commitment to working closely with like-minded partners across the maritime, land, air, cyber and space domains to uphold international law. This is vital for a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific.
One of the most notable results of Canada's Indo-Pacific outreach has been the growth of its security relations with the Philippines. As democracies strongly committed to international law, both nations are natural partners.
However, the current convergence of political perception and security priorities in Manila and Ottawa has served as a significant force multiplier in the bilateral relationship. At this point, Canada has illustrated its understanding of the Philippines' concerns. It has proven to be a trusted and committed partner in the Philippines' efforts to protect its waters from illegal coercion and revisionism.
In September 2023, the two navies held a joint sail activity in the West Philippine Sea. The following month, Ottawa and Manila signed a landmark agreement that gave the Philippines access to Canada’s satellite-based technology to detect dark vessels — that is, ships that turn off their automatic identification system (AIS).
This is increasingly vital for the Philippines in the face of regular and illegal activities from China’s maritime militia and coast guard ships that “go dark” in the Southeast Asian nation’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Canada has also regularly participated in multilateral maritime cooperative activities with the Philippines and other like-minded Indo-Pacific nations like Japan, the US, Australia and New Zealand. Such activities improve coordination and interoperability amid the growing insecurities surrounding the Indo-Pacific.
The Philippines and Canada have also moved to institutionalize their growing security partnership by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Defense Cooperation in January 2024. This entailed Ottawa's willingness to invest more in its defence collaboration with Manila through a forward-looking roadmap.
On Nov. 2, 2025, a bilateral milestone was reached with the signing of the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA), making it the first of such agreements that Canada has signed with any Indo-Pacific state. The SOVFA would not only streamline joint military preparedness activities but also catalyse a more robust Canadian participation in various exercises, such as the annual Balikatan. In fact, Canada is poised to become the third-largest participant in this year’s Balikatan exercise.
In February, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney launched the country’s first Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS). This roadmap aims to increase the revenues and exports of the Canadian defense industry, while also creating 125,000 new jobs over the next decade.
Although the DIS is a national agenda, it opens the door to cooperation with like-minded countries in areas such as diversifying arms sales, strengthening supply chain resilience and, possibly, joint production.
In the Indo-Pacific, the Philippines is a viable collaborator as the Southeast Asian nation is on track to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). This opens new opportunities for arms diversification in line with the emerging threats in the region. Along with Canada’s world-class cyber capacity, it would be useful to broaden the conversation to include other notable Canadian defence assets, such as the Twin Otter aircraft, whose reliability and performance align with the Philippines' defence needs.
Additionally, the Philippines, as the second-largest producer of nickel, also positions itself as a critical pillar of the critical mineral supply chain. As China tries to monopolize the market, this is an opportunity for both Manila and Ottawa to explore ways (including third-country partnerships) to secure this critical supply chain, which is vital for major defence-related industries like steel.
Furthermore, the Philippines and Canada can also explore other crucial areas of collaboration, such as joint production. This also aligns with the Philippines' Self-Reliant Defence Posture (SRDP) initiative. Having mutual stakes in each other's defence industrial base visions would increase the likelihood of a sustained, functional security partnership.
However, sustaining relations requires more than track 1-level dialogue. Fortunately, there has been a surge in both track 2 and track 1.5 dialogues between the nations, spearheaded by the Starbase Institute in the Philippines.
In less than a month, Stratbase has unveiled a series of dialogues in partnership with the Canadian Embassy in Manila and the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada, covering topics ranging from hybrid threats to defense industrialization. Such engagements support and supplement the positive trajectory in bilateral security relations.
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Don McLain Gill is a non-resident fellow at the Stratbase Institute. He is also an Indo-Pacific Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada and a lecturer at the Department of International Studies, De La Salle University.
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