Winning the air war: Countering China’s information manipulation strategy
The “air war” between Philippine Coast Guard Commodore Jay Tarriela and the Chinese Embassy’s deputy spokesman has dominated the social media space for the past few days.
The embassy’s attack on Tarriela was deliberate. He has been a target since assuming his role as Coast Guard spokesman on the West Philippine Sea (WPS). They waited for a trigger; in this case, a caricatured depiction of Xi Jinping used in one of his public dialogues.
Tarriela withstood repeated attacks through sheer will and with support from the security sector, political leaders from across the spectrum, civil society, and many Filipinos who back our position in the WPS. In the end, perhaps to deflect from the controversy it had stirred, the Chinese ambassador posted a photo of himself with the First Lady in what appeared to be a last-ditch attempt to reset the narrative.
We extoll Tarriela for his perseverance under extreme pressure, and quietly remind him whenever he succumbs to operational overreach in some of his impromptu spiels. But we should strongly call out the government for its lapses that led the Chinese embassy to conclude that Tarriela is its “single point of failure” in its counter-disinformation campaign. Tarriela’s current plight is a symptom of a lack of a “whole-of-government approach” in dealing with China, as we find government agencies either operating in siloes or too busy fighting for primacy in setting the policy and agenda on China and the WPS.
But the air war is just the tip of a very large and insidious iceberg. China’s “theory of victory” against the country rests on achieving any of the four conditions: (1) if they can disrupt the PH-US alliance and our partnerships with like-minded democracies, (2) if they can sow discord among fellow Filipinos within its society, (3) if they can create division within our government and its political leaders, and (4) if they can compel us to surrender to their demands for fear of escalating tension leading to conflict.
To succeed in any of those conditions, China employs different modalities that fall under what we now consider “foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI).” It is defined by the European External Action Service (EEAS) as “intentional, coordinated activities by foreign states or state-linked actors aimed at manipulating information to interfere with democratic processes, national security, and foreign policy.” This cover acts of disinformation, propaganda, and influence operations. However, it should be noted that Europe’s concept of FIMI is just an aspect of a broader United Front Work effort being undertaken by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
The International Republican Institute (IRI), a US-based think tank focused on studying Chinese political warfare, has developed a framework to describe the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) “Global Influence Strategy.” The IRI categorized them into three pillars of influence: political, economic, and information manipulation. Just focusing on the latter, IRI listed out the following tools and the tactics it employs for information manipulation:
- Online Information Warfare that involves the use of propaganda accounts to hide the true source of disinformation, employing bot networks to amplify the seeding of fake news in social media, the harassment of critics such as Tarriela, and the control of social media platforms and apps such as TikTok.
- Traditional Media that involves the sharing of pro-Chinese content in broadsheets through paid advertisements, training programs for local journalists in mainland China sponsored by the embassy, and the co-optation of Chinese-language media catering to the Filipino-Chinese community.
- Academic and Think Tanks, referring to the various Confucius Institutes established in Manila and in the nearby provinces. This front organization is supporting the sister school arrangements program in collaboration with Filipino-Chinese non-government organizations.
- Targeting the Diaspora of Filipino-Chinese communities and the various friendship associations in Binondo that are likely targets for co-optation for united front work activities in the country.
In a paper by the Ateneo Policy Center (APC), scholars studying Chinese political warfare and its national security implications proposed several countermeasures. To wit:
- Amendment of the pre-WW2 Anti-Espionage Law (Commonwealth Act No 616). The law is currently operative only in wartime, limiting the government’s ability to address the “insider threat” among Filipinos acting as agents of another country and foreign nationals who abuse our hospitality by engaging in espionage that threatens our security interests.
- Review of the unutilized Foreign Agent Registration Act of 1979. Once vetted and amended, it could regulate those who promote foreign interests in the Philippines.
- The passing of a Foreign Interference Law that would deal with the incidence of FIMI. The APC drafted two versions defining malign influence, setting sanctions, and strengthening societal resilience while safeguarding constitutional freedoms.
- Designation of a Counter-Political Warfare Coordinator from the National Security Adviser’s office.
- Review of the DILG Circular on Sister City Arrangements to extend oversight over transactions made by local government units and even government-owned corporations with Chinese provincial and city party officials.
- Follow up on the implementation of Section 24 of the Public Service Act or RA 11659, which is a provision designed to protect the country’s business and industry sector from toxic foreign direct investments.
But there is hope. On Feb. 5, 2026, the House Committee on National Defense and Security held an initial hearing on bills addressing foreign interference. House Bills 1068, 3219, 4214, 4887, 4890, and 7200 reflect many of the APC’s proposals, including a dedicated foreign interference law and a mechanism for a holistic national response Chinese-sponsored FIMI activities in the country.
Because we have fellow Filipino legislators espousing the Chinese narrative on the WPS and actively castigating our government officials for doing their jobs, we have a divided government. Unless we can make every critical stakeholder aware, capacitate key agencies to develop a response, and eventually turn the tide, then we hand over to Beijing an easy victory. As we ponder our current challenges now, 2028 looms over the horizon. Our national elections three years from now will be our eventual battleground on information manipulation.
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I will be speaking more about building public resilience against FIMI at a two-day conference entitled “Navigating Digital Crossroads: Advancing Cybersecurity and Democratic Resilience in the Indo- Pacific,” jointly organized by the Stratbase Institute and the Embassy of Canada in the Philippines. The conference will be on February 19 to 20.
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RADM Rommel Jude Ong is a non-resident fellow at the Stratbase Institute and professor of Praxis at the Ateneo School of Government. He retired in 2019 as vice commander of the Philippine Navy.
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