The trilateral Japan-Philippine-US security partnership: Quo vadis?

On April 11, 2024, the heads of state of Japan, the Philippines, and the US held their first-ever trilateral summit meeting. The summit ensured the regional security agenda was on top of the three leaders’ agenda.  

It was considered the first of its kind as Japan and the US strengthen their respective security relations with the Philippines; the three countries have worked to bring each other closer to deep and comprehensive trilateral security cooperation and build up what can be considered a collective capacity to address common regional security concerns—China maritime expansion in the South China Sea, and irredentist ambition against Taiwan. 

With Japan and the US strengthening their respective security relations with the Philippines, the three countries have worked to bring each other closer to deep and comprehensive trilateral security cooperation and build up what can be considered a collective capacity to address common regional security concerns.

Then Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida described the tripartite arrangement as a multilayered cooperation essential to bolstering a rules-based and open international order. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. described the trilateral security arrangement as a partnership, borne not out of convenience nor expediency but as a natural progression of deep relations and robust cooperation amongst three nations linked by profound respect for democracy, good governance, and the rule of law.” 

For his part, Former President Joseph Biden considered the trilateral arrangement as a means to reduce redundancies and coordination challenges in a bilateral security arrangement apparent in the hub-and-spokes system of the alliances the US formed separately with the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan at the onset of the Cold War in the early 1950s. 

The April 11 trilateral summit ensured the regional security agenda was on top of the three leaders’ agenda.  

The Japan-Philippine Reciprocal Access Agreement

An immediate result of the formation of the Japan-Philippine-US trilateral security partnership is strengthening the Philippine-Japan security partnership.

Three months after the formation of the Trilateral Japan-Philippine-US Security Partnership, on July 8, 2024, Japanese Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko and Defence Minister Kihara Minoru met their Filipino counterparts, Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrico Manalo and National Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro, for the Philippine-Japan 2 +2 Foreign and Defence Ministers Meeting.  

The four ministers discussed the security environment during the 2 +2 meetings. They exchanged views on regional issues, such as the East China Sea, the South China Sea, Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. They strongly called on the international community to voice the importance of maintaining and strengthening a free and open international order based on the rule of law. 

More significantly, the Philippines and Japan signed the Japan-Philippine Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) on the same day.  Like the Philippines’ Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Australia, the RAA provides the legal procedures for the cooperative security activities that the JSDF and the AFP conduct while the armed services of one country are visiting the other.

Thus, it defines the legal status of the visiting force during military exercises and Humanitarian Assistance and Risk Reduction (HADR) operations. The signing of the Japan-Philippine RAA indicates Tokyo’s recognition of Manila as a security partner situated at a strategic junction on the sea lanes and sharing its values and principles.  It also shows Japan’s intention further to promote security and defense cooperation with the Philippines to support peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

On Nov. 5, 2024, President Marcos ratified the agreement and submitted it to the Philippine Senate for concurrence under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. 

On December 17, through Senate Resolution No. 1248, the Philippine Senate concurred with President Marcos’ ratification of the RAA between Japan and the Philippines.  The senators unanimously approved the said resolution, which aims to strengthen the cooperation between the AFP and the JMSDF. 

Immediately, the AFP announced that the “RAA will bolster its maritime domain awareness capabilities through technology transfer, intelligence sharing and strenthen collaboration with Japan, a country with an advanced defence system.” 

The Philippine Navy spokesperson, Reard Admiral Roy Trinidad, also welcomed this development, as it was expected that the RAA would allow for closer cooperation between the PN and the JMSDF. More significantly, closer Philippine-Japan security cooperation, made possible by the 2024 RAA, engendered a solid and stable base of the trilateral Japan-Philippine-US security partnership.

This is because “trilateral security cooperation with Japan keeps the US engaged in the Indo-Pacific and allows the Philippines to reduce its dependence on and increase its bargaining power with the US.” 

Quo vadis?

However, this evolving and incipient trilateral security partnership faces three critical challenges.

The first is the institutional issue, as the three leaders’ joint vision statement is conspicuously silent on how this trilateral security partnership would take its institutional shape. This tripartite relationship could evolve into a formal, standardized security agreement or a loose, de facto trilateral security network.

However, the prospect of a formal security agreement among the three countries is currently not on the table.

Secondly, on whether this trilateral security arrangement might compete with or undermine the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Southeast Asia. This is because there is potential for the trilateral security arrangement to evolve either into an AUKUS-like strategic alliance or the QUAD-like functional multilateralism. 

Many ASEAN member states see these mini-laterals as threats to ASEAN and ASEAN-led Southeast Asian institutions. 

Third, the long-term viability of this trilateral security partnership depends on whether or not the current Trump administration will continue what his predecessor did in building up this trilateral security partnership. 

At this point in time, Manila and Tokyo should further strengthen their current bilateral security cooperation with the hope that the prospect of this trilateral security cooperation will keep the US engaged in Southeast Asia and maintain the continuity of its security and defense policies in the Indo-Pacific.  

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Dr. Renato De Castro is a trustee,  convenor and non-resident fellow of think tank Stratbase ADR Institute. He is also a distinguished full professor at the Department of International Studies at De La Salle University-Manila.