A war, short or long, can inevitably put nations of the world on the verge of a global economic catastrophe affecting business and lifestyle modes. Alan Stoga of Zemi Communications, a New York-based consultancy firm, believes that "If it goes forward, the whole universe will share in its cost, regardless of how many nation members of the United Nations voted for it. The true cost of the Iraq war will be measured not by its impact on the US budget alone but on the dollar, oil prices, asset value, and its further deteriorating effects on the already weak global economy expansion." It will be marked by slower growth, and perhaps even a recession in the US. This will mean a slower growth as well for countries like the Philippines that largely depend on the US economic engine to power everyone out of the slump and stagnation. And importantly, it will be gauged in financial markets that will become even more volatile and dysfunctional as investors run increasing risk.
Economic leaders project that the Iraqi war will be a messier struggle compared to the first Gulf War and the invasion of Afghanistan. They estimate it will lead to instability in other oil-rich Arab countries, which can definitely exacerbate the global downturn. Even countries that normally benefit from rising oil prices like Mexico and Indonesia can see much of the gains eroded by the drop in economic activity in the US, and the rest of the industrial world, as well as by further declines in international capital flows. With the foreseen negative economic, social and political impact of the war in Iraq, it will be, by any accounting, going to be an expensive endeavor.
Scanning local and international news and commentaries, the US appears dead serious about going to war to repulse Iraq’s aggression. It is bent on destroying its alleged weapons of mass destruction and is determined to remove its leadership to prevent it from perpetrating a new wave of belligerence in the future. This critical intent of the US has generated negative and positive responses from both its international and domestic publics. The most recent poll from the Pew Research Center reports that only 55 percent of Americans are generally in favor of a war with Iraq, down from 64 percent in August 2002. Beyond the blanket support and opposition figures, a recent Gallup Poll found that 60 percent of Americans think the US should give diplomatic efforts more time, while 25 percent believe that it ought to invade immediately.
The aims of said ad hoc group, she continues, are "a carbon copy of a typical corporate strategy." Very much like when a company discovers that it is losing market sales and shares due to a bad product, it immediately deploys its communications team to create PR programs and media-based campaigns that will correct its image in the public eye. The same mobilization of forces, Benzschawel maintains, is being used to whip the American public to align with the war agenda, even when the public opinion against it is mounting.
The Pew and Gallup research numbers, not to mention the increasing incidents of mass street protests have brought to light the weaknesses inherent in the White House’ "PR campaign for war." As if reading from a shrewd corporate "how to" manual, Benzschawel points out, "the administration has fallen back on its last line of defense: the spin game."
The developments in the purported Iraqi hostility have, without a doubt, put in the surface the vital roles of PR communications in times of war. Actions to be undertaken by the proponent would require careful handling and projection. J-Dam bombs might wipe out the nests of terrorists, havens of nuclear arms, or even a hostile government, but bombs alone will not prevent new terrorists and antagonistic governments from rising from the ashes.
Although Americans, Guineven stresses, recoil at the thought of the US engaging in propaganda, the fact is that managed strategic communication is a weapon of war. Joseph Goebells and Adolf Hitler’s Nazis proved that. The American efforts were a counterattack and attracted communication pioneers such as Carl Hovland, Harold Laswell, Paul Lazarsfeld and Wilbur Schramm. In addition to contributing to the war effort, their works led to the use of content analyses, focus group discussions and persuasion researches in the communication disciplines, as well as to the introduction of communications as a field of study and specialization in universities. A week after the bombing of Pearl Harbor for example, Schramm wrote to Archibald MacLeish, poet and then, US Librarian of Congress, saying: "Perhaps more than any previous war this is likely to be a war of communications."
The same could be said for the impending Iraqi war, or any war against terrorism. The public, Guineven contends, is being told that it will be a long struggle with considerable sacrifices. Plus, the opposition includes not only avowed terrorists, but also millions of people with no understanding of the American push, and as a result, an almost genetic hatred of its citizens and principles.
The second step is the activation of a government media agency that will move the communications initiatives. Guineven clearly refers to the re-establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA) together with its famous property, the Voice of America (VOA). He insists, "It is time to fix the fix and put these operations back in the nation’s arsenal where they can do the most good. There is a large part of the world that does not understand the USA. They are prone to believe the worst of us, and to follow those who want to harm us. Military strikes will not alter that situation and, in fact could exacerbate if it is used in isolation from other actions." Guineven emphasizes that with a communication arm like USIA, the government’s actuations can be projected with more efficiency and effectiveness.
Making people understand why America has to go to war is a tough job. At this point it sure needs to do a better job at making sure that citizens of the USA and the world are not confused as to what the Iraqi war is all about. But then again, no amount of PR wizardry can change the cold facts – when a bomb hits a school, a hospital, a home for the aged or a crowded residential neighborhood. Of course, the use of PR becomes even more of an impossibility when a bombing campaign sets in motion strings of violent upheavals, mass confusion, wanton destruction and large-scale starvation.
As syndicated columnist and book author Norman Solomon stresses, "If some people are confused about the Iraqi war, it may be because they remember the rationale for it: Killing thousands of civilians is unconscionable."