‘6 Americans monitored SAF raid’

MANILA, Philippines - Six Americans apparently monitored the police operation launched on Jan. 25 in Maguindanao to capture two top terrorists wanted by the government and the United States.

The Americans were with then Philippine National Police (PNP) Special Action Force chief Director Getulio Napeñas at his tactical command post (TCP) together with other senior SAF officers.

This is according to Superintendent Michael John Catindig Mangahis, who was in charge of monitoring the movement of at least eight SAF teams from Zamboanga City and other parts of Mindanao to Maguindanao in the evening of Jan. 24 until Jan. 25, when the operation was carried out.

The assault team, 84SAC (Special Action Company), killed suspected Malaysian terrorist Zulkifli bin Hir alias Marwan. However, their second target, Marwan’s Filipino deputy Basit Abdul Usman, escaped.

In a sworn statement taken by a PNP investigator, Mangahis said he was at the SAF TCP inside the headquarters of a SAF unit in Shariff Aguak town on the eve of the operation.

According to knowledgeable local officials, the location of the SAF unit’s headquarters was about 10 kilometers from the general area of the operation.

Asked who was with him at TCP, Mangahis said he saw Napeñas, the SAF chief’s deputy Supt. Noli Taliño, Supt. Richard dela Rosa, Supt. Abraham Abayari, Senior Insp. Lyndon Espe, a Police Officer 2 Belmes “and six American nationals.”

“Do you know these American nationals?” was the next question.

“I met them only at the TCP during the operation, but I do not know them. I saw them the following day as pilots of the helicopter that helped in evacuating our wounded personnel in the hospital,” he said.

Mangahis’ testimony gives credence to reports that US military officers, at the very least, helped SAF track down Marwan and monitored the operation in Mamasapano and the ensuing clashes of two SAF teams with guerrillas belonging to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and its breakaway faction, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF).

Marwan and Usman were on the most wanted list of suspected international terrorists of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The US offered $5 million for Marwan and $2 million for Usman for their capture dead or alive.

There were unverified reports that American officers flew drones to monitor the operation and that President Aquino, who was in Zamboanga City on Jan. 25, had access to real-time information on the progress of the SAF mission and the encounters.

The clashes left 44 SAF troopers, 18 guerrillas mostly belonging to the MILF and five civilians dead.

The assault team, 84SAC, lost nine of its 38 men while withdrawing when it encountered armed men belonging to BIFF. A second team, 55SAC, which was composed of 36 members, was to serve as blocking force. It was nearly wiped out when it clashed with MILF guerrillas. Only one team member survived.

Mangahis said under Oplan Exodus, the assault team, which was the lead group, was to move from its staging area in Suralla, Sultan Kudarat to its designated vehicle drop-off point (VDOP), then proceed by foot to its target.

It was to be followed by 55SAC – the blocking force – then by support and reinforcement groups composed of six companies – from the 41st to the 46th. Each company was made up of 41 to 45 men.

All eight teams and some other support personnel like drivers were given waypoints and the time at which they should be in their assigned places. Apparently, the objective was to position the operating units within short distances of each other so they could reinforce any embattled team if needed.

Waypoint 1 was their VDOP, from where the troopers would walk to their assigned positions. Waypoint 18 was 84SAC’s target area.

“However, 84SAC reached the target area at about 4 a.m. of Jan. 25, instead of 3 a.m. I also monitored over the radio that 55SAC noticed the presence of civilians while on their way to waypoint 12. They waited for the civilians to disappear before they could move. However, these people did not go away. They were unarmed at first, but later on, some of them were already armed and their number was growing,” Mangahis said.

Based on the accounts of other officers and survivors, 84SAC and 55SAC were delayed in reaching their assigned waypoints due to difficulty in crossing five rivers and canals. The delay had a domino effect on the support teams, which had to slow down in going to their designated positions.

At 5 a.m., Mangahis said he monitored over their radio network that 55SAC was already engaged in a firefight with MILF fighters.

At about this time, the assault team had killed Marwan and was withdrawing when it encountered BIFF guerillas.

Two hours later, Mangahis said Napeñas directed him to ask for reinforcement from the nearby 1st Mechanized Brigade of the Army, also located in Shariff Aguak.

“Upon arrival at the 1st Mechanized Brigade, I briefed Col. Gener del Rosario (brigade commander) on the operation and the current situation of the troops on the ground. I showed him the location of our SAF troopers using the map we brought along,” he said.

He said he and Del Rosario came up with two options: artillery or indirect fire support, and infantry and mechanized reinforcements.

Mangahis recalled that at 7:30 a.m., Taliño arrived at Del Rosario’s headquarters to follow up their request for reinforcement.

However, he said Taliño “was later informed that option 1 (artillery fire support) would not materialize because of the peace process (with the MILF).”

“Supt. Taliño and Col. del Rosario cannot do otherwise, so option 2 was put in place and at about 8 a.m. was assembled,” he said, referring to infantry and mechanized vehicle support.