Fred Lim at EDSA (Conclusion)

MANILA, Philippines - By Monday and Tuesday, EDSA had become a veritable human rampart – the Great Wall of Pinoy resistance: People Power!

But what was not known then is that it could have been aborted on the first two days of uprising. And what the other side didn’t know was that the foiled aborting was an “inside job” accomplished by its own G-men, headed by the police superintendent in charge of the EDSA area.

The inside job is the untold story of EDSA.

Edo Lim had to play such a sly game at EDSA (seeming ready to obey the orders to disperse the crowds there while making no move to do so) because he saw that EDSA could be saved only if he remained in command there.

“Had I betrayed myself to be on the side of the rebels, I would have been pulled out of EDSA and replaced with somebody really intent on clearing the highway. So I had to feign compliance when actually not complying at all. I had felt up and not down when President Marcos said on the phone that I failed him. But my cover was blown that Sunday night when General Ramos told the media on which side I stood. ‘General Lim has joined us,’ said Ramos told the newsmen, ‘he is supporting this revolt.’ The announcement appeared in Tempo on Monday morning.”

He had barely rested in his quarters at Sikatuna when he was ordered to meet with Gen. Victor Natividad at the corner of Boni Serrano and Katipunan Avenue at about six a.m. Monday, Feb. 24. The tanks that he and his men saw had been stopped by nuns praying the rosary and other brave souls. Now Lim learned they were to disperse the crowd. He went instead to the Quirino Labor Hospital. Then there was a series of gunfire, and the crowds were rushing towards the hospital where Lim was. He learned the teargas was thrown at the crowd to disperse them at Boni Serrano and Katipunan. He took his men to the place where he was met by Southern Police District commander General Escarcha.

Lim was told by Gen. Escarcha that they had been waiting for him at 6 in the morning, and because he was not around, he, Escarcha, was forced to disperse the crowd on orders of Gen. Natividad, who then arrived and asked Lim why he was not there that morning. Lim said he was at the Quirino Labor Hospital. He stayed at the command post at Logcom from 7 to 8 in the morning.

“I saw Col. Balbas, commander of the marine tanks, and Col. Barangan, Gen. Ver’s PSC deputy, who ordered Balbas to pre-position his tanks to blast at Crame. Balbas was giving orders and the tanks moved back and forth, moved right and left, like they were also dragging their chains, appearing to obey commands.

“Gen. Barangan called us to the Logcom building where he had his command post. Gen. Natividad was also ordered to be there. Gen. Barangan told us to proceed to Channel 4 because the security force there was being harassed by demonstrators and the trucks could not get out.

“I brought my 37 officers and men to Channel 4. Col. Dawis reported to me at the Country Chef restaurant that former LTO chief Col. Santiago Mariano was going to take Channel 4. Then Fr. Efren Datu of Veritas met me. He was with Col. Subia who saluted me and confirmed that Gen. Ramos had ordered them under Col. Mariano to take Channel 4.”

Lim and Col. Dawis agreed that since there was already an order from Gen. Ramos, they might as well return to Quezon City Police headquarters.

“Before noon of Monday, I was informed that Gen. Olivas had himself admitted at the Philippine Heart Center. I rushed to see him. He told me his blood pressure had shot up and he felt faint. I reported that I was ordered to disperse the crowd at Channel 4 but since there was already an order to Col. Mariano and his men to take Channel 4, we left them. Gen. Olivas seemed more concerned with his blood pressure.”

Then Lim got a radio message from Gen. Natividad ordering him to meet with him at his new command post, the Country Chef restaurant near Channel 4 where he was met by Gen. Escarcha, who said they have been looking for him all morning because he was to disperse the crowd at Channel 4. Escarcha had even caught a rebel with a carbine. Lim explained that he reported to Gen. Olivas at the Heart Center, that he could not possible disperse that large crowd.

Gen. Natividad arrived with Col. Ely Yorro, a godson and one of the military aides of the President. It was he, so Lim had learned, who had been trying to reach him and had even gone to Sikatuna with 12 soldiers in full battle gear. Now at the Country Chef he was not talking to Lim but kept looking at him. Lim thought: because I did not disperse the crowd when ordered.

Gen. Natividad now ordered that they retake Channel 4. He agreed to Lim’s suggestion that they first get the Channel 4 building plans in Quezon City. He sent one of his men to get the plans. Lim knew that the City Hall was closed, it would take a long time before the plans could be located and taken out, if ever.

While they were waiting, a Caloocan policemen whom Lim knew approached, saluted, told him that they already had taken Channel 4, adding that he was ordered by Col. Subia to report to him. Lim told the policeman to return to Channel 4 and they will talk later. The others, particularly Col. Yorro, could not have missed seeing that the policeman wore his Philippine flag patch upside down.

Gen. Natividad then was called to the phone. Lim suspected it was his brother, the late Assemblyman Teodulo Natividad, giving the General some advice.

The police officer sent to City Hall came back without the plans. It was late in the afternoon. Lim asked Gen. Natividad if he could go back to Sikatuna. Metrocom reinforcement from Bobby Ortega was coming from Bicutan, Gen. Natividad said. Lim’s suggestion that in the meantime they place a traffic officer was accepted. If Ortega came maybe they should send him back to Bicutan. They all left the place.

Back at his Sikatuna office, Lim got a call from Mitch Templo, telling him “Gen. Ramos said to tell you, Sir, that a reinforcement from Lipa Air Base was coming. Gen. Ramos requests that you allow them to bivouac at Sikatuna.”

Lim readily consented. It was already published in Tempo that Lim had joined the rebel forces. Lim took a nap. He was waiting for the Lipa Air Base rebels. But they did not come.

His sympathies already unmasked, he decided to strip to the altogether the following morning.

“On Tuesday, I assembled my officers and the police chiefs of the four towns and two cities under my command. ‘This is the hour of truth,’ I said to them, ‘and I want your honest opinion on my stand.’ Some voices yelled: ‘If it’s your stand, we support you.’ I bade them remember that they were involving not only themselves but also their families, since this was the nation’s total rebellion. And they chorused: ‘We and our families go, General, where you go!’ I thanked them for their trust in me. ‘And now,’ I continued, ‘here is my decision: to go to Camp Crame and present myself to Gen. Ramos. Those of you who are willing, follow me. Those who don’t want to are free to go where they please – and no hurt feelings.’ This was about 2 p.m. of Tuesday, Feb. 25, 1986, and of the over 40 officers present only two voices were raised in opposition.”

Then he called Gen. Cabrera and Yson informing them he was already taking his men inside Camp Crame at six o’clock.

When General Alfredo Lim entered Camp Crame at six o’clock that evening he was accompanied by all his men, including the two lone oppositors. Also joining the grand entrance (Lim had asked that the Metrocom gate on Boni Serrano be opened to admit them) were commander Cabrera of the Western Police District, and Commander Yson of the Eastern Police District, with their respective aides.

The police assemblage proceeded to headquarters, where Lim was amused, but not surprised, to find his boss, Gen. Olivas (with nary a sign of illness), and his aide Mitch Templo. Those two had been playing possum through the weekend, to escape being ordered to attack Camp Crame.

Presently, Gen. Fidel Ramos came down to welcome his police allies. Said he to them: “Gentlemen, thank you for coming here and supporting us. But during one of the crisis moments last Sunday, when the order to disperse was given, I contacted Fred Lim. And without much ado, he evaded that dispersal order. Fred, thank you very much. And thanks again to all of you, gentlemen.”

Lim felt all eyes turned towards him: he had told no one of that telephone talk with Ramos.

“And I never told Ramos that, when he called, I was still wondering who was kalaban and who was kakampi.

“That assembly at Crame was about six o’clock of Tuesday night, Feb. 25, 1986. I was still in Crame three hours later when the news came that Ferdinand Marcos had been helicoptered out of Malacañang, on his way to exile. The rebellion was victorious! Cory Aquino was President! The next day, we police commanders were asked to submit reports on our actuations during EDSA. Afterwards it was announced that being retained at their posts were: General Cabrera as commander of Western Police District; General Yson as commander of the Eastern Police District; and myself as commander of the Northern Police District. When all those EDSA heroes started cropping out, I just kept quiet, but I couldn’t help wondering what would have happened if I had swept EDSA clean that Sunday as ordered.”