As far as delivery systems are concerned, India has the Agni (Fire) series which has a range of 2,000 kilometers (kms) and a warhead with a payload of 1,000 kilograms (kg). They also have the Pritvi (Earth) series, which has ranges of 150 kms to 350 kms. They have a payload of 500 kg to 1000 kg. Then there is the Sagarika (Born on the Ocean) series, which have a range of 350 kms and is submarine-launched. These are all intended as tactical weapons.
On the Pakistani side, they have the Hatf (Armor) series, which has a range of up to 600 kms and warhead payloads of 250 kg to 500 kg. Then there is the Ghauri (named after an Afghan king), which has a range of 1,500 kms and a payload of 700 kg. They also have the Shaheen (Eagle) with a range of 600 kms to 750 kms and a warhead of 1,000 kg.
With a range of only about 350 kms, India’s short-range nuclear warheads could cover all of Pakistan’s territory. Almost the whole of China and the whole of Southeast Asia are within range of the Indian bomb. The Pakistani nuclear warhead capacity, in all its ranges, could cover most of India. Within minutes of each other, early warning systems don’t make sense in this case. They present grave danger of nuclear exchange considering the historical hatred of these countries with each other.
The research of the weapon systems of both countries started almost after independence from Great Britain in 1947 although important developments happened in the 1980s through the 1990s. For five decades there has been low-level war over Kashmir. So, primarily the bomb has been used to scare one another, although no one can tell what is ultimately going to happen.
There are indications that Canada assisted India in building the bomb. CANDU reactors (made in Canada) are the only commercially available nuclear reactors that produce both plutonium and tritium. India’s first nuclear explosion in 1974 used plutonium from a heavy water reactor that was a gift from the Canadian government.
"India’s ability to detonate nuclear devices was not developed in isolation," said Elizabeth May, executive director of the Sierra Club of Canada. "The government always wants to celebrate sales of nuclear technology, without facing responsibility."
Kristen Ostling, national coordinator of the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, pointed out that the technical assistance and reactor designs provided by Canada to India formed the basis of India’s nuclear industry and allowed it to develop a current "civilian capacity" to produce over 300 kg of plutonium annually. "Only 5 to 8 kg of plutonium is required to produced a nuclear bomb. The lessons learned in 1974 are obvious to any school child and should be obvious to the federal government in 1998. It has proved impossible to separate civilian nuclear power from its military applications," said Ostling. "All of Canada’s current and past customers for nuclear reactors have at one time or another pursued nuclear weapons programs."
On the other hand, Pakistan got help from the US and China. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a former prime minister of Pakistan, declared in 1965, "If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves – even go hungry – but we will get one of our own." It got the bomb through a global network of theft and espionage, and uncounted millions of dollars for Pakistan, one of the world’s poorest countries, to have the capacity to build and use the bomb. But it could not have happened without smuggled Chinese technology and contradictory shifts in US policy, according to present and former US officials.
China, a staunch ally of Pakistan, provided blueprints for the bomb, as well as highly enriched uranium, tritium, scientists and key components for a nuclear weapons production complex, among other crucial tools. Without China’s help, Pakistan’s bomb would not exist.
The United States provided Pakistani nuclear scientists with technical training from the 1950s to the 1970s. The US also turned a blind eye to the nuclear weapons program in the 1980s, because Pakistan was providing the crucial link in the CIA’s effort to smuggle billions of dollars of weapons to Afghan guerrillas then attempting to drive out Soviet invaders.
But why be concerned beyond the general level of disapproval over nuclear weapons involving major countries?
The Pakistani bomb has been hailed as a "Muslim bomb" and provides inspiration to Muslims everywhere. Nuclear proliferation among the big Muslim countries is a possibility. Under a militaristic-religious leadership in (including but not limited to) Muslim countries, the use of nuclear weapons is a distinct possibility. It is estimated that India has 55 to 110 nuclear explosives and Pakistan possesses 20 to 40 of the same. Mutual deterrence is the normal behavior expected here but religious extremism is possible and in fact evident already on both sides. Under the leadership of fundamentalist fanatics (under any religion), anything is possible, including the use of nuclear weapons.
ASEAN is in no present danger. The region has no major misunderstanding with either India or Pakistan. It is a far-fetched idea yet but Indonesia, being the largest Muslim country in the world, may someday be ambitious to develop the technology in pursuit of the proliferation of a Muslim bomb. Its first indicator is its withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty. In terms of being in clear and present danger, we, in the region, have yet to watch for the unfolding of this development.