There are now reports that the 40mm M203 grenades used by the SAF commandos in the firefight against MILF and BIFF were duds, meaning they did not explode. There is also no truth to the statement that the SAF commandos ran out of ammunition, which led to them being overrun and eventually executed. According to Supt. Raymund Train, the intelligence officer who led the thirty-eight commandos tasked to apprehend or kill Marwan and Usman, he instructed his men to have fire discipline and to shoot only when a clear target presented itself. But because the grenades failed to explode, and help or reinforcement did not arrive on time, they were eventually overrun. Had the grenades worked as they should have, the commandos would have held their positions until help arrived.
Defective equipment and ammunition isn't really new to our police and armed forces. I recall an encounter between the MILF, ASG and the Philippine Marines where the mortar rounds used by our soldiers were also duds. Several Marines were killed in the encounter, some even beheaded. If it is being stressed that all equipment and ammunition being given to the police and armed forces are thoroughly inspected, why do they fail at the times they are needed the most? Are they old inventory? If we still use Vietnam-era Huey helicopters, I wouldn't be surprised if we still have Vietnam-era ammunition and ordnance. Where were these defective ammunition manufactured? Here, the US? Can they be traced by batch so they can be properly discarded? It seems civilians have better equipment and ammunition than our forces in the field!
One can just speculate that if the grenades worked, they would not have been overrun, and there would not be forty-four dead SAF commandos. They would have retreated safely to where other SAF commandos were located. There wouldn't be Senate and House investigations. But I'm really wondering why these operational reports are only coming out now. Are there other aspects of this fiasco that the public does not yet know of? Just how bad was this operation? It obviously shows just how poor this operation was executed. If the reason for Gen. Napeñas and Purisima's decision not to inform the AFP, the Secretary of the DILG and the PNP OIC was because of operational security, can they honestly say they did the right thing, now that the whole operation is labeled a fiasco? Was it worth the lives of forty-four SAF commandos who could have survived had their equipment worked and reinforcements arrived? These are the questions that may never be answered, because a few people thought that keeping the mission to themselves was the right thing to do.
I wonder if they still sleep soundly at night.