No doubt about it, Game 2 of the NBA Finals should’ve gone to Orlando, not the Los Angeles Lakers, if only coach Stan Van Gundy didn’t leave the Magic’s fate in the hands of a rookie, Hedo Turkoglu defended Kobe Bryant most of the way instead of Mickael Pietrus or Courtney Lee, Rashard Lewis was more aggressive in staying on top of Lamar Odom and Dwight Howard looked to pass more than score against stifling double or triple teams.
Van Gundy blew it. The Magic could’ve levelled the series count at 1-all going to Orlando for Games 3, 4 and 5 but now, it’s a 0-2 hole that’s almost impossible to dig out of. Since the NBA instituted the 2-3-2 Finals format in 1985, 11 of 12 teams that opened a 2-0 lead went on to clinch with the only exception the Dallas Mavericks. In 2006, Dallas squandered a 2-0 cushion to lose four in a row to Miami.
In Game 2, the Magic had more rebounds, 44-35, more assists, 22-20 and more three-point makes, 10-5. What killed Orlando was its turnovers, 20 to the Lakers’ 12 and Los Angeles shot more accurately from the floor, .462 to .418, meaning the Magic’s defense wasn’t quite up to par.
Defending their Staples Center homecourt, the Lakers felt the sense of urgency to win more than Orlando and they did, 101-96. Coach Phil Jackson realized the importance of a 2-0 lead moving to Orlando and didn’t hold back in unleashing his big guns. Only seven Lakers logged at least 10 minutes with four – Bryant, Pau Gasol, Odom and Derek Fisher – playing at least 40. In contrast, there was more distribution of playing time with the Magic – nine had at least 10 minutes and only three, at least 40. The disparity meant Jackson went with his nucleus more than Van Gundy. Of course, it may be argued that Van Gundy’s hands were tied as some of his starters were in early foul trouble – still, the numbers showed when it came to crunch time, the Magic reliables weren’t available to play major minutes. Despite more minutes, the Magic’s relievers were outscored by the Lakers bench, 23-17.
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Before Game 2, I wrote in Sunday’s column that Turkoglu would be a more suitable defender against Bryant than either Lee or Pietrus. I also suggested sliding Lewis to No. 3, where he is more comfortable, and Turkoglu to No. 2 to create the match-up against Bryant. Marcin Gortat and Tony Battie could alternate at No. 4 as Howard’s caddy under the boards. Playing Gortat and Battie at No. 4 would mean sacrificing points for more defensive and rebounding presence. Another residual effect is it would take away Lee’s spot which is no big loss since Howard, Lewis and Turkoglu could still provide a triple threat on the floor. Turkoglu could play the point, too, depending on whom Van Gundy taps for the other guard spot – his options are J. J. Redick, Jameer Nelson, Rafer Alston and in case he’s forgotten, veteran Anthony Johnson.
Van Gundy used two Twin Towers combinations sporadically in Game 2, Howard with Gortat and Gortat with Battie. But instead of eliminating one guard from the unit on the court, Van Gundy sat down Lewis or Turkoglu – which defeated the purpose of the exercise. Van Gundy missed the whole point of playing two bigs because he didn’t stay with Lewis and Turkoglu together.
Turkoglu got the assignment to shadow Bryant only in the last two minutes of regulation and overtime. It was the Turk who blocked Bryant’s potential game-winner with 1.8 seconds left in regulation and held the Black Mamba to just a field goal in the five-minute extension. Surely, Van Gundy got the message loud and clear.
In the reverse match-up, Jackson was smart enough not to put Bryant on Turkoglu as an energy saver. Bryant took on Lee because Van Gundy’s combination was Howard at No. 5, Lewis at No. 4, Turkoglu at No. 3, Lee at No. 2 and Redick at No. 1. If Lewis slid down to No. 3 and Turkoglu to No. 2, Bryant would’ve been forced to play defense against the Turk.
Lee missed two shots in the last 12 seconds of regulation. Credit the Lakers defense for not allowing Howard, Lewis or Turkoglu a shot down the stretch. In the final play, time down to .6 of a second, Van Gundy went to Turkoglu for the inbound alley-oop to Lee. Going to a rookie with a crucial Finals game on the line was too big a gamble by Van Gundy and he paid dearly for it.
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Odom, as the Lakers sixth man, was the X-factor in Game 2, scoring 19 points on 8-of-9 from the floor and 3-of-4 free throws in 45 minutes. Lewis, struggling as a No. 4 defender, couldn’t guard Odom’s pants. Odom outscored the entire Orlando bench which delivered only 17 points. Lewis collected 34 points, 11 rebounds and seven assists but his effort went for naught.
Howard was slapped seven turnovers, his inability to extricate from double or triple teams evident. Howard, Lewis and Turkoglu were assessed 14 turnovers combined, two more than the entire L. A. squad.
Van Gundy still hasn’t found a way to check the Lakers’ pick-and-roll with Bryant and Gasol playing together. That move produced Gasol’s three-point play with 1:14 to go in overtime and it shoved the Lakers ahead, 97-91. The Lakers have been so successful in executing the pick-and-roll that they often stray from the triangle. If Van Gundy can’t figure out how to defend the pick-and-roll, he doesn’t deserve to be in the Finals.
Orlando is in another must-win situation in Game 3 this morning (Manila time). The Magic is hosting for the first time in the Finals and the Lakers are ready to spoil the party. In the playoffs, Orlando’s home record is 7-2 with the losses coming in Game 1 to Philadelphia, 100-98, and Game 2 to Boston, 95-94. It’s tough to beat Orlando on the Magic court but it’s tougher to beat the Lakers three in a row whether at home or on the road.
The Lakers’ playoff road record is 4-4 with wins coming in Game 4 over Utah, 108-94, Game 3 over Houston, 108-94, Game 3 over Denver, 103-97 and Game 6 over Denver, 119-92. Note that the Lakers’ average margin in road wins was 15.3 points, indicating a killer’s instinct to go for the jugular.